Abstract:
We intend to analyse the text of Republic V, 478e-480a, in which Plato argues against an opponent who rejects the theory of Forms and confines the domain of knowledge to sensible items. Plato's argument concludes that his opponent cannot have knowledge, but only opinion. The reasoning relies on a premise stating that the sensible objects, unlike the Forms, suffer a certain compresence of opposite attributes. We present a version of the argument with two aims in mind: on one hand, we intend to solve a set of textual and theoretical difficulties that the reader of the passage has to face; on the other, we avoid committing Plato to the thesis that sensible items are excluded from the domain of knowledge. Our strategy involves arguing that the passage assumes a conceptual framework that belongs not to Plato, but to his opponent.
Keywords:
Plato; Forms; Ontology; Epistemology