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Manuscrito, Volume: 36, Número: 2, Publicado: 2013

  • A puzzle for philosophers Articles

    Lo Guercio, Nicolás

    Resumo em Inglês:

    In the paper I tackle a puzzle by Goldberg (2009) that challenges all of us as philosophers. There are three plausible thesis, separately defensible, that together seem to lead to a contradiction: 1) Reliability is a necessary condition for epistemic justification. 2) On contested matters in philosophy, philosophers are not reliable. 3) At least some philosophical theses regarding contested matters in philosophy are epistemically justified. In this paper I will assess the status of the puzzle and attempt to solve it. In the first section, I'll present the puzzle with a little more detail. Secondly, I'll provide some general arguments to show that the alleged puzzle is not a legitimate one. Finally, in section 3, I will argue that even assuming that the puzzle can be coherently formulated, Goldberg's arguments in favor of premise (2) are either unsound or too limited in their scope in order to represent a significant or interesting problem for philosophers.

  • Caution and necessity Articles

    González Varela, José Edgar

    Resumo em Inglês:

    In this paper I examine Crispin Wright's modal anti-realism as based on the availability of a certain attitude of Caution towards judgements of necessity. I think that Wright's account should be attractive in several ways for modal theorists with an anti-realist bend. However, the attitude of Caution to which it appeals has attracted some controversy. Wright himself has later come to doubt whether Caution is ultimately coherent. Here I first address Wright's worries concerning the coherence of Caution and show that they are unfounded. But then I argue that although the attitude of Caution is coherent, it cannot provide a suitable basis for a non-eliminativist account of necessity. I offer two different objections against Caution. (1) I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution, if successful, would show not only that modal judgement is non-objective but also that it is dispensable. Thus, I claim that appeal to Caution would seem to serve more as a threat against a non-eliminativist account of necessity, rather than as a potential adequate basis for it. However, (2) I argue that Wright's appeal to Caution is unsuccessful, for there is no genuine Caution: Caution is a mere verbal attitude.

  • Innatismo y control genético

    Barberis, Sergio Daniel

    Resumo em Espanhol:

    Mi objetivo en este artículo es defender una elucidación reduccionista parcial del concepto de lo innato en ciencias cognitivas. En primer lugar, especifico las condiciones mínimas para una elucidación de lo innato. En segundo lugar, presento los principales enfoques que se han adoptado en la discusión, es decir, las propuestas reduccionistas, autonomistas y escépticas. Luego de ofrecer argumentos versus el escepticismo y las propuestas autonomistas, presento en detalle lo que considero es una elucidación parcial de lo innato en términos de control genético, mostrando cómo un concepto de la biología del desarrollo puede ser provechosamente utilizado para elucidar el concepto de lo innato en ciencias cognitivas. Por último, explicito las ventajas filosóficas de mi propuesta.

    Resumo em Inglês:

    The aim of the present paper is to defend a partial reductionist explication of the concept of innateness in cognitive science. Firstly, I specify a set of minimal conditions for the analysis of the innateness concept. Secondly, I present the main proposals in dispute, namely, the reductionist, autonomist and skeptical accounts of innateness. After criticizing both skeptical and autonomist positions, I develop a partial account of innateness as genetic control, showing how that concept from developmental biology could be used to explicate innateness in cognitive science. Finally, I mention some philosophical advantages of my proposal.

  • El efecto knobe: asimetrías en la atribuición de intencionalidad y sus causas

    Rosas, Alejandro; Arciniegas, María Alejandra

    Resumo em Espanhol:

    En este artículo proponemos una explicación novedosa del efecto Knobe. El efecto Knobe es una asimetría peculiar en la atribución de intencionalidad a un agente con relación a los efectos colaterales previstos de su acción, dependiendo sólo de la valoración moral del efecto y sin que nada más cambie en la situación juzgada: los efectos colaterales malos, pero no los buenos, se consideran intencionalmente producidos. Nos enfocamos aquí en la pregunta por la explicación de esa peculiar asimetría ¿basta la valencia moral del efecto colateral para explicarla? Hacemos un análisis sistemático de una gran variedad de viñetas presentes en los estudios experimentales y de sus resultados. Intentamos así aislar los factores explicativos. Proponemos que la asimetría se explica por concordancia o discordancia entre la valencia moral del efecto colateral y la actitud moral del agente, juzgada por los espectadores.

    Resumo em Inglês:

    In this article we discuss factors presumably responsible for the Knobe effect and offer a novel explanation. The Knobe effect refers to a peculiar asymmetry in attributions of intentionality to the foreseen side-effects of an action, depending only on their moral assessment and with no other changes in the circumstances: the bad effects, but not the good ones, are considered intentionally produced. We focus on the possible explanation: does the moral value of the effect explain the asymmetry? We analyze a variety of vignettes introduced in experimental studies and their results, trying to isolate the explanatory factors. We propose that a concordance or discordance between the moral valence of the side effect and the moral attitude of the agent, as judged by spectators, explains the asymmetry.

  • Kant and Non-Conceptual Content Book Review

    Faggion, Andrea

  • Santos, César Schirmer dos

  • Errata

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