This paper is divided in three sections. The purpose of the first section is to show how the search for an alternative conception of practical normativity by contemporary moral philosophers keeps affinities with Nietzsche's attempt to overcome morality in the nineteenth century. In the second section I assess the merits and limitations of Brobjer's attempt to affiliate Nietzsche to the ancient Greek tradition of virtue ethics. In the third section I present the different motivations behind Nietzsche's critique of the moral conception of practical normativity. I claim that this diversity of motivations makes his position unstable and helps us to explain why he oscillates between the consequentialist and the non-consequentialist view of perfectionism. Although I do not discuss it exhaustively in this paper, I point out some reasons why Nietzsche should have advocated a non-consequentialist view of perfectionism.
Nietzsche; moral philosophy; practical normativity; perfectionism; consequentialism; virtue ethics