Abstract
The government of the Brazilian state of Minas Gerais adopted a management model, known as Management Shock, by way of covenants called Agreement on Results, which foresee possible rewards for the achievement of agreed upon targets. Considering such covenants and the assumption that agents can promote adjustments or changes in performance indicators contained therein in order to pursue interests different than those initially agreed upon, this research sought to identify the organizational and environmental factors influencing changes of performance indicators in the government's management structure. This research was conducted in light of the Agency and Contingency Theories. To this end, we conducted a qualitative case study, collecting data through documentary analysis, questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. The interviews were subsequently submitted to content analysis. The results show that the tools provided are not sufficient to shield the model's managerial structure from pressures identified using Agency and Contingency Theories. As a consequence the model as originally proposed was undermined, allowing for changes to indicators.
Key words:
organizational performance evaluation; performance indicators; management by results; public management; Minas Gerais state Government management shock