Jair Bolsonaro and the Dominant Counterpublicity

This article focuses on the controversial and infamous behavior of Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro in the public sphere. Based on an understanding that there exists something specific in relation to his strategy of rhetorical mobilization and the discursive domination related to broader dynamics in the Brazilian public sphere, we seek to analyze here the use of what we consider to be a ‘dominant counterpublicity’.

rogressive sectors of Brazilian society have accompanied with horror the polemical declarations of Jair Bolsonaro and his followers, as well as the dissemination in the public debate of ideas related to a positive revaluation of the monarchy (overthrown in 1889) and the military dictatorship established in 1964, or even the refuse to pay taxes, 'gender ideology', and 'globalism'. To understand how determined ideas, which had previously circulated only in restricted circles, became routine in public debate, it is fundamental to take into account the contemporary dynamics which pervade the public sphere, especially the proliferation of 'counterpublics'.
This article focuses on the controversial and infamous behavior of Jair Bolsonaro in the public sphere. Based on an understanding that there exists something specific in relation to his strategy of rhetorical mobilization and the discursive domination related to broader dynamics in the Brazilian public sphere, we seek to analyze here the use of what we consider to be a 'dominant counterpublicity'. A paradoxical phenomenon which challenges our understandings.
In the first section of the article we make a brief review on the post-Habermasian debate on the public sphere, which produced studies on publics and counterpublics. In the second section we analyze the use of right-wing counterpublicity in Brazil, and, finally, in the third section, we show how the behavior of Bolsonaro and his supporters in the public sphere can be interpreted based on the idea of a dominant counterpublicity and the implications of this discursive strategy for democratic coexistence.

The post-Habermasian debate: publics and counterpublics
The concept of counterpublic was originally developed with the purpose of highlighting supposed insufficiencies in the reflections of the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1989) in relation to the democratizing potential of the public sphere (FRASER, 1997). Habermas (1989) was criticized for idealizing the public sphere as a social space in which there occurred only rational public debates and also for ignoring how determined social groups are excluded, to a greater or lesser extent, from the public arena. In this sense, the use of the concept of counterpublic is not related here to his classic conception of public sphere, but rather to the post-Habermasian turn of 'Counterpublic Studies'. P Camila Rocha & Jonas Medeirosl (2021) 15 (3) e0004 -3/20 To analyze the contemporary dynamics of the public sphere, first of all, it is necessary to bear in mind the idea that there does not exist anything like a unified public sphere, but rather a multiplicity of 'publics'. Publics are formed through the reflexive circulation of texts, photos, videos, performances, and other discursive media 1 and can be more or less local, more or less integrated, more or less official and institutionalized, and more or less digitalized (CELIKATES, 2015). In this way, there are publics which are dominant -in general those who are closer to state, capital, and science -and publics which occupy a subordinated position in relation to the former.
What all the publics possess in common is the fact that they are voluntary, self-organized spaces, aimed at sociability among strangers, in other words, the formation of ties between people who do not know each other 'a priori'.
Participating in these publics thus requires a minimum of attention, as well as a shared understanding, that their arguments should be based on a rational-critical reflection, an understanding which acts as a type of predominant ideology in dominant publics. This occurs because although discursive modes and ways of addressing of a performative nature are present to some degree in any public, a rational-critical approach possesses a greater legitimacy to the extent that it allows a more effective interlocution with the state (WARNER, 2002  , who also experienced an important decline in power and legitimacy in the public sphere shortly after redemocratization. However, while on the one hand there are publics who aim to obtain legitimacy from the state, the market, or science, on the other hand there also those who go in the opposite direction. With the explicit purpose of attacking the state and the established order, these publics seek to put into circulation texts of opposition to a cultural horizon perceived as dominant and whose performative nature stands out, causing reactions of shock and disturbance of the social order. As they consciously disobey the rules of decorum instituted by dominant publics, these publics are better understood as 'counterpublics' (WARNER, 2002). understanding, the fact that dominant publics are structured through relations of domination limits the scope of rational-critical discourses in these arenas, which motivates the employment of a 'shock politics'  to call the attention of society to these relations of domination. What unites the members of any counterpublic is, thus, the shared perception that their world-views are subordinated to a dominant cultural horizon which alienates, silences, attacks, disparages, and even ridicules them; hence their appeal to counterpublicity.
Initially the concept of counterpublic was employed to understand the action of subaltern social groups in the public sphere, but recently it also came to be used to understand the rise of groups and leaders located on the right of the political spectrum (DOWNEY and FENTON, 2003;THIMSEN, 2017), as we will do here. While for the members of 'queer' counterpublics, who oriented the pioneering theorization about counterpublicity by the literary critic Michael Warner (2002), heteronormativity is hegemonic in dominant publics, for the purposes of the analysis proposed here, a determined discourse can also be read as hegemonic by members of right-wing counterpublics. In this sense, it is not relevant if, for example, In this way, anti-globalist women can constitute a counterpublic, but they should not be seen as a subaltern counterpublic just because they are women. After all, these women probably do not perceive themselves as dominated in a social structure which privileges men, or do not do so in a central form, but rather see themselves as culturally subordinated by dominant publics regarded as globalists.
Similarly, right-wing homosexuals can also belong to a non-subaltern counterpublic, since these do not see themselves as dominated by a heteronormative social structure, even though this structure objectively exists and inspires murders for motives as banal as the panic caused by a boy with a way of walking deemed to be effeminate (BUTLER, 2006). associations and make use only of a rational-critical discursive approach to demand more childcare facilities or more public facilities for victims of domestic violence (MEDEIROS, 2017). On the other hand, SlutWalk activists who expose their breasts in public to call attention to feminist causes, would be members of subaltern counterpublics (GOMES, 2018;MEDEIROS and FANTI, 2019). Similarly, it is also possible to understand defenders of monarchy or the unrestricted privatization of the economy who defend their agendas through rational-critical arguments as marginal non-subaltern publics; and right-wing groups and political actors who make disruptive and shocking discourses and performances as right-wing counterpublics, whom we shall analyze next.

Right-wing counterpublics
Before Jair Bolsonaro was elected, a new right had emerged in the country.
While the traditional right did not assume itself as such due to the stigma of having At that time the internet came to function as a refuge for right-wing groups or simply for those who did not feel represented by the Workers Party government.
Feeling excluded from dominant publics, these people discovered on the Internet the possibility of finding others with whom they could exchange ideas and solidarize with through forums, blogs, and sites. In this sense, the emergence of the social media Orkut, founded in 2004, was especially important, since it ended up becoming the most important media for the rise of the Brazilian new right.
The first step in this direction was taken at the end of the 1990s, with the creation of a blog by the philosopher Olavo de Carvalho in 1998 entitled 'Sapientiam activities which were all provided by Orkut.
In Orkut it was possible to create forums about the most diverse subjects, however, the use of fake profiles and anonymous accounts was quite common, which contributed to very free and at times violent atmosphere (FRAGOSO, 2006); something analogous to what Angela Nagle (2017)  I believe that it [the podcast] has achieved its goals and from now on I will only be repeating what was already said. One of these goals was to modify a bit the language of political talk in Brazil. Because to the extent that the conduct of our politicians descended to appalling levels it didn't make any sense to continue to speak of them using polite language, the educated language used by the opposition. We have to learn to say that a 'motherfucker' is a 'motherfucker' and so on. Even because this is their language, this is the language of Mr. Lula! Mr. Lula is always cursing, now if we curse, they [say] 'Ah, how rude'. We had to lower our standards. We have done so. To do this, I had to make this concession of speaking the language of Brazilian 'trash talk', which is not my language.
However, it is the only way of making people realize the horrible mess which Brazil has become. And create a language, which is this bad language, to actually talk about it. This purpose has been entirely fulfilled. I see that many people have learned this. They learned to curse, they learned to tell someone to shove it up your ass because they needed to shove it up in the ass, they learned to call someone a motherfucker when they had to be called 'motherfucker' and so on. And I think this is a huge progress! (CARVALHO, 2012, podcast).
Shock politics, as mentioned above, is frequently used in a conscious form I have a different way of seeing things, and because of that, I do not have any space in the press. There are those people who criticize us and certainly also criticize you, Olavo, because of the way you act in a discussion. But I believe it is necessary to create the fact, to call attention, to 'shock', especially considering certain issues, so they can receive some attention from the press and the population as a whole can gain access to this discussion, like the famous 'gay kit'. If Deputy Jair Bolsonaro did not call attention to this issue in an ostensive manner, we would never ______________________________________________________________________________________________ and the dominant counterpublicity (2021) 15 (3) e0004 -10/20 know there was this incentive to sexuality, whether on the 'homosexual side' or the 'heterosexual side' (sic), Olavo, for children of six years of age, for now in public schools, but we do not know what the next step will be, it can affect private schools too, because I am certain that the middle and upper classes will also engage in this discussion.  Because they know that this will 'shock' the religious and evangelicals and that these guys will have an emotional reaction, they will attack homosexualism [sic]. So, what do they do? 'Look, homophobia!' They use this as proof of homophobia, and the evangelicals and Catholics fall for this trick. They end up in a crusade against homosexualism. This is crap, my son, homosexualism exists since the fall of Adam, and you will not end it, what we have to fight against is this legislation which exists, and not homosexualism itself. This is rubbish. Also because there is this wonderful site called 'right-wing gays', and they denounce all this stuff, that there is a homophobic persecution, so these people are on our side, and I believe that the majority of gays will be on our side and that they understand the constitutive lie of this (left) movement and the psychotic ambitions of these people (BOLSONARO, 2012) (emphasis added).
Right-wing counterpublicity also gained supporters in political and business realms when the presidential candidacy of Jair Bolsonaro began to become a reality. In the midst of Rousseff's impeachment protests, demonstrators began to adopt Bolsonaro as their first option for the 2018 presidential elections. As Bolsonaro's presidential candidacy in the midst of Rousseff's impeachment protests, permeated by anti-Workers Party, anti-corruption, and anti-politics discourses (ORTELLADO; GALLEGO, and MORETTO, 2016;TELLES, 2016).
By incorporating all of these elements in its rhetoric, in addition to the lawand-order discourse, which responded both to insecurity in relation to criminality, and to the 'progressive shock', Bolsonaro began to rise as a new political force. Known for his controversial and disruptive discourse, the former army captain soon received the nickname 'Bolsomito' (Bolso-myth), in reference to his 'trolling', meaning that he could put an end to an argument in an way that left other people unable to react, which became popular on the internet in the middle of the dynamics created by publics and counterpublics. However, pro-Bolsonaro counterpublicity is, as a rule, much more radical than a regular 'trolling', due to his frequent exaltation of army Colonel Carlos Brilhante Ustra, a known torturer during the military dictatorship.
In this sense, it is possible to highlight two high points in the pro-Bolsonaro counterpublicity before his victory at the ballot box. The first is the tribute to Ustra

Bolsonaro and the dominant counterpublicity
The dissemination of counterpublics was central for the development of counter-discourses aligned both with the emerging right and with 'Bolsonarismo' (ROCHA, 2021). However, after the 2018 elections, there was a normalization process of determined right-wing counterpublics, which moderated the performative radicality of its discourses, taking into account, for example, the action of certain political actors who later ended up disassociating themselves from 'Bolsonarismo'.
However, the hardcore of 'Bolsonarismo' did not go through any process of normalization, continuing to use counterpublicity as a radical counter-hegemonic political strategy in a conscious form. This can occur to the extent that a shared perception is continually fostered among the members who participate in certain discursive arenas that their discourse is blocked, silenced, despised, or even ridiculed in central arenas, understood by them as 'the system' or 'the The 'gravatinhas' [bowties] of the right want an anodyne world of ideas, a democratic rule of law and a plurality of ideas, while the dream of the left is to destroy everything you love, everything you respect. Do you think this deserves your passionate defense? If you are having to debate your ideas, you have already lost, you just don't know it. For example, abortion is not an issue to be discussed, you have to spit in the abortionist's face and that is it. If you admit that this is a question for debate you have already lost. The day is coming when the most rational and coherent response that it will be suitable to these opinions is to stuff two fingers down your throat and barf on the shoes of those speaking to you ( However, it is possible to say that there are important differences in relation to the use of dominant counterpublicity, considering both the right of free speech and the position occupied by those who utilize this discursive strategy. During the Bolsonaro administration, the president and his sons used counterpublicity several times, especially making eschatological references and using bad language with the press, but some of his supporters were punished for crossing the tenuous line which divide the acceptance of counterpublicity as part of the democratic exercise from direct attacks on the rule of law.
In January 2020, for example, Roberto Alvim, Secretary of Culture, was exonerated for giving a speech containing phrases that were similar to the ones used by Joseph Goebbels, Adolf Hitler's propaganda minister and an idealizer of Nazism.
In the speech given by Goebbels it was stated that "German art in the next decade will be heroic" and "imperative", while in Alvim's speech it was announced that "Brazilian art in the next decade will be heroic" and "imperative" 10 , causing reactions of shock and hostility in dominant publics. At the time, Alvim argued that the similarity was only 'rhetorical', however, according to the historians Jorge Paulino and Igor , it was also possible to find a flagrant aesthetic similarity between the two: The similitudes appear not only in parts of the discourse, but also in the background music -Lohengrin, a Richard Wagner opera, Hitler's favorite composer -and the actual mounting of the scene. As a 'man of the theater', Alvim knows how to compose scenarios. The framing of the commander, the position of the enunciator, the Jesuit cross: nothing is ther e by chance. The comparison of the images destroys the justification -given by the secretary after the disastrous repercussion -that it was nothing more than a coincidence (PAULINO and ROCHA, 2020) 11 .
In this way, as Bolsonaro stated at the time, it became impossible for Alvim to remain in his position. In addition to the dismissal of the minister, the president apologized to the Jewish community and stated that he "repudiated totalitarian and genocidal ideologies, as well as any type of reference to them" 12 . The video can no longer be watched because YouTube removed it, alleging a violation of its policy on harassment and bullying. However, the transcription of the deputy's words can be read at ˂https://www.poder360.com.br/justica/leia-a-transcricao-do-que-disse-daniel-silveira-e-o-quelevou-o-stf-a-prende-lo/˃. 14 Declaration available at ˂https://www.bol.uol.com.br/noticias/2021/02/19/daniel-silveiradisse-a-deputado-vou-ser-preso-nao-tem-problema.htm˃. 15 Gomes (2018) thematizes suffering related to gender violence through an analysis of the SlutWalk protests in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, while Hochschild (2016) highlights feelings of anger and inferiority in her study of 'Tea Party' enthusiasts in Louisiana, in which a supporter of the movement says to her: "The liberals think that Southerners who believe in the Bible are ignorant, backwards, rednecks, losers. They think that we are racist, sexist, homophobic, and perhaps fat". which has indoctrinated them to defend malign ideas, making any rational debate of ideas impossible.
The paradoxical nature of counterpublics lies in their relationship with conflictuality. Counterpublics not only establish a conflict between the dominant cultural horizon and an alternative horizon, but also allow the conflict to be named as they voice their own utopia for the reorganization of public life (WARNER, 2002).
Generally speaking, dominant publics work with the naturalization of their own cultural horizon and, thus, perpetuate the domination of their codes, performances, ideas, and structures, since they present themselves as consensual and free from any conflict. Counterpublicity denaturalizes this false consensus; but its paradoxical dimension relies on the difficulty of escaping pure conflictuality and fabricating new consensuses that are more inclusive and more reflexive 16 .
The actions of Jair Bolsonaro and his sons in government are a paradigmatic example of pure conflictuality: they betray and abandon allies, as Bolsonaro did when he abandoned the party elected; sabotage and impede new consensus from being formed, since this would betray the principle of counterpublicity; and hinder the construction of a social solidarity, even in times of a pandemic crisis. Bolsonaro's only goal is to demolish the foundations of dominant publics. He seeks to naturalize his own extremism, by moving the cultural horizon increasingly to the right (NUNES, 2020), and by promising a future authoritarian political regime for radicalized groups, which are also abandoned to their own luck if they threaten the permanence of 'Bolsonarismo' in power.
Dominant counterpublicity, thus, has a hybrid and unstable nature and seems to point to various political outcomes. If pro-Bolsonaro counterpublicity is weakened, other publics, on the left and/or the right, can strengthen themselves. However, if pro-Bolsonaro counterpublics become stronger, this can enact the beginning of a historical transition to a new authoritarian regime in Brazil, ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 16 If we are not mistaken, this fabrication of new consensus is the normative horizon of Fraser's theory of the public sphere: the transformation of the discursive arenas of subaltern social groups as weak publics into strong publics, pushing the dominant public sphere in the direction of greater inclusion and reflexivity (FRASER, 1997). A process analogous to this occurred in Brazil with the 1988 constitutional pact; for this reason, we have interpreted this historical tendency as the emergence of a post-bourgeois public sphere, now in decline.