Religion is often claimed to contribute to social capital, though under certain circumstances; it is widely recognized that movements of religious renewal and revival are mostly commonly observed among low-income, and marginalized populations, and sometimes seem to be the only institution-builders in circumstances of extreme poverty and institutional decay or vacuum; religious movements exhibit numerous undemocratic features: authoritarian hierarchies, strong pressures on followers to make sacrifices, to conform, and to contribute money. This paper explores the theoretical implications and support for these apparently paradoxical observations by adopting a rational choice approach augmented by the concept of power, and a concept of social capital which emphasizes transparency and the building of democratic institutions in society as a whole. The argument is illustrated by examples from Latin American evangelical churches and ultra-Orthodox Judaism, and concludes with the view that while the contribution of religious movements to democratization at large is limited, this is not a sufficient reason for belittling what they can do for their own followers.
rational choice; religious movements; social capital; trust