Abstract
The literature on the relationship between public policies, political parties, and presidential voting strongly focuses on analyses of income transfer programs, which limits the understanding of how different aspects of policy design and implementation relate to the partisan-electoral game. Through linear regressions applied to all Brazilian municipalities, this article analyzes the electoral dynamics of the Minha Casa Minha Vida (My House My Life) housing policy program. From the program’s inception to the 2014 elections, it details results by policy modalities, implementation phases, and adherence to the housing deficit. The results show that municipalities governed by parties belonging to the federal government’s coalition did not receive more housing units, except for the modality targeted at the poorest electorate. Moreover, the Worker’s Party’s (PT) electoral return was positive where the program’s implementation was related to the housing deficit, particularly in 2010.
Minha Casa Minha Vida; elections; PT; public policy; Bolsa Família Program