Summary Our topic is a basic discussion of what it is to regard a bit of mathematics as referring to something physical, and the different options one has for explaining -and hence rendering non-miraculous- the empirical success of a mathematical formalism. In order to strip away as much extraneous distraction as possible, we will leave the particular case of the wavefunction in quantum theory aside and tell a simpler tale. A fairy tale, in fact. The aim is to foreground some possible relations between a mathematical formalism and the physical system it is used to represent.

Resumen Nuestro tema es una discusión básica de lo que es considerar que una porción de matemáticas se refiera a algo físico y las diferentes opciones que uno tiene para explicar -y por lo tanto hacer que no sea milagroso- el éxito empírico de un formalismo matemático. Para eliminar tanta distracción externa como sea posible, dejaremos a un lado el caso de la función de onda en la teoría cuántica y contaremos una historia más simple. Un cuento de hadas, de hecho. El objetivo es poner en primer plano algunas posibles relaciones entre un formalismo matemático y el sistema físico al que representamos con el formalismo.

ABSTRACT In “Temporal Passage and the ‘No Alternate Possibilities Argument’”, Jonathan Tallant takes up one objection based on the observation that if time passes at the rate of one second per second there is no other possible rate at which it could pass. The argument rests on the premise that if time passes at some rate then it could have passed at some other rate. Since no alternative rate seems to be coherent, one concludes that time cannot pass at all. The obvious weak point of the NAP is the premise itself.