Als filosofie "actualiteitsanalyse" wil zijn, moet zij niet alleen een kritische blik werpen op de eigen actualiteit, maar ook, en daartoe, op de mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden van een beschrijving en diagnose van die eigen tijd. Actualiteit is de werkelijkheid van "hier en nu". Maar wellicht kan dat "hier en nu" alleen dan doorzien worden op een manier die niet de vooroordelen van de eigen tijd en omgeving herhaalt, wanneer men afstand neemt van dat hier en nu. In dit artikel wordt die afstand ingenomen door Nietzsches beschrijving en duiding van het nihilisme weer te geven op een manier die de actualiteit daarvan suggereert. Wat hij in zijn 19de eeuw aankondigt als de geschiedenis van de komende twee eeuwen, lijkt inderdaad herkend te kunnen worden in onze tijd. Bovendien wordt de suggestie gedaan dat wat volgens Nietzsche een typisch Europees fenomeen is - hij spreekt van "het Europese nihilisme" - ook buiten Europa herkend kan worden. Waarschijnlijk moeten we afstand nemen, in ruimtelijke en in tijdelijke zin, om scherp naar onszelf te kunnen kijken. Zoals Nietzsche het ergens formuleert: "wie weten wil hoe hoog de torens van een stad zijn, verlaat die stad".

If philosophy claims to be an analysis of the here and now, it should also reflect on the preconditions of a description and diagnosis of the present. One of the challenges presented by such an analysis is the risk of repeating the prejudices of the present in the description thereof. In this article, I attempt to address this challenge by presenting Nietzsche's description and interpretation of nihilism in such a way that the topicality of that description comes to light. Nietzsche distinguishes at least three different stages or forms of nihilism. The first one is also called pessimism, or more precisely: the pessimism of the tragic Greeks. It is an awareness of the absurdity of life and reality without becoming completely befuddled by it. The history of European culture from Socrates up to Nietzsche's 19th century is the period in which a second form of nihilism emerges. Unable to affirm the absurdity of reality, people started to devalue it and to interpret it in the light of a truer reality. This ultimate reality was conceived as meaningful and intelligible, and it showed the reality of our sensual experience to be unreal, only apparent and contingent. This schema is nihilistic because it denies the reality of our sensual world. It was introduced first and foremost by Plato's philosophy and then "democratized" in Christianity. But it dominated all of European culture (science, morality, religion and art) for 2500 years. The third stage or form of nihilism is associated with "the death of God", i.e. the erosion and eventual demise of the core concept upholding the protective structure that was built by the second phase of nihilism. The death of God is what Nietzsche foresees as coming to pass in the two centuries to come. His theory of nihilism is a description of this future. It proves not to be too difficult to present Nietzsche's description of this future in such a way that we recognize our present. There are at least three reasons why Nietzsche calls nihilism a European phenomenon. Firstly, Europe represents a great plurality of cultures and peoples. This situation could lead to greatness if it manages to maintain the tension and conflict among all the different tendencies. It is more probable, however, that the conflict and tension will be wiped out and that the collected plurality will lapse into a weak and ugly mixture or into indifference. Secondly, nihilism is already present in the two main roots of European culture: Greece and Christianity. In Greek mythology we learn that the world only emerged out of chaos by violent acts, and Christian theology interpreted the Jewish creation myth as a creation out of nothing. Chaos and nothingness are more fundamental than order and meaning. The third reason for calling nihilism a European phenomenon has to do with the strength and success of the second phase of nihilism: it has become so established that its very foundations may be questioned, without risking discrediting it as such. That is also the reason why the death of God is hardly understood, and the least of all by those "who don't believe anymore". All three reasons seem not to be limited to European culture, or the scope of European culture seems to be much broader than the borders of the European continent. If Nietzsche's predictions are indeed applicable to our present conditions, and if therefore we can gain some insight into ourselves by looking in the mirror of this 19th century European philosopher, it suggests that temporal and spatial distance is needed for self-critique. Here we are reminded of Nietzsche's saying that "whoever wants to know how high the towers in a town are, [should] leave[.] the town."

Resumo Qual é a mensagem do sétimo capítulo de Para Além de Bem e Mal, intitulado 'Nossas Virtudes'? Inicialmente apresento uma análise da estrutura do capítulo (que parece ser o capítulo central da segunda metade do livro). Constata-se por meio desta análise que as seções 214 e 227 ocupam um lugar especial no capítulo. Uma análise detida destas duas seções sugere que neste capítulo o leitor é introduzido em uma condição tipicamente nietzschiana: o questionamento crítico da moralidade torna-se autorreferencial: aquele que questiona torna questionável o seu próprio questionamento. O mesmo procedimento adotado na seção 1 do primeiro capítulo em relação à filosofia e à vontade de verdade (tanto a vontade de verdade tradicional quanto a "nossa" própria) é adotado agora na segunda metade do livro em relação à "honestidade" ou "probidade" [Redlichkeit] e aplicado à moralidade (tanto a tradicional quanto a "nossa" virtude moral). O que no início parecia ser uma apresentação da virtude moral do espírito livre se revela agora como uma "autossupressão" da moralidade. Esta interpretação recebe uma elaboração e confirmação adicionais pela luz que ela permite lançar sobre as seções supostamente antifeministas que encerram o capítulo.

Abstract What is Nietzsche's message in the seventh chapter of Beyond Good and Evil: 'our virtues'? First an analysis of the structure of the chapter (which itself seems to be the central chapter of the second half of the whole book) is presented. From that analysis sections 214 and 227 appear to be of special importance. An analysis of mainly these two sections suggests that in this chapter the reader is being introduced into a typical Nietzschean condition: the critical questioning of morality is being made self-referential: the questioner makes his own questioning questionable. What Nietzsche did in section 1 of the first chapter with regard to philosophy and the will to truth (the traditional will to truth one as well as 'our' own), is now, in the second half of the book repeated with regard to 'honesty' or 'probity' [Redlichkeit] and so applied to morality (again: traditional, as well 'our' moral virtue). What in the beginning looks like being a presentation of the free spirit's moral virtue, turns out to be a 'self-liquidation' of morality. The interpretation is elaborated and confirmed by the clarifying light it sheds on the allegedly anti-feminist texts in the last part of the chapter.

A amizade ainda é possível em condições niilistas? Kant e Nietzsche são fases importantes na história da idealização de amizade, o que inevitavelmente conduz ao problema do niilismo. O próprio Nietzsche afirma que, por um lado, apenas algo como a amizade pode nos salvar em nossa condição niilista mas que, por outro, precisamente a amizade foi desmascarada e se tornou impossível baseada nas mesmas condições. Parece que estamos presos no paradoxo niilista de não nos ser permitido acreditar na possibilidade do que não podemos prescindir. A imaginação literária, desde o século XIX, parece nos tornar ainda mais céticos. Talvez Beckett forneça uma ilustração de uma maneira que se adapta bem à afirmação de Nietzsche de que apenas "os mais moderados, aqueles que não necessitam de quaisquer artigos extremos de fé", serão capazes de lidar com o niilismo.

Is friendship still possible under nihilistic conditions? Kant and Nietzsche are important stages in the history of the idealization of friendship, which leads inevitably to the problem of nihilism. Nietzsche himself claims on the one hand that only something like friendship can save us in our nihilistic condition, but on the other hand that precisely friendship has been unmasked and become impossible by these very conditions. It seems we are struck in the nihilistic paradox of not being allowed to believe in the possibility of what we cannot do without. Literary imagination since the 19th century seems to make us even more skeptical. Maybe Beckett provides an illustration of a way out that fits well to Nietzsche's claim that only "the most moderate, those who do not require any extreme articles of faith" will be able to cope with nihilism.

The term "nihilism" is often used as an invective to blame a person or a way of thinking. If used in that way there would be a simple opposition between "nihilism and morality"'. That opposition could maybe point to a practical problem, but certainly not to a theoretical one. If, however, we follow Fr. Nietzsche's analysis of what he calls "the European nihilism" we must conclude that morality is not so much the opposite of nihilism, but rather itself nihilistic. The inescapable nihilistic "catastrophe" (Nietzsche is never afraid of big words) arises as soon as morality discovers its own nihilistfeatures, which - according to him - is happening at present. The problem indicated in the title refers to the question what could be the result of this self-undermining discovery; and if morality survives - as it seems to be the case - how is this at all possible? In my elaboration ofthis problem I focus on a particular element ofour moral tradition. That tradition can in general be summarized in the three well-known ethical positions: utilitarianism or consequentialism, Kantianism or duty-ethics and eudaimonism or virtue-ethics. In the historical development of the latter, the introduction of Christianity in Western culture was responsible for some additional virtues that were strongly different from the Greek ones. These explicitly religious virtues seem - strangely enough - nevertheless to survive in our present secular context. The question how this survival is possible is being stressed in the article by describing our contemporary situation in the light of Nietzsche's analysis of nihilism. For Nietzsche "nihilism" refersfirst andforemost to the platonic-christian tradition in which reality is denied or "annihilated" through the fictitious construction of a "true world". This annihilated world can, however, also itself be called "nihilistic", in the sense that this world (this "reality" which is denied by the platonic construction) is characterized by chaos and absurdity. The event of the so-called "death of God" is the collapse of the imaginary construction of the Christian-platonic world. This event characterizes the present age according to Nietzsche. Literary imagination since the 19th century gives us a picture ofwhat it would mean to live in this situation. If we cannot live without morality, what would living under these nihilistic conditions mean? Nietzsche explains why nihilism is a catastrophe, but nevertheless, at least for the time being, remains unnoticed to most people. In a certain sense God seems to survive his own death: platonic philosophy survives in the sciences as Christian morality does in contemporary humanism. But this survival is only relative and temporal. Sooner or later, the catastrophe will break through. Although Nietzsche sometimes speaks of an overcoming of nihilism, he does not seem to be able to conceptualize what that would consist of. Nihilism is, according to him, the inevitable result of a process in which the platonic-Christian structure (most clearly in the form of its "will to truth") undermines itself. The philosopher who understands and describes or even promotes this process cannot get any further than becoming himself the incarnation of the problem that he describes. But Nietzsche's self-descriptions seem to show that this paradoxical or even contradictory identity of the philosopher has a positive reverse side. On the one hand it is the untolerable aporia of not being able to believe in those fictions that one needs in order to live. On the other hand, however, it appears as the continuing attachment to those values and virtues that were undermined. Maybe we can still adhere to even the Christian virtues in a kind of parasitic attitude.

Veelal wordt het begrip "nihilisme" gebruikt als een beschuldigende term, doelend op en gericht tegen mensen die "om geen God of gebod" lijken te geven, of met betrekking tot een cultuur of samenleving die goddeloos en immoreel zou zijn. Wanneer de term op die manier gebruikt wordt, bevat de tegenstelling "nihilisme en moraal" misschien een praktisch, maar zeker geen theoretisch probleem. Fr. Nietzsche presenteert een ander en rijker begrip van nihilisme. Volgens hem staat het nihilisme niet slechts tegenover de moraal, maar zit het erin. Die samenhang tussen moraal en nihilisme neemt niet weg dat de moraal door de ontwikkeling van het nihilisme ondermijnd wordt. De vraag van dit artikel is hoe dat kan: hoe kan moraal bestaan in het nihilisme en wat betekent dat voor de moraal? Om die vraag op de spits te drijven concentreer ik me op een expliciet christelijk aspect van de moraal, de zogenaamde christelijke deugden. Veelal wordt het begrip "nihilisme" gebruikt als een beschuldigende term, doelend op en gericht tegen mensen die "om geen God of gebod" lijken te geven, of met betrekking tot een cultuur of samenleving die goddeloos en immoreel zou zijn. Wanneer de term op die manier gebruikt wordt, is de titel van deze bijdrage een simpele tegenstelling, die misschien een praktisch, maar zeker geen theoretisch probleem bevat. In deze bijdrage wil ik - op geleide van Fr. Nietzsche - een ander begrip van "nihilisme" presenteren (§ 2). Nietzsche beweert dat de hedendaagse samenleving door en door nihilistisch is, en dat dat niet in tegenstelling staat tot haar koestering van morele overtuigingen en idealen, maar zich ook daarin juist uitdrukt. Die samenhang tussen moraal en nihilisme neemt niet weg dat de moraal door de ontwikkeling van het nihilisme ondermijnd wordt. Daardoor ontstaat de vraag waar het mij in deze bijdrage om gaat: niet hoe moraal zich opstelt tegenover het nihilisme, alsof het om twee partijen zou gaan die buiten en tegenover elkaar staan, maar hoe moraal kan bestaan in het nihilisme. Ik concentreer me daarbij op een bepaald en beperkt aspect van de moraal, een aspect waarin het probleem dat ik aan de orde wil stellen wel het scherpst tot uitdrukking komt. Het betreft een aspect dat sterker dan andere gebonden is aan de christelijke wortel¹ van de Westerse cultuur en moraal: de christelijke deugden (§ 1). Misschien vermag de filosofie niet veel meer dan problemen die doorgaans worden verborgen onder een deken van vanzelfsprekendheid en pragmatiek, zichtbaar te maken en ons bewust te maken van de problematische conditie waarin we verkeren. Niettemin wil ik (§ 3) een kleine suggestie doen voor de mogelijkheid van een ("christelijke") moraal onder nihilistische condities.

Este artigo apresenta o projeto do Nietzsche-Wörterbuch (NWB), uma obra de referência, de longo prazo e em vários volumes, sobre a linguagem de Nietzsche (e seus usos). O artigo oferece algumas informações sobre o projeto, enfatizando sua motivação na necessidade de um dicionário Nietzsche. Ele explica os princípios de trabalho e métodos, bem como a estrutura dos verbetes. Na última seção, é dado um exemplo dos resultados do dicionário, focando o conceito de Größe e sua relação com o projeto de Nietzsche de Umwertung¹.

This article presents the project of the Nietzsche-Wörterbuch (NWB), a long-term, multi-volume reference work on Nietzsches (use of) language. The article offers some background on the project, focusing on its motivation in the need for a Nietzsche dictionary. It explains the working principles and method, as well as the structure of the lemmata. In the last section, an example of the results of the dictionary work is given, focused the concept of Größe and its relation to Nietzsche's project of Umwertuung.

Quando Nietzsche é chamado de um filósofo radical, é (dentre outras razões) porque pretende pôr em questão o que outros pensadores tomam por certo. No artigo, concentro-me no modo pelo qual Nietzsche pergunta suas questões e em como elas (e o vocabulário que utiliza para expressá-las) se desenvolvem ao longo de seus escritos. O artigo aponta como Nietzsche gradativamente descobre suas questões adequadas e como essa busca atinge seu clímax por volta de 1886. Essa questão adequada se torna uma questão prática ou existencial: "Em que medida a verdade pode suportar a incorporação?" (FW/GC 110, KSA 3.471).

When Nietzsche is called a radical philosopher, it is (among other reasons) because he claims to put into question what other thinkers take for granted. In the article I concentrate on the way in which Nietzsche asks his questions, and how his questions (and the vocabulary which he uses to express his questions) develop through his writings. The article points out how Nietzsche gradually discovers his proper question and how this search reaches it climax around 1886. This proper question turns out to be a practical or existential one: "To what extent can truth endure incorporation?" (FW/GC 110 KSA 3.471).