The political literature has highlighted relevant aspects regarding the legalization of politics in the Brazilian scenario. This article focuses on one of its nuances, to treat about the role of the Brazilian Bar Association (OAB) front of abstract judicial review. Unlike the other players in this select group of Article 103 of the Federal Constitution, the OAB has its operations based on three pillars, legitimized by the Supreme Court in the trial of ADI 3.026/DF: the absence of thematic relevance, lack of external control and characterization as independent public service. It is clear, therefore, that the institutional design of the Brazilian Bar Association gave a list of atypical prerogatives, signaling a strong political power, capable of generating significant costs on public authorities. In this sense, what interests and what the performance of this actor in the field of abstract judicial review? This research aims to answer this question by exploring a large dataset of constitutional actions (ADI) and searching for empirical evidence of the role played by Brazilian OAB in political judicial review arena. Overall, in conclusion, it was found that there is a higher success rate of the actions that deal with corporate interests, taking advantage of the public interest aimed at strengthening itself.
Brazilian Bar Association; judicialization of politics; Constitutional actions
