The main objective of this perspective paper is to analyze the role of the judiciary in resolving conflicts between cattle raisers and meatpacking firms in Brazil. Looking at the transaction for the acquisition of cattle for slaughter in the state of Mato Grosso do Sul (the central-western region of Brazil), the analysis encompasses three steps. First, the authors describe the transaction pattern between cattle raisers and meatpacking firms, identifying a guarantee vacuum within the supply chain. Secondly, the authors present evidence that the guarantee vacuum may give rise to legal conflicts of non-payment, which are indeed prevalent in disputes that reach the courts. Finally, the role of the judiciary in resolving these conflicts is investigated. Results suggest that, on average, producers have little confidence in the legal system, indicating the potential function that informal mechanisms may play in the supply chain. The paper concludes by suggesting some implications for public and private strategies.
institutions; judicial system; guarantees; beef chain
