Abstract The political and economic crises that ravaged Brazil in the last years of Dilma Rousseff’s government resulted in a substantial drop in voters’ trust in the central government (57.10% in 2013 to 13.35% in 2018). This article investigates the impact of this phenomenon on voters’ attitude toward the distribution of power across government levels in Brazil. Based on two original nationally representative surveys, we show that the reduction of voters’ trust in the central government did not lead to an increase in decentralist attitudes, which is counter-intuitive and different from the trends observed in the United States. However, the trust crisis which worsened along these years significantly changed the importance of trust as a predictor of centralist attitudes. These results show that the public opinion about the federation does not oppose the current level of centralization in Brazil and alert to the importance of trust shocks to understand its role in the formation of opinions about centralist attitudes.

Resumen Las crisis política y económica que afectaron a Brasil en los últimos años del gobierno Dilma, implicaron una caída sustancial en los niveles de confianza en el gobierno central. Estos niveles pasaron de 57,10% en 2013, con Dilma Rousseff (PT) como presidenta, a 13,35% en 2018. Este artículo investiga el impacto de ese fenómeno sobre las actitudes de los electores en relación con la distribución de poder entre los niveles de gobierno en Brasil. A partir de dos encuestas inéditas con representatividad nacional, mostramos que la menor confianza en el gobierno central redujo el apoyo al aumento del poder de la Unión en la federación brasilera, pero, de forma contraintuitiva, no implicó un crecimiento de actitudes descentralistas, a diferencia del caso norteamericano. La crisis de confianza en el gobierno central que se instaló entre esos dos puntos en el tiempo cambió significativamente la importancia de la confianza como un factor predictivo de actitudes centralistas. En conjunto, estos resultados muestran que la opinión pública sobre la federación no se opone al nivel de centralización existente en Brasil y también resaltan la importancia de los choques de confianza para entender cómo esta última afecta la formación de actitudes centralistas.

Résumé Les crises politiques et économiques qui ont frappé le Brésil lors des dernières années du gouvernement Dilma ont entraîné une baisse substantielle des niveaux de confiance dans le gouvernement central. Ces niveaux sont passés de 57,10 % en 2013, sous la présidence de Dilma Rousseff (Parti des Travailleurs), à 13,35 % en 2018. Cet article examine l’impact de ce phénomène sur les attitudes des électeurs à l’égard de la répartition du pouvoir entre les différents niveaux de gouvernement au Brésil. Sur la base de deux enquêtes inédites à représentativité nationale, nous montrons que la baisse de confiance dans le gouvernement central a réduit le soutien à un renforcement du pouvoir de l’Union dans la fédération brésilienne, mais, de manière contre-intuitive, n’a pas entraîné une croissance des attitudes décentralisatrices, contrairement à ce qui a été constaté dans le cas américain. La crise de confiance dans le gouvernement central qui s’est installée entre ces deux points dans le temps a considérablement modifié l’importance de la confiance en tant que facteur prédictif des attitudes centralisatrices. Dans l’ensemble, ces résultats montrent que l’opinion publique sur la fédération ne s’oppose pas au niveau de centralisation existant au Brésil, et soulignent également l’importance des chocs de confiance pour comprendre comment ce dernier affecte la formation des attitudes centralisatrices.

Resumo As crises política e econômica que assolaram o Brasil nos últimos anos do governo Dilma resultaram em uma queda substancial nos níveis de confiança no governo central. Estes caíram de 57,10% em 2013, com Dilma Rousseff (PT) como presidente, para 13,35% em 2018. Este artigo investiga o impacto desse fenômeno sobre as atitudes dos eleitores em relação à distribuição de poder entre os níveis de governo no Brasil. Com base em dois surveys inéditos com representatividade nacional, mostramos que a queda de confiança no governo central reduziu o apoio ao aumento do poder da União na federação brasileira, mas, contraintuitivamente, não resultou em crescimento de atitudes descentralistas, em direção distinta da encontrada para o caso norte-americano. A crise de confiança no governo central que se instalou entre esses dois pontos no tempo mudou significativamente a importância da confiança como um fator preditivo de atitudes centralistas. Em conjunto, esses resultados mostram que a opinião pública sobre a federação não se opõe ao nível de centralização existente no Brasil, e também alertam para a importância dos choques de confiança para entendermos como esta última afeta a formação de atitudes centralistas.

RESUMO: Introdução: O artigo discute uma proposição empírica largamente difundida nos estudos sobre as formas de Estado, segundo a qual é possível operar analiticamente com a distinção binária entre Estados federativos e unitários. A distinção foi formulada por Arend Lipjhart, para quem Estados federativos e unitários poderiam ser adotados como proxies de atributos institucionais de, respectivamente, regimes de dispersão e de concentração de autoridade. A formulação, entretanto, tem sido contestada por estudos empíricos, em geral concentrados nas democracias europeias. Este artigo se concentra na análise dos Estados latino-americanos com o objetivo de examinar se Estados federativos e unitários constituem clusters distintos de distribuição de autoridade política. Materiais e Métodos: O estudo adota duas categorias analíticas: self-rule (a extensão em que os Estados têm autoridade em seu próprio território) e shared-rule (a extensão em que os Estados participam das decisões nacionais). Para testar empiricamente esses conceitos, a categoria self-rule foi desdobrada em quatro subcategorias analíticas: (i) o escopo de políticas atribuídas aos governos estaduais; (ii) a autoridade dos governos estaduais sobre seus próprios impostos; (iii) a autoridade dos governos estaduais para tomar empréstimos e (iv) as regras eleitorais para escolha dos governos estaduais. A categoria shared-rule também foi desdobrada em quatro subcategorias: (i) a simetria entre as duas câmaras; (ii) a regra de escolha dos senadores; (iii) o poder de veto dos Estados às regras de redistribuição de recursos e (iv) a rigidez constitucional. Os Estados latino-americanos, federativos e unitários, foram observados, de modo a testar empiricamente se suas estruturas de governança correspondem a clusters distintos de instituições políticas. Resultados: A principal conclusão do trabalho é que, se examinados por suas características institucionais, Estados federativos e unitários da América Latina não são representativos de mundos distintos, característicos de estilos mutuamente excludentes de distribuição da autoridade política. A associação entre Estados federativos e regimes de dispersão de autoridade, de um lado, e Estados unitários e regimes de concentração de autoridade política, de outro, não é suficiente para interpretar o modo como operam os Estados latino-americanos. Discussão: O trabalho contribui para a literatura comparada sobre as formas de Estado demonstrando que a distinção analítica entre Estados federativos e unitários mais esconde do que revela. Isso significa que estudos futuros deverão adotar novas categorias institucionais para examinar o impacto das instituições estatais sobre a produção de políticas públicas e o bem-estar agregado.

ABSTRACT Introduction: The article examines an empirical proposition widely disseminated in studies about the forms of state, according to which it is possible to operate analytically with the binary distinction between federal and unitary states. The distinction was formulated by Arend Lipjhart, for whom federal and unitary states could be adopted as proxies for institutional attributes of, respectively, regimes of dispersion and concentration of authority. The formulation, however, has been challenged by empirical studies, generally focused on European democracies. This article focuses on the analysis of Latin American states in order to examine whether federal and unitary states constitute distinct clusters of distribution of political authority. Material and Methods: The study adopts two analytical categories: self-rule (the extent to which states have authority on their own territory) and shared-rule (the extent to which states participate in national decisions). In order to empirically test these concepts, the self-rule category was divided into four analytical subcategories: (i) the scope of policies attributed to state governments; (ii) the authority of state governments over their own taxes; (iii) the authority of state governments to borrow and (iv) electoral rules for choosing state governments. The shared-rule category was also divided into four subcategories: (v) the symmetry between the two chambers; (vi) the rule for choosing senators; (vii) the veto powers of senators to the rules of federal revenue distribution and (viii) constitutional rigidity. Latin American states, both federal and unitary, were observed, in order to empirically test whether their governance structures correspond to distinct clusters of political institutions: Results: The main conclusion is that, if examined by their institutional characteristics, federal and unitary states in Latin America are not representative of different worlds, characteristic of mutually exclusive styles of distribution of political authority. The association between federal states and regimes of authority dispersion, on the one hand, and unitary states and regimes of authority concentration, on the other, is not sufficient to interpret the way in which Latin America states operate. Discussion: The article intends to make a contribution to the comparative literature on the forms of state, by demonstrating that the analytical distinction between federal and unitary states, hides more than it reveals. This means that future studies should adopt new institutional categories to examine the impact of state institutions on the production of public policies and on aggregate well-being.

RESUMO A Constituição Federal (CF) de 1988 representou o resultado de uma bem-sucedida transição democrática inclusiva, pela qual mudanças paradigmáticas nas políticas sociais produziram a inclusão dos outsiders, mecanismo este que não apenas reduziu desigualdades como operou como um contrapeso aos efeitos da crise econômica. Por outro lado, a CF 88 também desenhou uma política tributária regressiva. Buscar o equilíbrio fiscal não requer desfazer as políticas inclusivas.

ABSTRACT The 1988 Federal Constitution (FC) concluded a successful inclusive democratic transition, where paradigmatic shifts in social policies produced the inclusion of outsiders, a mechanism that not only reduced inequalities but also operated as a counterweight to the effects of the economic crisis. On the other hand, the FC 88 also designed a regressive tax policy. Striving for fiscal balance does not require breaking down inclusive policies.

O artigo examina a trajetória da desigualdade econômica no Brasil no período democrático contemporâneo. Demonstra que esta foi substancialmente reduzida por um mecanismo de inclusão dos outsiders. A trajetória desse mecanismo é descrita como tendo compreendido duas fases: (i) mudanças paradigmáticas no desenho das políticas sociais brasileiras, que produziam grande divisão entre insiders e outsiders desde os anos 1930, foram introduzidas na transição para a democracia; (ii) sob o sufrágio universal, partidos de esquerda e conservadores convergiram em torno das preferências dos beneficiários dessas políticas, a saber, política do salário mínimo, de saúde e de educação. Esses resultados desafiam o poder explicativo da teoria do eleitor mediano e da força parlamentar da esquerda. Em vez, indicam que mudanças exógenas ao sistema de políticas sociais introduziram políticas redistributivas sob uma conjuntura crítica, as quais, por sua vez, deram origem a mudanças endógenas, nas quais a competição política jogou papel central.

This article examines the path of economic inequality in Brazil under the current democratic period. It demonstrates that a mechanism of inclusion of outsiders sharply reduced economic inequality. The path of such mechanism is described as being deployed through two sequential phases: (i) in the transition to democracy, the introduction of paradigmatic changes in the model of Brazilian social policies, which had produced a big divide between insiders and outsiders since the 30s; (ii) under universal suffrage, the convergence of conservative and left-wing parties around the preferences of the beneficiaries of those policies, namely minimum wage as well as education and health policies. Such research results challenge the explanatory power of the median voter and the power of the theories of the Left. Instead, they suggest that exogenous changes introduced redistributive policies under a critical juncture, which in turn have given place to endogenous changes in which political competition played a key role.

L’article examine la trajectoire de l’inégalité économique au Brésil dans la période démocratique contemporaine. Il démontre que cette inégalité a été substantiellement réduite par un mécanisme d’inclusion des outsiders. La trajectoire de ce mécanisme est décrite comme étant composée par deux phases : (i) celle des changements paradigmatiques dans la conception des politiques sociales brésiliennes, qui ont produit une grande division entre les insiders et les outsiders depuis les années 1930 et qui ont été introduits dans la période de transition vers la démocratie ; (ii) celle sous le suffrage universel, quand les conservateurs et les partis de gauche ont convergé autour des préférences des bénéficiaires de ces politiques, plus précisement, la politique du salaire minimum, de la santé et de l’éducation. Ces résultats défient le pouvoir explicatif de la théorie de l’électeur médian et de la force parlementaire de gauche. Au contraire, ils indiquent que des changements exogènes au système des politiques sociales ont introduit des politiques de redistribution sous une conjoncture critique qui, à son tour, ont donné lieu à des changements endogènes dans lesquels la concurrence politique a joué un rôle central.

O artigo refuta o argumento de que o federalismo no Brasil enfraquece a União e favorece minorias sobrerrepresentadas no Congresso, mostrando que a regra de desproporção adotada no Brasil impede o veto da minoria sem que a maioria, por sua vez, tenha recursos para tiranizar a minoria. Além disto, a União tem amplos poderes legislativos, e os partidos inibem tendências inerentemente limitadoras do federalismo. Por fim, não é fato que a aprovação de matérias de interesse federativo exija aprovação em uma multiplicidade de arenas decisórias em que supermaiorias são necessárias. Em conjunto, as instituições do federalismo brasileiro aproximam o Brasil das fórmulas que favorecem a autoridade do governo central.

The article examines the proposition that Brazilian federalism is an extreme case of demos-constraining. It demonstrates that the Brazilian federal institutions - the upper chamber veto powers, the broad policy competences of the Union, the partisan parliamentary behavior of senators, the low requirements for plurality formation, and the malapportionement formula - do not constrain the demos. Instead, it favors the central government.

The article distinguishes federal states from bicameralism and mechanisms of territorial representation in order to examine the association of each with institutional change in 32 countries by using constitutional amendments as a proxy. It reveals that bicameralism tends to be a better predictor of constitutional stability than federalism. All of the bicameral cases that are associated with high rates of constitutional amendment are also federal states, including Brazil, India, Austria, and Malaysia. In order to explore the mechanisms explaining this unexpected outcome, the article also examines the voting behavior of Brazilian senators constitutional amendments proposals (CAPs). It shows that the Brazilian Senate is a partisan Chamber. The article concludes that regional influence over institutional change can be substantially reduced, even under symmetrical bicameralism in which the Senate acts as a second veto arena, when party discipline prevails over the cohesion of regional representation.

The study explores the relationship between federalism and territorial inequality, taking Brazil as the object of analysis. The conclusion is that there is a trade-off between territorial inequality reduction and the full autonomy of local governments. The central government's redistributive role seems to be a condition for reducing revenue inequality between jurisdictions, and so reducing inequality in citizens' access to public services requires the central government to perform redistributive and regulatory role. On the other hand, local autonomy pushes toward inequality. Hence, federal regulation and local autonomy are combined in a given polity, the result tends to be bound inequality.

Dans ce travail, on examine les relations entre fédéralisme et inégalité territoriale, le Brésil étant l'objet d'étude. On conclut qu'il y a un compromis entre la réduction des inégalités territoriales et la pleine autonomie des autorités locales. Le rôle redistributif du gouvernement central semble une condition pour réduire des inégalités interjuridictionnelles du revenu et, par conséquent, l'inégalité d'accès des citoyens aux services publics dans le cadre d'un état nation. En outre, le produit de l'autonomie local is inégalité. Donc, quand on trouve régulation fédérale et autonomie locale, le resultat le plus probable est que l'inégalité soit controlé au-dedans de certains intervalles.

The study explores the relationship between federalism and territorial inequality, taking Brazil as the object of analysis. The conclusion is that there is a trade-off between territorial inequality reduction and the full autonomy of local governments. The central government's redistributive role seems to be a condition for reducing revenue inequality between jurisdictions, and so reducing inequality in citizens' access to public services requires the central government to perform redistributive and regulatory role. On the other hand, local autonomy pushes toward inequality. Hence, federal regulation and local autonomy are combined in a given polity, the result tends to be bound inequality.

Dans ce travail, on examine les relations entre fédéralisme et inégalité territoriale, le Brésil étant l'objet d'étude. On conclut qu'il y a un compromis entre la réduction des inégalités territoriales et la pleine autonomie des autorités locales. Le rôle redistributif du gouvernement central semble une condition pour réduire des inégalités interjuridictionnelles du revenu et, par conséquent, l'inégalité d'accès des citoyens aux services publics dans le cadre d'un état nation. En outre, le produit de l'autonomie local is inégalité. Donc, quand on trouve régulation fédérale et autonomie locale, le resultat le plus probable est que l'inégalité soit controlé au-dedans de certains intervalles.

Abstract The article distinguishes federal states from bicameralism and mechanisms of territorial representation in order to examine the association of each with institutional change in 32 countries by using constitutional amendments as a proxy. It reveals that bicameralism tends to be a better predictor of constitutional stability than federalism. All of the bicameral cases that are associated with high rates of constitutional amendment are also federal states, including Brazil, India, Austria, and Malaysia. In order to explore the mechanisms explaining this unexpected outcome, the article also examines the voting behavior of Brazilian senators constitutional amendments proposals (CAPs). It shows that the Brazilian Senate is a partisan Chamber. The article concludes that regional influence over institutional change can be substantially reduced, even under symmetrical bicameralism in which the Senate acts as a second veto arena, when party discipline prevails over the cohesion of regional representation.

The article shows that the drafters of the 1988 Brazilian Constitution approved political institutions that combine broad jurisdictional authority to the Federal government along with limited institutional veto powers to subnational governments. The study has examined 59 initiatives of legislation addressing federal matters voted by the Chamber of Deputies from 1989 to 2006. The article explores how political institutions affect the decision-making process of federal issues, by distinguishing main actors´ preferences from federal institutions, controlled by presidential terms.

Dans cet article, on cherche à montrer que les responsables de la Constitution brésilienne de 1988 ont créé un modèle d'État federal qui associe une large autorité juridictionnelle à l'État central avec des possibilités institutionnelles assez limitées de veto aux gouvernements subnationaux. L'etude tien pour base l'examen des 59 initiatives en matière d'intérêt federal soumises au Congrès national de 1989 à 2006. On y examine les déterminants fédératifs du processus décisionnel, tout en faisant la distinction entre les préférences explicites des principaux acteurs et l'effet des institutions fédératives, contrôlées par mandat présidentiaux.

The article analyses the veto power of territorial governments in Brazil, by examining the parliamentary behaviour of state caucuses (bancadas) as well as their institutional veto opportunities when it comes to matters related to sub-national governments’ revenues and decision-making authority over their own taxes, policy responsibilities and expenditures. The " imposition of losses" upon territorial governments characterized legislative production during the 1989-2006 period, even though these decisions were intensely negotiated. The article concludes that the decision-making centralization at the central arenas, the absence of additional veto arenas and the ease with which constitutional amendments may be approved characterize decision-making on federal issues in Brazil. Furthermore, state caucuses (bancadas) do not act as collective players, since they vote divided along party lines. These institutional factors limit the veto power of territorial governments in Brazil.

Trata-se de um dossiê sobre método no estudo da política. São discutidas metodologias crescentemente utilizadas em período recente, enfocando-se inicialmente elementos relativos à ontologia da política, aos processos analisados e ao próprio estatuto explicativo das diferentes perspectivas. Posteriormente, são discutidos de maneira mais detalhada os avanços trazidos pela análise neoinstitucionalista, pelos estudos históricos, pela análise de redes sociais e pela antropologia da política.

This is a dossier on method in studying politics. Prevailing methodologies are discussed focusing initially on elements relating to political ontology, processes analyzed, and the very explicative statute of different perspectives. Afterwards, advances brought by neoinstitutionalist analysis, historical studies, social network studies, and political anthropology are more carefully discussed.

Il s’agit d’un dossier sur la méthode dans l’étude de la politique. Des méthodologies de plus en plus employées dans la période récente sont discutées. Nous nous attachons initialement aux éléments relatifs à l’ontologie de la politique, aux processus analysés et au propre statut explicatif des différentes perspectives. Postérieurement, nous abordons de manière plus détaillée les avancées dues à l’analyse néoinstitutionnaliste, par les études historiques, par l’analyse de réseaux sociaux et par l’anthropologie de la politique.

Abstract The article analyses the veto power of territorial governments in Brazil, by examining the parliamentary behaviour of state caucuses (bancadas) as well as their institutional veto opportunities when it comes to matters related to sub-national governments’ revenues and decision-making authority over their own taxes, policy responsibilities and expenditures. The “imposition of losses” upon territorial governments characterized legislative production during the 1989-2006 period, even though these decisions were intensely negotiated. The article concludes that the decision-making centralization at the central arenas, the absence of additional veto arenas and the ease with which constitutional amendments may be approved characterize decision-making on federal issues in Brazil. Furthermore, state caucuses (bancadas) do not act as collective players, since they vote divided along party lines. These institutional factors limit the veto power of territorial governments in Brazil.