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Partisan alignment and requests for federal transfers in Brazil

Abstract

This article analyzes how subnational governments request transfers from the federal government in Brazil. Using microdata on applications for discretionary transfers from the Brazilian federal government to municipalities between 2009 and 2016 and a regression discontinuity design (RDD), I show that mayors affiliated with the president’s party demand substantially more resources than opposition mayors, meaning that the partisan alignment is an important channel to request transfers. On the other hand, the effect varies among mayors from other coalition parties. Thus, the results show that partisan alignment between different levels of government is a key factor in explaining the requests for discretionary resources in Brazil.

Keywords:
distributive politics; government coalitions; discretionary transfers

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