Abstract
This article aims to explore the conceptual, normative, and methodological gains of social equalitarianism based on a specific interpretation of the value of equality: equality as non-subordination. Throughout the two first sections we will argue that (1) the conception of equality as non-subordination identifies a common normative rationale to the diverse expressions of the social equalitarianism; (2) this interpretation is coherent with the historical background of the fights for social equality; and (3) it helps us to avoid conceptual issues which monist forms of equalitarianism tend to incur. Then, we would like to show that this specific way of understanding the value of equality resonates with the work of John Rawls, one of the most important political philosophers of the past century, and whose relationship with social equalitarianism is still open. Particularly important to the social equalitarianism is the way in which Rawls’s constructivism conceives the moral personality of the members of a just society as self-originating sources of valid claims.
Keywords:
Social Equality; Distribution; Social Hierarchy; John Rawls