This article aims to discuss some arguments against the acceptance of the naturalistic fallacy. It intends to demonstrate that some aspects, which seem to be correct in the argumentation of those who refuse that fallacy, are, despite their pertinence in some points, fundamentally imprecise. In order to reach this outcome, the fallacy is reformulated in terms of the refuse of the implication between "being" and "the will". Therefore, it pretends to clarify the relations - and their absence - between truth and morality as well as enable a defense of a moral naturalism disengaged from the existence of moral facts. This text is divided in five parts. In the first one, I show the naturalistic fallacy according to Moore; in the second part, a distinction between Moore's and Hume's formulations of the naturalistic fallacy is elaborated; in the third part, I do not just present some objections to the interdiction of the passage from "is" to "ought", but also formulate some responses to them; in the forth part, the interdiction problem between "is and "ought" is retrieved and an alternative solution via the will is suggested for it; finally, in the fifth part, some conclusions are drawn about moral naturalism and moral realism.
Naturalistic fallacy; Moral naturalism; Moral realism; "Is-ought" problem