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Court Disposition Time in Brazil and in European Countries

TEMPO DO PROCESSO JUDICIAL NO BRASIL E EM PAÍSES EUROPEUS

Abstract

The length of judicial proceedings is an important subject on the agenda of social researchers, policy-makers, politicians, legal practitioners, and court administrators in several countries. Whether the court disposition time in a country is reasonable or not is a matter of debate. Brazilian courts are usually perceived to be slow. This study investigates whether court delay is a real problem or merely a perception. The duration of civil cases in Brazil is measured by international standards and then compared to those in European courts. The disposition time in Brazilian first-instance courts takes 600 days, almost three times longer than the European average (232 days). In Brazilian second-instance courts, it takes 320 days, 50% longer than in Europe (215 days). However, the number of cases decided in those courts exceeds the number of new incoming cases, which means that the backlog and the disposition time in Brazilian courts are decreasing. These data are discussed in this paper and a research agenda and management recommendations are proposed later on this document.

Keywords
Court delay; civil cases; case backlog; disposition time; clearance rate

Resumo

O tempo do processo judicial é um assunto relevante na agenda de pesquisadores sociais, gestores de políticas públicas, políticos, profissionais do Direito e administradores do sistema de justiça. Se o tempo de processos judiciais em países específicos deve ser considerado razoável ou não, isso permanece uma questão em aberto. Os tribunais brasileiros são percebidos como lentos. Esse estudo investiga se o atraso judicial é um problema real ou apenas uma percepção enviesada. A duração de processos cíveis no Brasil é mensurada com o uso de padrões internacionais e, então, comparada com a duração em tribunais europeus. O tempo dos processos judiciais em tribunais de primeira instância é de 600 dias, quase três vezes maior que a média na Europa (232 dias). Nos tribunais brasileiros de segunda instância, o tempo de duração (320 dias) é 50% maior que na Europa (215 dias). No entanto, o número de processos decididos nos tribunais brasileiros é maior que o número de novos casos, o que significa que o estoque de processos e o seu tempo de duração têm uma tendência de queda. Esses dados são discutidos neste artigo, e também são propostas recomendações gerenciais e uma agenda de pesquisa.

Palavras-chave
Atraso judicial; casos cíveis; estoque de processos; tempo de julgamento; índice de atendimento à demanda

Introduction

Brazilian citizens believe that court delay is an issue in Brazil (FGV, 2017FUNDAÇÃO GETULIO VARGAS (FGV). ICJ BRASIL: Relatório Índice de Confiança na Justiça no Brasil. São Paulo: Fundação Getulio Vargas, 2017.; AMB, 2019ASSOCIAÇÃO DOS MAGISTRADOS BRASILEIROS (AMB). Estudo da imagem do Judiciário brasileiro. [S.l.]: AMB: FGV: IPESPE, 2019. Available at: Available at: https://www.amb.com.br/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/ESTUDO_DA_IMAGEM_.pdf . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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; CNJ, 2019CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (CNJ). Relatório Anual da Ouvidoria 2018. Brasília: Conselho Nacional de Justiça, 2019.). The Brazilian judicial system may be violating the constitutional rule according to which cases should be decided in a ‘reasonable time’. What constitutes a reasonable time is an open theoretical question, normally debated by legal scholars. However, what constitutes court disposition time is an empirical issue that can be measured and compared. In order to investigate whether court delay is a real problem or merely a perception, empirical studies can (1) measure court disposition time in Brazil, and (2) compare the results with other countries’.

The obstacle of court delay occurs in Asian and African countries, such as China (JIANG, 2005JIANG, Qing-Yun. Court Delay and Law Enforcement in China: Civil Process and Economic Perspective. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 2005.), India (HAZRA and MICEVSKA, 2004HAZRA, Arnab K.; MICEVSKA, Maja B. The Problem of Court Congestion: Evidence from Indian Lower Courts. ZEF - Discussion Papers on Development Policy, 88. Center for Development Research, University of Bonn, 2004. Available at: Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21844 . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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; CHEMIN, 2010CHEMIN, Matthieu. Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, [s.l.], v. 28, n. 3, p. 460-485, 2010. Available at: Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/41653646 . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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), Nepal (GRAJZL and SILWAL, 2020GRAJZL, Peter; SILWAL, Shikha. The Functioning of Courts in a Developing Economy: Evidence from Nepal. European Journal of Law and Economics, [s.l.], v. 49, p. 101-129, 2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-017-9570-7
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) and Senegal (KONDYLIS and STEIN, 2018KONDYLIS, Florence; STEIN, Mattea. The Speed of Justice. Policy Research. Working Paper, n. 8372. World Bank, 2018. Available at: Available at: http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/fr/455021521720861143/pdf/The-speed-of-justice.pdf . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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), in Latin American countries (BUSCAGLIA and ULEN, 1997BUSCAGLIA, Edgardo; ULEN, Thomas. A Quantitative Assessment of the Efficiency of the Judicial Sector in Latin America. International Review of Law and Economics, [s.l.], v. 17, n. 2, p. 275-291, 1997. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00007-0
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) and in parts of Europe (BIELEN, MARNEFFE and VEREECK, 2015BIELEN, Samantha; MARNEFFE, Wim; VEREECK, Lode. A Cross-Country Analysis of the Impact of Regulatory Quality on Commercial Case Disposition Time. European Journal of Law and Economics, [s.l.], v. 39, n. 3, p. 455-474, 2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-014-9469-5
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). European countries are substantially attentive to court disposition time. The European Convention on Human Rights, published in 1950, states that “everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time” (Article 6). The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ) examines court disposition time in more than 40 countries by using common statistical criteria and means of evaluation (CEPEJ, 2018COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). European Judicial Systems (Data 2016). Efficiency and Quality of Justice. CEPEJ Studies n. 26. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2018. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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). The data collected is publicly available on CEPEJ’s official website. The long tradition of CEPEJ in measuring court disposition time, the extensive and diverse list of countries measured, and the availability of data make European countries a suitable standard for comparison.

The length of cases can be measured by different methods. The Brazilian National Council of Justice (CNJ) applies the traditional method of measuring the number of days between the starting point (the day the case was brought to court) and the final point (the day the case was decided). For each of them, the number of days is calculated, and court disposition time simply means cases decided by that court in a specific period, such as a year.

Some problems may arise from this method. Firstly, excluding the large number of pending cases may end up distorting the results. Moreover, the number of days tends to increase when older cases (with longer duration) are decided. It may seem that the court performance is deteriorated, but it is, in fact, improved by removing old cases from the backlog.

To overcome this issue, CNJ uses a separate measure for the pending cases, however, it is also biased. All pending cases are considered resolved on a specific date, usually the last day of the year. Their real length is much longer, as they will run for many days or even years after the arbitrary cut-off date. Besides being biased, this ‘dual method’ (intended for decided and pending cases) increases the complexity of the analysis. It is not clear whether the court disposition time is increasing or not, considering that the length of decided cases decreases as the length of pending ones increases. It also complicates comparisons between different courts. If Court A is faster in decided cases and Court B is faster in pending cases, it is hard to say which one of them is preferable.

A statistical technique known as ‘survival analysis’ resolves some of these difficulties by considering both decided and pending cases in the same analysis (GRAJZ and ZAJC, 2017GRAJZL, Peter; ZAJC, Katarina. Litigation and the Timing of Settlement: Evidence from Commercial Disputes. European Journal of Law and Economics, [s.l.], v. 44, p. 287-319, 2017.). The use of survival analysis in the field of law and economics is increasing and some studies based on this technique have been published (e.g. BIELEN et al., 2016BIELEN, Samantha et al. The Duration of Judicial Deliberation: Evidence from Belgium. Working Paper, n. 5947, Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich, 2016.; GRAJZ and ZAJC, 2017GRAJZL, Peter; ZAJC, Katarina. Litigation and the Timing of Settlement: Evidence from Commercial Disputes. European Journal of Law and Economics, [s.l.], v. 44, p. 287-319, 2017.; PROCOPIUK, 2018PROCOPIUCK, Mario. Information Technology and Time of Judgment in Specialized Courts: What is the Impact of Changing from Physical to Electronic Processing? Government Information Quarterly, [s.l.], v. 35, n. 3, p. 491-501, 2018.). The major concern of survival analysis is that it requires case-level data, which is very difficult to obtain, especially for international studies comparing different countries.

The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice uses the backlog index (also known as the Capelletti-Clark index) to assess court disposition time in European countries (CEPEJ, 2018COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). European Judicial Systems (Data 2016). Efficiency and Quality of Justice. CEPEJ Studies n. 26. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2018. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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). This index is defined as the number of pending cases at the end of the year, divided by the number of cases resolved (CLARK and MERRYMAN, 1976CLARK, David; MERRYMAN, John. Measuring the Duration of Judicial and Administrative Proceedings. Michigan Law Review, [s.l.], v. 75, n. 1, p. 89-99, 1976.). It indicates the number of years the system would take to resolve all pending cases (backlog) and it can also be interpreted as the average length of a case in the court (CASTRO, 2009CASTRO, Alexandre. Court Performance in Brazil: Evidence from Judicature-Level Data. SSRN Electronic Journal, [s.l.], 2009.). Some studies evidence a correlation between this index and the actual procedural times per case. The index approximates both the median and the mean of actual duration, representing a consistent measure of central tendency (BUSCAGLIA and DAKOLIAS, 1999BUSCAGLIA, Edgardo; DAKOLIAS, Maria. Comparative International Study of Court Performance Indicators: A Descriptive and Analytical Account. Washington: The World Bank, 1999.). Several studies have used the backlog index as a measure of case duration (e.g. MURRELL, 2001MURRELL, Peter. Demand and Supply in Romanian Commercial Courts: Generating Information for Institutional Reform. Journal of Economic Literature. Manuscript: IRIS Center; University of Maryland, 2001.; CHEMIN, 2009CHEMIN, Matthieu. Do Judiciaries Matter for Development? Evidence from India. Journal of Comparative Economics, [s.l.], v. 37, n. 2, p. 230-250, 2009.; CASTRO, 2009CASTRO, Alexandre. Court Performance in Brazil: Evidence from Judicature-Level Data. SSRN Electronic Journal, [s.l.], 2009.). According to the CEPEJ, this ratio “allows comparisons within the same jurisdiction over time and, with some prudence, between judicial systems in different countries” (CEPEJ, 2018COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). European Judicial Systems (Data 2016). Efficiency and Quality of Justice. CEPEJ Studies n. 26. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2018. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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, p. 238).

To assess whether courts are keeping up with the incoming caseload, CNJ and CEPEJ monitor the clearance rate, obtained by dividing the number of decided cases by the number of incoming ones, expressed in a percentage (CNJ, 2020CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (CNJ). Relatório Justiça em Números 2020: Ano-base 2019. Brasília: Conselho Nacional de Justiça, 2020. Available at: Available at: https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/WEB-V3-Justi%C3%A7a-em-N%C3%BAmeros-2020-atualizado-em-25-08-2020.pdf . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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; CEPEJ, 2018COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). European Judicial Systems (Data 2016). Efficiency and Quality of Justice. CEPEJ Studies n. 26. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2018. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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). A clearance rate close to 100% indicates that the court resolves approximately as many cases as it enters during the period. A clearance rate above 100% indicates the ability of the court to resolve more cases than it receives, reducing the number of pending cases (backlog). A clearance rate below 100% means the number of incoming cases is higher than the number of decided cases, which increases the number of pending ones.

The case backlog of a court may be built up over several years, and the backlog index reflects past performance. Court disposition time is an indicator of present conditions. The clearance rate indicates future trends, as it shows whether the backlog will increase or decrease. The combination of backlog index and clearance rate reveals a general picture of the pace of cases in courts. Surprisingly, no study was found comparing the backlog index of Brazilian courts to the index of other countries. The clearance rate was uniquely used in one cross-country study (DAKOLIAS, 1999DAKOLIAS, Maria. Court Performance around the World: A Comparative Perspective. Yale Human Rights and Development Journal, [s.l.], v. 2, p. 87-142, 1999.), however, the research considered only two Brazilian cities (São Paulo and Brasilia) and it was produced a long time before the collection of official judicial data by the Brazilian National Council of Justice.

Since there aren’t any studies that compare the duration of cases in Brazil to that of other countries, it is hard to know whether court disposition time in Brazil is excessive or not. To fill in this gap in the literature, the present study (1) measures court disposition time in Brazil, using the backlog index, (2) measures the trend in court disposition time in Brazil, using the clearance rate, and (3) compares the results with the same performance indicators in European countries.

1. Method and Data

International comparisons of the length of judicial proceedings are complex and inaccurate, due to the differences between judicial structures, economic situations, demography, and legal characteristics from one country to another. One traditional international comparison considering judicial systems from different countries is carried out by The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice (CEPEJ). Since 2004, the commission has undertaken a regular process of evaluating the judicial systems of the Council of Europe member states. The data used by CEPEJ is provided by each country every two years. Each national correspondent answers a list of questions, using a specific collection system. All correspondents must read the explanatory notes carefully before replying to each question. This procedure promotes a common understanding and produces uniformity in the collection of data (CEPEJ, 2018COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). European Judicial Systems (Data 2016). Efficiency and Quality of Justice. CEPEJ Studies n. 26. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2018. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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). Therefore, the commission achieves data with a reasonable level of comparability between very different countries.

According to CEPEJ, focusing on civil and commercial litigious cases offers a clearer picture for comparative analysis as there are fewer differences in the definition used by different states (CEPEJ, 2018COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). European Judicial Systems (Data 2016). Efficiency and Quality of Justice. CEPEJ Studies n. 26. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2018. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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). The analysis produced by CEPEJ includes more than 40 countries with different judicial traditions, including civil law countries (e.g. Italy, Spain, Portugal), the same system adopted in Brazil. Considering the large number of countries analyzed by CEPEJ and the inclusion of some civil law countries, it seems reasonable to compare Brazil to European countries based on civil and commercial litigious cases.

The greatest methodological challenges of this study are (1) to understand the criteria used by CEPEJ to define “civil and commercial litigious cases” and (2) to apply these criteria in the Brazilian context. Serious flaws in either of those steps would affect the fairness of the comparison between Brazilian and European courts. Table 1 addresses both challenges, by displaying that CEPEJ in Europe and CNJ in Brazil adopt comparable criteria to define “civil and commercial litigious cases”.

Table 1 -
Judicial Data Comparability between Europe and Brazil

The document “Explanatory Note to the Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems” (CEPEJ, 2017COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). Explanatory Note to the Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems. 2016-2018 Cycle. 2017. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/explanatory-note-to-the-scheme-for-evaluating-judicial-systems/1680767c02 . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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) offers a detailed explanation of all criteria used by the European Council. That document defines “civil and commercial litigious cases” to include typical civil cases, such as divorces and disputes regarding contracts; typical commercial cases, such as bankruptcies and enforcement litigious cases; and labor cases, such as employment dismissals (termination of the employment contract by initiative of the employer). Enforcement cases related to those issues are also included. The category does not include criminal cases, administrative cases (disputes between citizens and public authorities), and civil non-litigious cases, such as business and land registers (duties performed by some courts in Europe).

Aiming to apply those criteria as precisely as possible, a careful process of data collection and selection of Brazilian cases was carried out. In Brazil, civil and commercial litigious cases (such as family, contractual, and bankruptcy cases) are decided by state courts, whereas employment dismissals are decided by labor courts. Therefore, only cases filed in state and labor courts were considered. Cases filed in federal and military courts were not included, as those courts are responsible for deciding cases that are considered administrative under CEPEJ standards. Cases filed in electoral courts were also excluded as they are not civil or commercial litigious cases.

In state courts, all the non-criminal cases were considered, including the enforcement ones. However, tax enforcement cases (when the government files a case to collect unpaid taxes) were not included due to their administrative characteristics. Some other administrative cases filed in state courts remained in the pool, such as those filed by public servants against the state government or cases filed by citizens or companies against the tax authorities, as the available data is not enough to distinguish them from civil cases. This is not a serious concern, as some European countries face the same difficulty in including some administrative cases in the “civil and commercial litigious cases” category,1 1 CEPEJ argues that countries may be not able to distinguish between administrative and civil cases. “Administrative law cases are in some countries addressed by special administrative courts or tribunals, whilst in other countries, they are handled by the ordinary civil courts. If countries have special administrative courts/tribunals or separate administrative law procedures or are in any way able to distinguish between administrative law cases and civil law cases, these figures are indicated separately under administrative law cases” (CEPEJ, 2017, p. 20). which affects a relatively small number of cases filed in Brazilian state courts.

All cases were considered in labor courts, including enforcement ones. Brazilian labor courts decide employment dismissals as well as other cases regarding professional relations between employees and employers, including moral damage or non-payment by employers. Although these cases are decided by labor courts in Brazil, they belong to the general category of “civil and commercial litigious cases” according to CEPEJ criteria and are included in the pool of cases analyzed.

Case disposition time in Brazilian courts was measured by the same formula adopted by CEPEJ (CEPEJ, 2018COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). European Judicial Systems (Data 2016). Efficiency and Quality of Justice. CEPEJ Studies n. 26. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2018. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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), obtained by dividing the number of pending cases at the end of the year by the number of decided cases within the same year, multiplied by 365 (days in a year):

C o u r t D i p o s i t i o n T i m e = N u m b e r o f p e n d i n g c a s e s a t t h e e n d o f t h e y e a r N u m b e r o f d e c i d e d c a s e s d u r i n g t h e y e a r × 365

Clearance rates in Brazilian courts were also measured by the same formula adopted by CEPEJ (CEPEJ, 2018COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). European Judicial Systems (Data 2016). Efficiency and Quality of Justice. CEPEJ Studies n. 26. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2018. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/rapport-avec-couv-18-09-2018-en/16808def9c . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
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), obtained by dividing the number of decided cases by the number of incoming cases, expressed in a percentage:

C l e a r a n c e R a t e ( % ) = D e c i d e d c a s e s i n a y e a r I n c o m i n g c a s e s i n a y e a r × 100

The Brazilian data was downloaded from the Brazilian National Council of Justice website2 2 Available at: https://www.cnj.jus.br/pesquisas-judiciarias/paineis-cnj/. and covered the year 2019, the last available data at the time the research was carried out. Disposition time and clearance rate of European countries were obtained from CEPEJ website3 3 Available at: https://www.coe.int/en/web/cepej/dynamic-database-of-european-judicial-systems/. and covered the year 2016, the last year available.

2. Results and Discussion

The final dataset used in the research captures the majority of litigation in Brazil. The number of new incoming cases filed in first-instance courts (15,295,613) represents 63% of all new cases filed in Brazilian courts at that level.

In Brazil, cases filed in state courts may follow the common procedure or the special procedure (designed for small claims). There is a similar division in labor courts, however, the data provided by the National Council of Justice about labor courts does not make such a distinction, so all cases are reported in a combined group (‘all procedures’). In the first-instance, cases may be in the judgment phase (when the case is not decided yet) or in the enforcement phase (when the judicial decision or an extrajudicial credit will be enforced). Considering the method described in the previous section, the disposition time and the clearance rate of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian first-instance courts are displayed in Table 2.

Table 2 -
Disposition Time and Clearance Rate of Civil and Commercial Cases at First-Instance Courts in Brazil

The disposition time of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian first-instance courts is 600 days, however, there is significant variation depending on the court, the procedure, and the phase of the case. The judgment of labor cases (197 days) is faster than the judgment in state courts, whether the judgment in the state court follows the common procedure (707 days) or the special procedure (323 days). Such a result is unexpected, considering that special procedures in state courts involve small claim cases which, in theory, are simpler to decide. The pace in the judgment of labor cases may reflect the specialization of those courts, the specific procedural rules for labor cases, or even the quantity and quality of available human resources. However, when it comes to disposition time in the enforcement phase, the special procedure (404 days) is faster than the common procedure (1,301 days) and the enforcement in labor courts (954 days). The maximum value of claims that follow the special procedure in state courts (40 times the minimum wage) may facilitate the enforcement of those cases. Cases following common procedure in state courts or cases brought to labor courts may be of any value.

The disposition time of judgments is always shorter than the time of the respective enforcement. This phenomenon occurs in state court common procedure (707 days in judgment vs. 1,301 days in enforcement), in state court special procedure (323 days in judgment vs. 404 days in enforcement), and labor courts (197 days in judgment vs. 954 days in enforcement).

The clearance rate of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian first-instance courts is 120%. It means that not only are first-instance courts coping with incoming cases, but also deciding cases in the backlog. The clearance rates during the judgment phase exceed the 100% threshold (133% in state court common procedure, 115% in state court special procedure, and 127% in labor courts). However, the clearance rates for enforcement are mixed. While they are high in labor courts (113%), they are around the 100% threshold in state court special procedure and low in state court common procedure (94%). There is a particular concern regarding the enforcement in state court common procedure, as it presents the highest disposition time (1,301 days) and the lowest clearance rate (94%) in the first-instance, which means that the backlog of those cases is increasing.

Tables 3 and 4 show the disposition time and clearance rates of civil and commercial cases in first-instance courts of Brazil and European countries.

Table 3 -
Disposition Time of Civil and Commercial Cases at First-Instance Courts in Brazil and European Countries
Table 4 -
Clearance Rates of Civil and Commercial Cases at First-Instance Courts in Brazil and European Countries

As evidenced in Table 3, the average disposition time of civil and commercial litigious cases in Brazilian first-instance courts (600 days) is significantly higher than the average in Europe (232 days). It is also higher than in all European countries monitored by CEPEJ, except for Greece (610 days). On the other hand, as displayed in Table 4, the average clearance rate of civil and commercial litigious cases in Brazilian first-instance courts (120%) is higher than in almost all European countries. Only Slovakia (132%) and Finland (125%) achieve higher clearance rates than Brazil. A combination of disposition time and clearance rates of civil and commercial litigious cases at first-instance courts is shown in Figure 1, offering a complete background of the pace of cases in Brazil in comparison to European countries.

Figure 1 -
Clearance Rate vs. Disposition Time for Civil and Commercial Cases at First-Instance Courts in Europe and Brazil

In Brazilian state courts, second-instance decisions may follow both common or special procedures. In Brazilian second-instance labor courts, there is a similar division, however, data provided by the National Council of Justice does not make such distinction, so all cases are reported in a combined group (‘all procedures’). As the enforcement of cases is only applied in the first-instance, there is no division of phase (judgment or enforcement) in the second-instance. Considering the method described in the previous section, the disposition time and the clearance rates of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian second-instance courts are shown in Table 5.

Table 5 -
Disposition Time and Clearance Rate of Civil and Commercial Cases at Second-Instance Courts in Brazil

The disposition time of civil and commercial cases in Brazilian second-instance courts consists of 320 days, almost half of the time in first-instance courts (620 days). This result is expected considering that the collection of evidence in the second-instance takes less time than in the first-instance. Another possible reason is the absence of an enforcement procedure in the second-instance, resulting in an evidently time-consuming phase in the first-instance, as demonstrated above.

Tables 6 and 7 highlight disposition time and clearance rates of civil and commercial cases in second-instance courts of Brazil and European countries, evidencing a Brazilian clearance rate of around 104%. Although much lower compared to the clearance rate in the first-instance (120%), it is still above the 100% threshold, which means that second-instance courts are dealing with incoming cases and a reduced part of the backlog. The lower clearance rate is expected assuming that the backlog is smaller. Consequently, the pressure over second-instance judges to reduce the backlog is also smaller. It is also possible to evidence little variation in the clearance rates of second-instance courts, which are very close to the mean of 104%.

The average disposition time of civil and commercial litigious cases in Brazilian second-instance courts (320 days) is almost 50% higher than the average in Europe (215 days). As shown in Table 6, Brazilian second-instance courts are slower than 25 of the 33 countries monitored by CEPEJ. The clearance rate of 104% is higher than most European countries, as indicated in Table 6, however, the position in the list (12th place) is not so consistent as the position of first-instance courts (3rd position).

Table 6 -
Disposition Time of Civil and Commercial Cases at Second-Instance Courts in Brazil and European Countries
Table 7 -
Clearance Rates of Civil and Commercial Cases at Second-Instance Courts in Brazil and European Countries

A combination of disposition time and clearance rates of civil and commercial litigious cases at second-instance courts is introduced in Figure 2, providing a more complete scenario of the pace of cases in Brazil in comparison to European countries.

Figure 2 -
Clearance Rate vs. Disposition Time for Civil and Commercial Cases at Second-Instance Courts in Europe and Brazil

Conclusions and Recommendations

Comparing the performance of courts from different countries is a challenging task and should be carefully approached. The legal and institutional characteristics of countries may affect the comparability of their judicial systems. This type of study requires a thorough understanding of the concepts used by different countries and plenty of quantitative data. The European Commission for the Efficiency of Justice has made remarkable efforts to ensure a clear understanding of the concepts used to evaluate the judicial systems of European countries. The Brazilian National Council of Justice has conducted distinguished work to properly deliver detailed judicial data to the public. The efforts of both organizations enabled a consistent comparison of the duration of cases in Brazilian and European courts.

Broadly speaking, court disposition time in Brazil is significantly higher than in European countries. The situation is particularly critical in first-instance courts. While disposition time in civil and commercial litigious cases in first-instance European courts consists of 232 days, in Brazil, it is almost three times higher (600 days). This result would put those courts in the last place among 40 countries analyzed by CEPEJ, except for Greece. Second-instance Brazilian courts are also slower than their European counterparts. Though less problematic than first-instance courts, the disposition time of civil and commercial litigious cases in Brazilian second-instance courts (320 days) is almost 50% higher than the European average (215 days). This result would put Brazilian second-instance courts in the last quartile of European countries. Considering this international comparison, it seems reasonable to conclude that case duration in Brazil is significantly long. The perception of Brazilian citizens about court disposition time is accurate. Court delay is a real issue in Brazil.

However, current court disposition times reflect a backlog of cases over several years. Currently, Brazilian courts are not accumulating cases. In fact, more civil and commercial cases are decided compared to the number of incoming cases. Both first and second-instance courts have clearance rates above 100%, which means that the backlog of cases is actually decreasing. The effort of first-instance courts is impressive. Considering its clearance rate of 120%, it is possible to state that these courts are quickly reducing their backlog. Such a scenario is higher than in almost all European countries. The disposition time in Brazilian courts is on a downward path.

Maintaining this trend will result in a great challenge to the Brazilian judicial system considering that the backlog of cases in Brazilian courts is huge. To achieve the average of disposition time in European countries, the clearance rate in Brazil must remain above the 100% threshold for several years. The legal agents in the judicial system may end up struggling to keep the clearance rate at this level for such a long time. Moreover, the pressure on judges will decrease by the time the backlog also starts decreasing, which usually reduces judicial productivity (BEENSTOCK and HAITOVSKY, 2004BEENSTOCK, Michael; HAITOVSKY, Yoel. Does the Appointment of Judges Increase the Output of the Judiciary? International Review of Law and Economics, [s.l.], v. 24, n. 3, p. 351- 369, 2004.; DIMITROVA-GRAJZL et al., 2012DIMITROVA-GRAJZL, Valentina; GRAJZL, Peter; SUSTERSIC, Janez; ZAJC, Katarina. Judicial Incentives and Performance at Lower Courts: Evidence from Slovenian Judge-Level Data. International Review of Law and Economics, [s.l.], v. 32, n. 1, p. 19-29, 2012.; GOMES, GUIMARAES and AKUTSU, 2017GOMES, Adalmir; GUIMARAES, Tomas; AKUTSU, Luiz. Court Caseload Management: The Role of Judges and Administrative Assistants. RAC, Rio de Janeiro, v. 21, n. 5, art. 3, p. 648-665, 2017.).

If judicial productivity declines, the number of decided cases diminishes and the clearance rate returns to a 100% level. In this scenario, the backlog of cases will stabilize and the trend toward faster court disposition times will end. To avoid this sequence of events, court administrators must control judicial productivity carefully, at least until court disposition times in Brazil get close to international standards. Quantitative goals defined by the Brazilian National Council of Justice may delay this possible decrease in judicial productivity. In fact, the first goal defined for each Brazilian court is to keep the clearance rate above 100% (CNJ, 2021CONSELHO NACIONAL DE JUSTIÇA (CNJ). Metas Nacionais 2021 Aprovadas no XIV Encontro Nacional do Poder Judiciário. Brasília: Conselho Nacional de Justiça, 2021. Available at: Available at: https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Metas-Nacionais-aprovadas-no-XIV-ENPJ.pdf . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
https://www.cnj.jus.br/wp-content/upload...
). Questions such as if, when, and how much the lower pressure on judges will affect the clearance rate is an empirical issue that may be addressed by future research.

Another primary focus of Brazilian policy-makers is the enforcement of cases in state courts, where the number of decided cases is below the number of new cases, which means that the backlog is increasing. It is possible to evidence a special emphasis on the enforcement of cases following common procedure, whose disposition time is the highest among those surveyed in this study, surpassing the symbolic limit of 1,000 days. The clearance rate of this group is only 94%, which means that the backlog is growing rapidly. It would also be interesting to prospectively investigate the reason why the enforcement of cases in state courts is so challenging.

Future cross-country studies about court disposition time could focus on specific classes of civil cases. Comparative research about the duration of cases could also center attention on other legal fields, such as criminal or administrative cases, following distinct procedural rules that may produce different results from those previously studied. As this study has only evaluated courts of first and second-instance, a comparison of disposition time in superior courts may also be considered a topic for future research.

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    CEPEJ argues that countries may be not able to distinguish between administrative and civil cases. “Administrative law cases are in some countries addressed by special administrative courts or tribunals, whilst in other countries, they are handled by the ordinary civil courts. If countries have special administrative courts/tribunals or separate administrative law procedures or are in any way able to distinguish between administrative law cases and civil law cases, these figures are indicated separately under administrative law cases” (CEPEJ, 2017COMMISSION EUROPEENNE POUR L‘EFFICACITE DE LA JUSTICE (CEPEJ). Explanatory Note to the Scheme for Evaluating Judicial Systems. 2016-2018 Cycle. 2017. Available at: Available at: https://rm.coe.int/explanatory-note-to-the-scheme-for-evaluating-judicial-systems/1680767c02 . Accessed on: October 24, 2022.
    https://rm.coe.int/explanatory-note-to-t...
    , p. 20).
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  • How to quote this article: CASTELLIANO, Caio; GUIMARAES, Tomas Aquino. Court Disposition Time in Brazil and European Countries. Revista Direito GV, São Paulo, v. 19, e2302, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1590/2317-6172202302

Publication Dates

  • Publication in this collection
    20 Feb 2023
  • Date of issue
    2023

History

  • Received
    18 Sept 2020
  • Accepted
    06 Sept 2022
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