ABSTRACT
Purpose:
The study seeks to verify the influence of the board of directors’ independence on the performance of BM&FBOVESPA listed companies and to analyse which agency conflicts influence the performance of the board of directors.
Originality/value:
The factor of Brazil being an emerging country which lacks a strict legal system and control factors against corruption in these environments and the public sectors emphasizes the importance of applying the best corporate governance practice code in the main developed countries, reflecting the need for effective supervisory bodies that contribute to better financial performance of companies.
Design/methodology/approach:
The study involved a quantitative survey using a sample of 33 companies in the highway operating segment and 220 reports from 2010 to 2016. A fixed-effects regression model with panel data was used for analysis.
Findings:
The results were statistically significant for the board’s independence variables, which confirm the theory that the presence of independents as members of the board positively influences financial management and the company that holds the executive member and chairman of the board positions has a negative effect. The size of the board did not present statistical significance.
KEYWORDS
Agency theory; Corporate governance; Board of administration; Independent advisor; Performance