This article discusses the conditions for applying the notion of singularity within the discourse of cognitive psychology. Given the diversity of human phenomena associated with the construction of knowledge, it is important to delineate the conditions by which individuals differentiate themselves as unique interpreters, and how cognitive psychology has traditionally emphasized the importance of universal phenomena in human cognition. In order to access the notion of singularity, we built on studies about the processes of meaning production and used as a reference the propositions of so-called Wittgenstein II. This opened up a dialogue between two distinctive but related episteme -discursive psychology and Vygotsky's sociohistorical psychology-, both at the core of our argument. Our goal was to underline the implications of the singular for discursively-oriented notions of subjectivity in psychology, taking into account the uniqueness of psychology itself as a field for signification and redescription.
Singularity; meaning; discursive psychology