ABSTRACT:
This article analyzes Brazilian budget model, considering Constitutional Amendments 86, of 2015 and 100, of 2019 - which makes it mandatory to execute budget programming included by parliamentary amendments. The paper's purpose is to link the discussion of nature of the budgetary system to the broader issue of power relations in the budget. Bibliographic and documentary research are used, with qualitative exploratory analysis, through comparative and argumentative verification of the national legal system, doctrine and jurisprudence, as well as specialists in the areas of budgeting and political science. It is possible to conclude that the Brazilian budgetary legal order has chosen to assign specific roles to each branch, in a system with shared responsibilities. In this sense, despite of persisting divergence in doctrine, the national budget has not had its modus operandi radically altered with the amendments, since the introduced mandatoryness has several conditions. It was also verified that the controversy is relevant in relation to power relations, notably between the Executive and Legislative branch, in the dispute for budgetary protagonism.
Keywords:
authorizing budget; mandatory budget; coalitional presidentialism; relations among government branches; Constitutional Amendment nº 86,2015 and nº 100, de 2019