Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract In a recent paper, Manuel Pérez Otero attempted to turn the tables on Paul Boghossian's claim that content externalism is incompatible with the 'a priority of our logical abilities'. In reply, Boghossian argued that Pérez Otero's criticism misses the main point of his argument through concentrating on the semantics of singular (as opposed to general) terms. I elaborate on Boghossian's reply by showing that even taken on its own terms Pérez Otero's paper fails to engage with internalism through systematically misrepresenting what a truly internalistic account of the semantics of singular terms should be.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract BRICS has philosophical significance. It creates new pressure on cross-cultural skill. This is analysed here as requiring transduction: a variety of defeasible practical reasoning. This replaces a simplistic model of the relation between knowledge and action with a more realistic and contemporary model. The transduction format has utility in cross-cultural training.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen Se discuten algunas divergencias entre La revolución copernicana (1957) y La estructura de las revoluciones científicas (1962), de Thomas Kuhn. Se muestra que presentan una consideración diferente de los factores extracientíficos, que tienen en la primera un peso explicativo mayor. Se propone que en 1957 Kuhn maneja una historiografía casuística, centrada en la revolución copernicana, y en 1962 una historiografía estructural, centrada en los rasgos invariantes de las revoluciones científicas. Se concluye que las diferencias entre las dos obras son lo suficientemente profundas como para no considerarlas expresión de una misma visión de la ciencia.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract The paper discusses certain discrepancies between The Copernican Revolution (1957) and The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) by Thomas Kuhn. It shows that they present a different consideration of extra-scientific factors, that in the former have a higher explanatory weight. It states that in 1957 Kuhn applies a casuistical historiography, focused on the Copernican revolution, and in 1962 a structural historiography, focused on the invariable features of scientific revolutions. The paper concludes that the differences between these two works are significant enough so as not to be considered an expression of the same view of science.

Resumo em Espanhol:

Resumen Stephen Mumford (2004) propone una alternativa al Realismo Nomológico que no requiere resignar los compromisos modales comúnmente asociados a posiciones realistas, un Realismo Sin Leyes (RSL) donde el peso de la modalidad no está puesto sobre las leyes sino sobre propiedades entendidas en términos de poderes y disposiciones. Las ventajas relativas del RSL dependen, sin embargo, de una serie de objeciones que presenta al RN. La principal de ellas es la que Mumford denomina el Dilema Central, según el cual el RN no es capaz de dar cuenta de cómo las leyes gobiernas sus instancias. En el presente trabajo me propongo mostrar que ni el Dilema Central ni el resto de los argumentos de Mumford contra el RN justifican su rechazo.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract Stephen Mumford (2004) proposes an alternative to Nomological Realism (NR) compatible with the modal commitments commonly associated to realist positions, a Realist Lawlessness (RL) in which the weight of modality is not set on laws but on properties, understood in terms of powers and propensities. However, RL's relative merits depend on a series of objections presented to NR. The main one is the so-called Central Dilemma, according to which NR is unable to give an account of how laws govern their instances. In this paper, I aim to show that neither the Central Dilemma nor the rest of Mumford's arguments against NR justify its rejection.

Resumo em Português:

Resumo: Pretendemos aqui analisar o texto de República V, 478e-480a, em que Platão argumenta contra um adversário que rejeita a teoria das Formas e restringe o domínio do conhecimento a itens sensíveis. O argumento de Platão conclui que seu adversário não pode ter conhecimento, mas somente opinião. O raciocínio baseia-se em uma premissa que afirma que os objetos sensíveis, ao contrário das Formas, estariam submetidos a uma certa copresença de atributos opostos. Apresentamos uma versão do argumento visando dois propósitos centrais: por um lado, buscamos resolver certas dificuldades textuais e teóricas que o leitor da passagem tem de enfrentar; por outro, evitamos comprometer Platão com a tese de que os itens sensíveis estão excluídos do domínio do conhecimento. Nossa estratégia envolve argumentar que a passagem assume um esquema conceitual que não é o de Platão, mas o de seu adversário.

Resumo em Inglês:

Abstract: We intend to analyse the text of Republic V, 478e-480a, in which Plato argues against an opponent who rejects the theory of Forms and confines the domain of knowledge to sensible items. Plato's argument concludes that his opponent cannot have knowledge, but only opinion. The reasoning relies on a premise stating that the sensible objects, unlike the Forms, suffer a certain compresence of opposite attributes. We present a version of the argument with two aims in mind: on one hand, we intend to solve a set of textual and theoretical difficulties that the reader of the passage has to face; on the other, we avoid committing Plato to the thesis that sensible items are excluded from the domain of knowledge. Our strategy involves arguing that the passage assumes a conceptual framework that belongs not to Plato, but to his opponent.