The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America*

In recent times the interaction between democracy and foreign policy has begun to be studied and theorized in Brazil. The link between politics and foreign policy is not new, however, the focus of this article is on the shifts that have taken place since t he beginning of the democratic regime. Its aim is to identify changes in Brazilian foreign policy based on ideas and political preferences due to alternation of governments; and deconstruct the idea that Brazilian foreign policy is a state policy, limited to superficial changes. Following a discussion of the recent literature about changes in foreign policy, the article maps the changes that occurred between 1990 and 2003 and analyses Brazilian foreign policy behavior towards South America during the Worker’s Party administrations. Based on a comparative perspective, it examines the changes in Brazilian behavior toward the region during the Temer administration. This was the area where foreign policy experienced strongest transformations. Finally, the article briefly points out the changes that occurred in foreign policy towards South America at the beginning of Bolsonaro’s administration. The methodology, especially in relation to the Temer and Bolsonaro administrations, uses press material and interviews with foreign policymakers.

nteractions between democracy and foreign policy in a country, with the consequent politicization of its foreign policy, is an area which began to be studied and theorized in Brazil in recent times. Lopes' work (2013)   The article aims to identify changes not only in strategies, but also in the objectives, in the field of foreign policy ideas and preferences (in accordance with HERMANN's conceptions, 1990). It maps the changes that occurred in the 1990s and The article is organized as follows, in the first part, the literature on the state of the art about change is reviewed. Following this is a historic overview of the changes occurred since the first elected government, concentrating on the PT governments, highlighting their perspective towards South America. The principal part of the paper examines the changes in terms of ideas and the formulation of foreign policy in the Temer administration, also looking at the ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 3 The interviews were carried out in various forms over recent years. There were interviews with structured questions and others with a very informal profile, such as an exchange of ideas. characteristics of the foreign behavior of the country, notably behavior towards South America. Before the conclusion, I will point to certain foreign policy features of the Bolsonaro administration in relation to the region.

Change in foreign policy
The defense of continuity has an important political weight for the Ministry of Foreign Relations, which has provoked academic debate about continuity and change in foreign policy.
In terms of explanatory frameworks for the change in foreign policy, a model that is much used in the Brazilian literature is that proposed by Hermann (1990), who suggests the three most frequent classifications: adjustments, program changes, and target changes. Adjustment signifies a change in the intensity and style of foreign policy, without modifying how it is done or its objectives; in program changes there occur variants in methods and strategies to achieve objectives, although these remain unaltered; target or objective change signifies a reconfiguration of proposals for action and the objectives to be attained. A fourth classification proposed is a change in the pattern of international insertion. He identifies important domestic motivations which impact on the foreign policy decision making process and provoke changes.
More distant from the Brazilian literature, Welch (2005) proposes a mode of anticipating changes in foreign policy posture 4 . In other words, he seeks to determine under which conditions a change in direction is more or less feasible. According to Welch (2005), change demands great effort, which favors the condition of inertia; it is thus important to discover when this inertia is breached. He defines three conditions in which change is expected: in states that are not strongly bureaucratized and are authoritarian (which is not the case of Brazil); when the chosen policy fails repeatedly, leading to a reassessment by the policymaker; or when the risk of losses is latent and change is perceived as a means of avoiding it. Rodrigues, Urdinez, and Oliveira (2019)  for area studies. They propose a Foreign Policy Index which establishes diverse variables, both systematic and domestic, while the choice of these variables and their use through mediation is indicated in function of the theme which has to be explained in the foreign policy universe. Milani, Lima, and Pinheiro (2017) define what they called the 'graduation dilemma'. This explains changes in the pattern of international insertion in the foreign policy of emerging, non-nuclear countries, through the choice of a differentiated strategy. Graduation is identified with moving to a type of international insertion based on autonomy; in opposition to the search for equilibrium in relation to the consolidated potentials; in the choice of innovative and flexible coalitions within the framework of multilateralism; and in the preference for cooperation with other countries from the South. According to the authors, graduation signifies "an ambition for international prominence, a role as rulemaker, a geopolitical vision, and a commitment to regional integration" (MILANI, LIMA, and PINHEIRO, 2017, p. 592).
Gardini (2011) provides a useful differentiation for the analysis of continuity and change, separating pragmatic foreign policy and ideological foreign policy. Pragmatic is where merit is assessed according to usefulness, practicality, and operationality above doctrine or pre-established principles, associated with mid-term policies and not a specific government. Ideological foreign policy emphasizes solutions of principle or doctrine, not necessarily linked to the merit of the policy. In this author's vision, elements of the two types of foreign policy are often linked. It should be emphasized that the success of a determined policy does not necessarily arise out of its ideological or pragmatic profile. These definitions apply to the motivation of policy, not its results.
In relation to foreign policy continuity, its defense has an important political weight in diplomatic circles. The centrality of Itamaraty in the foreign policy formulation process is linked, roughly speaking, to the preponderance of its own state project and the international insertion within the Ministry, which is not always explained or shared with other political actors. This concentration of the formulation process makes foreign policy less vulnerable to direct interference from domestic policy and, thus, has less traits of change. Its continuity is based on stable behavior following principles such as pacifism, non-intervention, the sovereign equality of nations, and respect for international law, supported by a specialized diplomatic corps in which the policy formulation process is concentrated. These principles can be identified with the country's 'diplomatic archive' 5 . Pinheiro and Vedoveli (2012) call attention to the concentration of diplomats who not only implement, but also analyze foreign policy presented as academic papers. The concentration and participation of diplomats as foreign policy analysts has favored the academic acceptance of an official vision of foreign policy.
Within the framework of this profile of continuity, there exist papers which defend with theoretical rigor the existence of continuity in foreign policy in terms of its objectives and patterns of international insertion. Burges (2016)  of the country, as well as its singularity 6 . Itamaraty played an important role in the construction of this. However, this discourse of continuity hides discontin uities or changes which can be identified in empirical studies.
In contrast to the defense of continuity, based on the process of democratization and the alternance of presidents, some authors work with different dimensions of changes in Brazilian foreign policy. In search of elements of continuity and change, Lima (1994) shows two historical paradigms -that of the special alliance with the United States and globalism; Silva (1995) refers to pragmatic and ideological Americanism; while Letícia Pinheiro (2000) introduces the pragmatic institutionalism of the Fernando Henrique Cardoso administration. Focused on the impact of ideas in foreign policy Saraiva (2010) identifies two groups of thought within Itamaraty: the pragmatic institutionalists supported by Pinheiro (2000) and ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 5 In relation this, see Silva (1995). 6 Identity is seen by the author as a "set of circumstances and predicates which differentiated the vision of a country and its interests as an actor in the world system" (LAFER, 2001, p. 20).
the autonomists. In this paper she also introduces the role of the 'Partido dos Trabalhadores' (Workers' Party) in the formulation of foreign policy.
Based on the analysis of governmental changes from Sarney to Lula da Silva, Fonseca (2011) reinforces the dimension of continuity, highlighting that, despite the changes with the alternance of presidents, these occurred in the strategy dimension, meaning that the objectives remained the same. It is what she calls the 'paradox of change in continuity'.
In The explanatory frameworks for changes and/or continuity in foreign policy is not exhaustive, but the theoretical-conceptual option adopted here seeks important elements in these frameworks. Among the perspectives mentioned three are particularly useful for the analysis.
In first place, in response to the politicization that occurs in dealing with foreign policy, Gardini's (2011) concepts of ideological and pragmatic foreign policy are of importance. Ideology in foreign policy is not something uncommon, since like any public policy, it condenses visions of the world and preferences with an ideological profile with different political nuances. For Gardini (2011) an ideological foreign policy is one that starts with a cognitive map and is focused on doctrines and principles, prioritizing the compatibility of alternatives with the principles defended to the detriment of the practical consequences of these principles (GARDINI, 2011, p. 17). A pragmatic foreign policy, in turn, is based on the utility and practicality of ideas, the weight of the consequences of each action exceeds the value of a principle. Ideological foreign policy is more associated with specific administrations and personalisms, while pragmatic is associated with medium/long-term planning, as a 'state policy'. However, they have almost always been complementary phenomena; a policy guided by ideology alone would tend towards utopia, while that guided only by pragmatism would tend to be immediate and opportunistic (GARDINI, 2011, pp. 13-14).
Much concentrated in the hands of Itamaraty, Brazilian foreign policy was presented for many years as a state policy, isolated from the political game. However, democratization and the subsequent democratic regime brought public actions to the political universe, assuming divergences, preferences, and obviously ideologies. The foreign policy of the PT administrations, with the participation of a greater number of political actors in the decision making process, was labelled as ideological by various critics. But the following administrations -as will be seen later -were no different in this aspect.
Next, the identification of institutionalist and autonomist currents provides the basis for analysis in the field of ideas and political preferences. This classification was constructed in research published by Saraiva (2010), aimed at introducing concepts into the debate. The groups of thought in Itamaraty are not watertight and diplomats can change opinion or preferences. As in Brazilian politics the transformations which occur in both international and domestic terms provoke changes within these groups as well as favoring approximation or distancing between both. Although both coincide in having a vision which, in the final instance, is not open to the changes that have been occurring in the international economy since the 1990s, in the economic field 7 the institutionalists favor a process called the 'conditioned liberalization' of the economy 8 , while in the political party context they are basically identified with the PSDB 9 . They defend Brazil's formal support for international regimes of a liberal type and identify the rules of international politics as a framework which can benefit Brazilian economic development, combining ideology and pragmatism. They suggest an international insertion for Brazil based on new meanings of the concepts of autonomy and ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 7 Elements such as connections with changes in the productive paradigm of information and value chains are not considered and since the 2000s the Brazilian economy has been growing less than similar countries in terms of a productive stage. 8 A term introduced by Veiga (2002) for explaining the gradual, discontinuous, and often incomplete implementation of the liberal paradigm adopted in the 1990s in Brazil. 9 The identification of the majority does not signify that diplomats who follow these currents are members of the PSDB or any other political party in particular, nor that the parliamentarians of this party have acted as a veto power against the foreign policy proposals of the PT (with some exceptions).
The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America These first two categories are used with greater frequency by the traditional literature mounting the paradox between continuity and change presented by Fonseca (2011). However, the perspective adopted here seeks to discuss what is understood as a foreign policy objective and its level of profundity and permanence oriented towards changes of objectives 11 . Agreeing with Merke ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 10 Silva (2019) provides a very good analysis of Hermann's perspectives (1990) for the analysis of the foreign policy of the Temer administration. 11 Elements such as 'development' and 'defense of the territory' are objectives which are difficult to remove from the foreign policy agenda of a country such as Brazil. The debate about the country's regional or international insertion can be understood as a change in strategy or a change of objective to be pursued.
(2008), who highlights the various re-significations of key terms of Brazilian foreign policy such as autonomy and development, maintaining the coexistence of a discourse of continuity in processes of changes, it is defended here that not always do the terms used in different governments signify the same thing.
Change in the domestic political environment, not only of regime, but also of the alignment of internal forces and social sectors, is fundamental for a political office holder to be able to implement a program for government; bureaucracies, whose administrative normativity serve as a resistance to change, can be overcome

Changes in the 1990s
Collor de Mello's short term in office, with his own liberal type foreign policy, signified a rupture with globalism, whose principles had been established during the ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 13 Pinheiro and Lima (2018) argue that the concept of autonomy cannot be resignified and that the presence of a logic of autonomy in Brazilian foreign policy is more of an exception than a rule. 14 Adopted here in part is the nomenclature of Pinheiro (2000) for one of the groups. The denomination of the autonomists was mentioned by Saraiva (2010). Here the categories established by Hermann (1990)  Finally, the text suggests the adoption of the 'grand strategy' concept, criticizing pervious foreign policies 25 . This type of discourse is typical of governments who want to differentiate themselves from their predecessors. The document conveys the idea of change, historically avoided in diplomacy.
However, the worsening of the internal political crisis and the need for the president to defend himself from accusations of corruption greatly limited presidential diplomacy which, from the beginning to the end of his mandate, was meager.

Changes in South American policy
In (Relationship between Brazil and Venezuela has never been so bad) (OLIVEIRA, 2018). It speaks of a decline of 10% in Brazilian exports to Venezuela in the previous five years. 28 In comparison with the case of the Bolivian senator who sought asylum in the La Paz embassy, it is worth noting that the diplomat who brought him to Brazil was the chief of staff of Aloysio Nunes.
The democratic regime and the changes in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America  Program', and its president was not invited to the presidential inauguration.
These ideas also encountered limits In the internal scenario. In the agribusiness field, the retaliation of Arab countries would impact on the direct interests of Brazilian exporters of agricultural products, reducing its exports. Distancing from China would directly hurt exporters of soybean and other primary products, while breaking with the Paris Accord could reduce exports to European countries, also purchasers of primary products. The 'ruralistas', who were a group who received a new department in the structure of Itamaraty, have already shown their concern with the foreign minister's statements which could result in losses for them 39 .
Finally, a sector which has resisted the application of the Bolsonaro government's ideological proposals is the diplomatic service. Itamaraty has a historic tradition of acting in multilateralism and has internal groups with political preferences. The ideas presented by Bolsonaro (and his foreign minister), with rare exceptions, do not have followers. In the mid-term, it is difficult to convince a wellstructured corporation such as Itamaraty to abandon multilateralism and universalism and to implement proposals coming from actors external to diplomacy, which could also bring tangible losses to the country.
Internal divisions within the government began to appear in its first two months, while the struggle between the ideology of some sectors closest to the president and other groups that are part of the government and who were concerned with losses -who present themselves as pragmatists -is already  42 . The idea of the use of any military force was strongly rejected and the existence of a channel of conversation between the Armed Forces of both countries since previous governments was acknowledged 43 .
In the case of MERCOSUR, there have been no changes until the present.
During the presidential campaign the current finance minister Paulo Guedes made comments about multilateral and bilateral agreements and the Common External Tariff (TEC). However, since Brazil is the country which most benefits from TEC to export manufactured products in which they do not have a comparative advantage in the international market, various questions were raised about the permanence of protectionism and the Manaus Free Zone. The ending of TEC would remove longterm benefits from Brazilian industries. In addition to Argentina being a great ______________________________________________________________________________________________ On the other hand, and also in the case of Temer, the relations of Bolsonaro and Maurício Macri are misaligned. Maurício Macri has a clearly liberal preference, but this did not signify conservatism in customs. For example, the defense of human rights is an important theme for Argentine society and the presence of numerous army officers in the government has no counterpart in Buenos Aires. Unlike other presidential inaugurations, which Argentine presidents usually attended, Macri did not appear at Bolsonaro's. On the other hand, the respective positions of both presidents towards Venezuela are similar.

By way of conclusion
As can be seen, changes are a part of the democratic regime and ideology is a full part of politics. This research can still be expanded in some ways, but some ideas can be advanced now. The principal of these is that the changes that occurred in Brazilian foreign policy towards South America with Michel Temer's administration, and those that have started to occur with Bolsonaro, deconstruct the idea of a state foreign policy whose fundamentals do not change. As seen in the second part, foreign policy has experimented inflections since the return to In dialogue with the explanatory perspective for change examined in the first section, it is possible to argue, in accordance with Hermann's classifications (1990), that in the case of Brazilian foreign policy towards South America, the transition to Temer signified not only an adjustment added to a more frequent programmatic (and strategical) change in Brazilian foreign policy (FONSECA, 2011), but also a change of objectives. Targets such as the construction of regional governance and the consolidation of Brazil's regional leadership role were abandoned. Brazil's principal partners in the region were changed (with the exception of Argentina). Although Rousseff's administration did not implement strategies in this sense, in terms of discourse the criteria of the precious administration was maintained. However, it is important to highlight that the decline of foreign policy oriented to neighboring countries between 2011 and 2016 reduced the impact of change.
In the case of Bolsonaro, looked at from a broader sense, changes in Brazilian behavior also fit into the classification of change from Hermann's perspective (1990) in the international insertion model.
In relation to the binomial of pragmatic foreign policy /ideological foreign policy (GARDINI, 2011), under the Temer administration Brazilian behavior towards the region had an important ideological aspect, considering the criticism of the Venezuelan government due to its disrespect for the principles of a political regime. However, pragmatism was also present, since there were differences within the government in relation to foreign policy preferences. Finally, Brazil's behavior towards Venezuela was not aligned with the most radical (and liberal) proposal of the Argentine government. Some actions were oriented to utility, practicability, and operationality rather than doctrine or the cognitive map. However, it should also be noted that pragmatism is not synonymous with success. In relation to the behavior of the Bolsonaro administration, ideology made itself felt in relation to Venezuela and in the sympathy demonstrated towards the PROSUR project, but in the Venezuelan case pragmatism was defended by the military holding government positions. In the case of MERCOSUR, so far pragmatism seen as continuity so as not to affect gains has been felt in the two administrations.
Finally, some details can be raised for reflection. In relation to what Cason and Power (2009) call foreign policy presidentialization, Michel Temer was not a president committed to the directions of foreign policy and did not defend specific ideas; which, according to Burges and Bastos (2017, p. 287) did not propel strong change. However, in the case of South America, a foreign minister was appointed with political interests in change. Bolsonaro, in turn, has a strong commitment to foreign policy ideas, which were strongly mentioned in the presidential campaign.
The alternance in administrations was fundamental for the changes. In both cases, as emphasized by Busso (2014) the transformations occurred in situations of crisis.
There is a clear mention of the 'failures' of previous foreign policies, which appears in Welch (2005) as an element of change. Ideology, as shown by Gardini (2011), as well as change, appears in various governments.
Translated by Eoin Portela Submitted on June 01, 2019 Accepted on February 02, 2020