Regimes are defined by institutionalist theories in the discipline of International Relations as formal or informal sets of norms and rules that create patterns of behavior and allow the convergence of the expectations of their participants in specific issue areas, in order to solve coordination problems that could lead to non-pareto-efficient outcomes. Considering that such definitions based merely on the "efficiency" of regimes do not seem to be sufficient to explain their effectiveness, the present article proposes a different definition for regimes: political arrangements that allow a redistribution of the gains of cooperation among the participants in certain issue areas, within an interdependence context. Regimes would thus be effective due to their autonomy and relevance - that is, due to their objective existence autonomously from their participants and their influence on the participants' behavior and expectations in ways that cannot be reduced to the individual action of any of them. This article begins with a brief discussion about terminological problems related to regime studies and with a definition of the concepts of autonomy and relevance. Then it classifies the authors that take part in this debate according to two distinct perspectives, one that denies (non-autonomists) and the other that attributes (autonomists) autonomy and relevance to regimes, briefly analyzing the authors and traditions that are more significant for this debate, focusing on autonomist authors and on arguments that back the hypothesis here presented. Finally, the article proposes an analytic decomposition of regimes into four main elements that give them autonomy and relevance: normativity, actors, specificity of the issue area and complex interdependence as context.
Regime; Regime's Definition; Regimes' Effectivity; Regimes' Autonomy and Relevance; Regimes' Elements
