The scope of this essay is to present an analysis of the economic theory of incomplete contracts, interacting law and economics, especially through contracts. By studying foreign doctrine, we aim at bringing an economic view of long-term contracts into judicial structure, evolving the current possibilities of contract review. Hence, the timeliness of the subject, especially in international doctrine and the reduced internal doctrine on the subject justify its choice for academic research. In the scenario, the main characteristics of the economic theory of incomplete contracts shall be presented. This is a qualitative study which methodology consists of bibliographic research, in order to establish a dialogue between law, economics and contractual theory. This essay is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is dedicated to establishing the relation between law and economics. The second chapter analyses the economic theory of the incomplete contract and transaction costs. The third chapter aims at applying the economic theory of incomplete contracts to our legal system. As a conclusion, we believe that the economic theory of incomplete contracts broadens the cases in which contract review may apply.
Law and economics; Incomplete contracts; Transaction costs; Contract review