The Party of the Brazilian president in the legislature: centralization of labor in permanent commissions

Abstract

In Brazil, the president's party commands job positions and legislative proposals in the executive branch, demonstrating the effort to implement its agenda. However, a bill only becomes law after being passed by the legislature, where it is frequently changed in committees. Thus, the presidential party also seeks to gain command of these bodies. This article analyzes if and how this occurs. We use a descriptive analysis, with logistic regressions, and data from the Cebrap Legislative Database on the presidents and rapporteurs of legislative commissions (1995-2014). We demonstrate that the presidential party has more rapporteurs than their weight in the House, mainly for bills proposed by government. Its deputies preside over the committees that distribute the most rapporteurships and benefit their co-members in the assignments. The article contributes to analysis of executive-legislative branch relationships, and the administration of coalitions and confirms the importance of committees in the decision-making process.

centralization of labor; presidentialism through coalition; the president's party; legislative branch; permanent commissions