Recompra de ações: regulamentação e proteção dos minoritários

Gabrielli, Marcio Fernandes; Saito, Richard

doi:10.1590/S0034-75902004000400002

Resumos

O objetivo deste trabalho é rever a legislação brasileira referente ao processo de recompra de ações, inclusive as recentes mudanças com a introdução da Instrução CVM no 299, e analisar o seu impacto sobre os acionistas minoritários. Antes dessa Instrução, as recompras de ações poderiam sinalizar um fechamento branco de capital. Nesse caso, os acionistas minoritários poderiam ser prejudicados. A pesquisa foi realizada a partir de uma amostra dos anúncios de recompra de ações realizados na BOVESPA no período entre janeiro de 1994 e junho de 2002, e confirmou-se que, em média, os acionistas minoritários tiveram um retorno acumulado de -10% durante os três meses após o anúncio da recompra das ações. Concluiu-se que, após a promulgação da Instrução CVM no 299, as ações passaram a obter retornos anormais acumulados positivos, beneficiando os acionistas.

Recompra de ações; Instrução CVM no 299; proteção dos acionistas minoritários; regulamentação

This article reviews the legal aspects regarding the share repurchase process, including the recent changes introduced by the CVM Instruction #299, and analyze its impact on minority shareholders. Prior to the introduction of CVM #299, share repurchases could signal that the company would go private. This could expropriate the minority shareholders. We empirically test based on a sample with all share repurchase on BOVESPA from January 1994 to June 2002, and confirm that on average the minority shareholders had an accumulated return of -10% within three months after the announcement of share repurchase. After the enactment of the CVM Instruction #299, there was evidence of positive cumulative abnormal returns for the announced share repurchase programs, bringing benefits to minority shareholders.

Share repurchase; Instruction CVM #299; expropriation of minority shareholder; regulation

FINANÇAS

Recompra de ações: regulamentação e proteção dos minoritários

Share repurchase: regulation and minority shareholders

Marcio Fernandes Gabrielli^I; Richard Saito^II

^IESPM e FGV-EAESP

^IIFGV-EAESP

RESUMO

O objetivo deste trabalho é rever a legislação brasileira referente ao processo de recompra de ações, inclusive as recentes mudanças com a introdução da Instrução CVM no 299, e analisar o seu impacto sobre os acionistas minoritários. Antes dessa Instrução, as recompras de ações poderiam sinalizar um fechamento branco de capital. Nesse caso, os acionistas minoritários poderiam ser prejudicados. A pesquisa foi realizada a partir de uma amostra dos anúncios de recompra de ações realizados na BOVESPA no período entre janeiro de 1994 e junho de 2002, e confirmou-se que, em média, os acionistas minoritários tiveram um retorno acumulado de 10% durante os três meses após o anúncio da recompra das ações. Concluiu-se que, após a promulgação da Instrução CVM no 299, as ações passaram a obter retornos anormais acumulados positivos, beneficiando os acionistas.

Palavras-chave: Recompra de ações, Instrução CVM no 299, proteção dos acionistas minoritários, regulamentação.

ABSTRACT

This article reviews the legal aspects regarding the share repurchase process, including the recent changes introduced by the CVM Instruction #299, and analyze its impact on minority shareholders. Prior to the introduction of CVM #299, share repurchases could signal that the company would go private. This could expropriate the minority shareholders. We empirically test based on a sample with all share repurchase on BOVESPA from January 1994 to June 2002, and confirm that on average the minority shareholders had an accumulated return of 10% within three months after the announcement of share repurchase. After the enactment of the CVM Instruction #299, there was evidence of positive cumulative abnormal returns for the announced share repurchase programs, bringing benefits to minority shareholders.

Key words: Share repurchase, Instruction CVM #299, expropriation of minority shareholder, regulation.

Texto completo disponível apenas em PDF.

Full text available only in PDF format.

Artigo recebido em 11.11.2003.

Aprovado em 05.05.2004.

Marcio Fernandes Gabrielli

Professor da Escola Superior de Propaganda e Marketing. Mestre em Administração de Empresas pela FGV-EAESP. Interesses de pesquisa na área de finanças. E-mail: mfgabrielli@terra.com.br Endereço: Rua São Vicente de Paulo, 367, apto 52, Higienópolis, São Paulo SP, 01229-010.

Richard Saito

Professor Titular do Departamento de Contabilidade, Finanças e Controle da FGV-EAESP. Ph.D. em Engenharia econômica pela Stanford University. Interesses de pesquisa na área de finanças. E-mail: rsaito@fgvsp.br Endereço: Av. 9 de Julho, 2029, 11º andar, Departamento de Finanças, Bela Vista, São Paulo SP, 01313-902.

BAGWELL, L. S. Dutch Auction Repurchase: An Analysis of Shareholder Heterogeneity. The Journal of Finance, v. 47, n. 1, p. 71-105, 1992.
BARCLAY, M.; SMITH, C. Corporate Payout Policy: Cash Dividends versus Open Market Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 22, n. 1, 1988.
BROCKMAN, P.; CHUNG, D. Managerial Timing and Corporate Liability: Evidence from Actual Share Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 61, n. 3, 2001.
COMMENT, R.; JARRELL, G. A. The Relative Signaling Power of Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases. Journal of Finance, v. 46, n. 4, p. 1243-1271, 1991.
COOK, D. et al Corporate Repurchase Programs: Execution Strategy and the Competing-Market-Maker Effect. Working Paper, University of Colorado (USA), 1996.
DANN, L. Y. Common Stock Repurchases An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 9, n. 2, p. 113-138, 1981.
GRINBLATT, M.; TITMAN, S. Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy 2. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002.
GRULLON, G.; MICHAELY, R. Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis. Journal of Finance, v. 57, n. 4, 2002.
GUAY, W.; HARFORD, J. The Cash Flow Permanence and Information Content of Dividend Increases versus Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 57, n. 3, 2000.
IKENBERRY, D. et al Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 39, n. 2/3, p. 181-208, 1995.
IKENBERRY, D. et al Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading. Journal of Finance, v. 55, n. 5, p. 2373-2397, 2000.
JAGANNATHAN, M. et al Financial Flexibility and the Choice Between Dividends and Stock Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 57, n. 3, p. 355-384, 2000.
JENSEN, M. C.; MECKLING, W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, n. 4, 1976.
KIM, J.; SCHREMPER, R. Cross-Country Examination of Open Market Repurchase Regulations: Do They Create a Conflict of Interest in the U.S.? Working Paper, University of Oregon (USA), 2002.
LAKONISHOK, J.; VERMAELEN, T. Anomalous Price Behavior Around Repurchase Tender Offers. Journal of Finance, v. 45, n. 2, p. 455-477, 1990.
LA PORTA, R. et al Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. Journal of Finance, v. 55, n. 1, p. 1-33, 2000.
LASFER, M. A. The Market Valuation of Share Repurchases in Europe. Working Paper, City University Business School (UK), 2002.
LI, K.; McNALLY, W. Information Signaling or Agency Conflicts: What Explain Canadian Open Market Share Repurchases? Working Paper of the University of British Columbia and the University of Victoria, February, 1999.
LIE, E.; LIE, H. J. The Role of Personal Taxes in Corporate Decisions: An Empirical Analysis of Share Repurchases and Dividends. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, v. 34, n. 4, p. 533-552, 1999.
MILLER, J.; McCONNELL, J. Open-Market Share Repurchase Programs and Bid-Ask Spreads on the NYSE: Implications for Corporate Payout Policy. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, v. 30, n. 3, 1995.
PROCIANOY, J. L.; MOREIRA, L. F. Open Market Stock Repurchases at BOVESPA, BALAS, 2000.
SAITO, Richard. Determinants of the Differential Pricing between Voting and Non-Voting Shares in Brazil. Brazilian Review of Econometrics, v. 23, n.1, 2003.
SAITO, R. Share Repurchase Mechanisms and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from Brazil. In: ENCONTRO ANUAL DA ASSOCIAÇÃO NACIONAL DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM ADMINISTRAÇÃO, 2001. Anais Campinas: ANPAD, 2001.
STEPHENS, C. P.; WEISBACH, M. S. Actual Share Reacquisition in Open Market Repurchase Programs. The Journal of Finance, v. 53, n. 1, p. 313-334, 1998.
VERMAELEN, T. Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 9, n. 2, p. 139-183, 1981.
VERMAELEN, T. Repurchase Tender Offers, Signaling, and Managerial Incentives. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, v. 19, n. 2, p. 163-181, 1984.
WEISBENNER, Scott J. Corporate Share Repurchases in the 1990s: What Role Do Stock Options Play? Working Paper of the National Reserve Board (USA), April 2000.

Datas de Publicação

Publicação nesta coleção
10 Fev 2011
Data do Fascículo
Dez 2004

Histórico

Aceito
05 Maio 2004
Recebido
11 Nov 2003

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.

[1] BAGWELL, L. S. Dutch Auction Repurchase: An Analysis of Shareholder Heterogeneity. The Journal of Finance, v. 47, n. 1, p. 71-105, 1992.

[2] BARCLAY, M.; SMITH, C. Corporate Payout Policy: Cash Dividends versus Open Market Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 22, n. 1, 1988.

[3] BROCKMAN, P.; CHUNG, D. Managerial Timing and Corporate Liability: Evidence from Actual Share Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 61, n. 3, 2001.

[4] COMMENT, R.; JARRELL, G. A. The Relative Signaling Power of Dutch-Auction and Fixed-Price Self-Tender Offers and Open-Market Share Repurchases. Journal of Finance, v. 46, n. 4, p. 1243-1271, 1991.

[5] COOK, D. et al Corporate Repurchase Programs: Execution Strategy and the Competing-Market-Maker Effect. Working Paper, University of Colorado (USA), 1996.

[6] DANN, L. Y. Common Stock Repurchases An Analysis of Returns to Bondholders and Stockholders. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 9, n. 2, p. 113-138, 1981.

[7] GRINBLATT, M.; TITMAN, S. Financial Markets and Corporate Strategy 2. ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002.

[8] GRULLON, G.; MICHAELY, R. Dividends, Share Repurchases, and the Substitution Hypothesis. Journal of Finance, v. 57, n. 4, 2002.

[9] GUAY, W.; HARFORD, J. The Cash Flow Permanence and Information Content of Dividend Increases versus Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 57, n. 3, 2000.

[10] IKENBERRY, D. et al Market Underreaction to Open Market Share Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 39, n. 2/3, p. 181-208, 1995.

[11] IKENBERRY, D. et al Stock Repurchases in Canada: Performance and Strategic Trading. Journal of Finance, v. 55, n. 5, p. 2373-2397, 2000.

[12] JAGANNATHAN, M. et al Financial Flexibility and the Choice Between Dividends and Stock Repurchases. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 57, n. 3, p. 355-384, 2000.

[13] JENSEN, M. C.; MECKLING, W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 3, n. 4, 1976.

[14] KIM, J.; SCHREMPER, R. Cross-Country Examination of Open Market Repurchase Regulations: Do They Create a Conflict of Interest in the U.S.? Working Paper, University of Oregon (USA), 2002.

[15] LAKONISHOK, J.; VERMAELEN, T. Anomalous Price Behavior Around Repurchase Tender Offers. Journal of Finance, v. 45, n. 2, p. 455-477, 1990.

[16] LA PORTA, R. et al Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around the World. Journal of Finance, v. 55, n. 1, p. 1-33, 2000.

[17] LASFER, M. A. The Market Valuation of Share Repurchases in Europe. Working Paper, City University Business School (UK), 2002.

[18] LI, K.; McNALLY, W. Information Signaling or Agency Conflicts: What Explain Canadian Open Market Share Repurchases? Working Paper of the University of British Columbia and the University of Victoria, February, 1999.

[19] LIE, E.; LIE, H. J. The Role of Personal Taxes in Corporate Decisions: An Empirical Analysis of Share Repurchases and Dividends. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, v. 34, n. 4, p. 533-552, 1999.

[20] MILLER, J.; McCONNELL, J. Open-Market Share Repurchase Programs and Bid-Ask Spreads on the NYSE: Implications for Corporate Payout Policy. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, v. 30, n. 3, 1995.

[21] PROCIANOY, J. L.; MOREIRA, L. F. Open Market Stock Repurchases at BOVESPA, BALAS, 2000.

[22] SAITO, Richard. Determinants of the Differential Pricing between Voting and Non-Voting Shares in Brazil. Brazilian Review of Econometrics, v. 23, n.1, 2003.

[23] SAITO, R. Share Repurchase Mechanisms and Expropriation of Minority Shareholders: Evidence from Brazil. In: ENCONTRO ANUAL DA ASSOCIAÇÃO NACIONAL DE PÓS-GRADUAÇÃO EM ADMINISTRAÇÃO, 2001. Anais Campinas: ANPAD, 2001.

[24] STEPHENS, C. P.; WEISBACH, M. S. Actual Share Reacquisition in Open Market Repurchase Programs. The Journal of Finance, v. 53, n. 1, p. 313-334, 1998.

[25] VERMAELEN, T. Common Stock Repurchases and Market Signaling. Journal of Financial Economics, v. 9, n. 2, p. 139-183, 1981.

[26] VERMAELEN, T. Repurchase Tender Offers, Signaling, and Managerial Incentives. Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, v. 19, n. 2, p. 163-181, 1984.

[27] WEISBENNER, Scott J. Corporate Share Repurchases in the 1990s: What Role Do Stock Options Play? Working Paper of the National Reserve Board (USA), April 2000.

Brasil

Brasil

Recompra de ações: regulamentação e proteção dos minoritários

Share repurchase: regulation and minority shareholders

Resumos

Datas de Publicação

Histórico