In evaluating the year of 2009 in Brazilian politics, this article focuses on what was the main political event of the year: the reform of Congress' Provisional Measures (MPVs) evaluation procedures. Through a very peculiar instrument of institutional reform, Michel Temer, President of the Chamber of Deputies, offered an alternative interpretation for the existing rule regarding the blockage of the legislative agenda (sobrestamento de pauta) by Provisional Measures. The new interpretation, also partially backed by the Supreme Court, may have affected the Executive Branch's use of Provisional Measures dramatically, reducing its reliance on MPVs as a policy-making instrument. In order to test this hypothesis, the article examines the patterns of MPV use before and after President Temer's new interpretation, contrasting the years of 2008 and 2009. Empirical evidence indicates, albeit still in preliminary fashion, that the reform did affect the Executive Branch's Impetus to issue new Provisional Measures.

En su evaluación de la política brasileña en el 2009 este artículo se enfoca en lo que fue el principal suceso político del año: la reforma de los procedimientos de evaluación de las medidas provisionales del Congreso (MPV). Haciendo uso de un particular instrumento de reforma institucional, Michel Temer, presidente de la Cámara de Diputados, ofreció una interpretación alternativa de la ley existente en tomo al bloqueo de la agenda legislativa (sobrestamento de pauta) usando Medidas Provisionales. La nueva interpretación, parcialmente apoyada por la Corte Suprema, pudo haber afectado dramáticamente el uso por pane del Ejecutivo de Medidas Provisionales, reduciendo su dependencia en MPV como instrumento de toma de decisón política. Con el objetivo de probar esta hipótesis, el artículo examina el comportamiento en el uso de MPV antes y después de la nueva interpretación del presidente Temer, contrastando los dados de los años 2008 y 2009. Las evidencias empíricas indican que, aun estando en sus inicios, la reforma sí afecta el ímpetu del Ejecutivo en su uso de Medidas Provisionales.

This article compares the determinants of electoral success in two consecutive Brazilian legislative elections, 1998 and 2002. There is a clear difference between both periods that renders the comparison especially interesting. In 1998 the incumbent president was running for reelection whereas in 2002 it was an open seat contest. We hypothesize that in 1998 the proximity of the Federal Deputy with the president and the allocation of federal monies controlled by the Executive Branch played a more significant role in affecting reelection success than in 2002. Hence, if the President is himself running for reelection is an important intervening contextual variable in understanding reelection success of Federal Deputies.

Este artículo describe las principales características de las elecciones presidenciales de 2006 en Brasil. El artículo explora las dos características definitorias de esta elección: la interrelación entre cómo el voto económico retrospectivo y las visiones sobre la corrupción afectaron la volatilidad del voto y el resultado final de la elección. El artículo concluye señalando las implicaciones de las elecciones para el fortalecimiento de la democracia brasilera.

The paper describes the main characteristics of the 2006 Brazilian Presidential elections. It explores two defining traits of this elections: the interplay between how retrospective economic voting and views towards corruption affected vote volatility and the final result of the election.The paper concludes by pointing out implications of the current elections to the strengthening of democracy in Brazil.

RESUMO O principal objetivo do trabalho é testar um modelo que explique a variação na razão de gastos com pessoal nos estados brasileiros de 1965 a 1994. As variáveis independentes incluem indicadores do ambiente político nos estados distintos, como número de veto jogadores e nível de competição política. Além disso, variáveis que modelam o ciclo eleitoral empresarial e mudanças institucionais durante o período também foram incluídas no modelo. Os dados orçamentários, eleitorais e legislativos foram coletados para 22 estados de 1965 a 1995. A regressão OLS com erros-padrão corrigidos em painel foi usada para testar as principais hipóteses. Os resultados indicam que o impacto das variáveis políticas parece estar condicionado pelo quadro institucional nacional mais amplo. Durante o período autoritário, os gastos com pessoal foram influenciados pelo ciclo de negócios eleitoral e pela presença de mais de um partido na legislatura estadual. No período democrático, a vulnerabilidade eleitoral dos legisladores estaduais e o ciclo eleitoral são os fatores políticos mais importantes que influenciam os gastos com pessoal.

ABSTRACT The main purpose of the paper is to test a model that explains variation in the ratio of expenditure with personnel in Brazilian states from 1965 to 1994. The independent variables include indicators of the political environment in the distinct states, such as number of veto players and level of political competition. Furthermore, variables that model the business electoral cycle and institutional changes during the period were also included in the model. The budgetary, electoral and legislative data were collected for 22 states from 1965 to 1995. OLS Regression with panel corrected standard errors was used to test the main hypotheses. Results indicate that the impact of political variables appears to be conditioned by the broader national institutional framework. During the authoritarian period expenditures with personnel were influenced by the electoral business cycle and by the presence of more than one party in the state legislature. In the democratic period, electoral vulnerability of state legislators and the electoral cycle are the most important political factors influencing expenditures with personnel.