I intend to discuss the way as Kant relates the concepts of freedom and morality in the Foundations. In this book, Kant argues that" free will and will submitted to moral laws are one and same". Apparently just the autonomous will would be free, not remaining other alternative that is not to assimilate the heteronomous will to the natural necessity. That consequence would provoke an embargo of the imputability of immoral actions. I want to defend that, although Kant has obscure the distinctions between free will and moral will, if we concentrate on analyzes of the concept of will in Foundations II, we can defend that not just the autonomy, but the heteronomy is also chosen freely, turning intelligible, like this, the imputability of immoral acts. I sustain, therefore, that it's possible, in spite of the ambiguities of Kant, to think the moral imputability starting from internal conceptual resources to Foundations. Thus, it won't be necessary to invoke the distinction between Wille and Willkür, not even other works to solve this problem.