This essay aims to analyze the evolution of the Brazilian economical and institutional scene that has both produced a new relationship among big corporations, shareholders, and commission agents, and spread its consequences over unions and the security service. The article points the vicissitudes of the attempts to install the corporative governance model in Brazil, using the parceled chambers as a cognitive counterpoint. It shows also some particularities on the recent dealings with laws that regulate the corporative governance, focusing on the difficulties faced by the agents who have attempted to bring such concept, natural of the Anglo-Saxon finance community, to the Brazilian scene. The discussion intends to show that, from one point of view the difficulties are an expression of the Brazilian capitalism model, which has currently undertaken a process of delegitimization caused by the prevalence of those who favor globalization, taken as the organic intellectuals of the current dominating elites; from another, it shows that the "globalizing" actors have received a decisive and somewhat unexpected help from the high ranks of the union movement, which by all means greatly influences the economic and political dispute fought around the implementation or not of the corporative governance and its boundaries.
Economical sociology; Cognitive sociology; Labor sociology; Institutional construction; Corporative governance