ABSTRACT
Even though there is a general agreement among the scholars concerning the relationship between Hume and experimental philosophy, yet important disagreements prevail regarding the subject of the “science of human nature,” as well as the reasons that ground the introduction of the experimental method into moral subjects, and the way in which Hume does it. Our aim is to shed some light into these three items in order to specify the sense in which Hume’s experimentalism should be understood. Regarding the first one, we maintain that the science of human nature not only deals with the study of the mind but also with human interaction within society through the course of history. Concerning the second one, we consider that there is a common ontological ground to moral and natural phenomena, because both fall into what Hume calls ‘matters of fact.’ This, in turn is what enables him to apply the same research method to both. In order to clarify the third item, we will delve into the central role that is given to facts, which Hume understands as epistemically relevant events, which are handled through explanatory reduction, Finally, we will show through some examples how Hume uses the method.
Keywords:
Experimental Philosophy; Science of Human Nature; Matters of Fact; Explanatory reduction