Institutional and organizational variety is increasingly characterizing advanced economic systems. While traditional economic theories have focused almost exclusively on profit-maximizing (i.e., for-profit) enterprises and on publicly-owned organizations, the increasing relevance of non-profit organizations, and especially of social enterprises, requires scientists to reflect on a new comprehensive economic approach for explaining this organizational variety. This paper examines the main limitations of the orthodox and institutional theories and asserts the need for creating and testing a new theoretical framework, which considers the way in which diverse enterprises pursue their goals, the diverse motivations driving actors and organizations, and the different learning patterns and routines within organizations. The new analytical framework proposed in the paper draws upon recent developments in the theories of the firm, mainly of an evolutionary and behavioral kind. The firm is interpreted as a coordination mechanism of economic activity, and one whose objectives need not coincide with profit maximization. On the other hand, economic agents driven by motivational complexity and intrinsic, non-monetary motivation play a crucial role in forming firm activity over and above purely monetary and financial objectives. The new framework is thought to be particularly suitable to correctly interpret the emergence and role of nontraditional organizational and ownership forms that are not driven by the profit motive (non-profit organizations), mainly recognized in the legal forms of cooperative firms, non-profit organizations and social enterprises. A continuum of organizational forms ranging from profit making activities to public benefit activities, and encompassing mutual benefit organizations as its core constituent, is envisaged and discussed.
organizational variety; evolutionary economics; behavioral economics; non-pecuniary motivations; private benefit; mutual benefit; public benefit
