ABSTRACT
The paper discusses and criticizes the credit rationing model (CRM) and its use to support the new-Keynesian approach to the monetary policy. After analyzing the working of the model in the different phases of the business cycle it is concluded that: (i) in the upward phase, demand rationing equilibrium - which is a condition for recommendation of counter-cyclical monetary policy in the CRM scope - is not plausible as a macroeconomic phenomenon, but only at microeconomic level; (ii) in the downward phase, although the demand rationing is a plausible equilibrium, it does not occur for the reason alleged by the CRM (the rigidity of the interest rate), neither it does act in favour of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. These conclusions imply the rejection of the CRM as theoretical basis for monetary policy analysis, as well as of the new-Keynesian approach about this theme. Finally, it is argued that, at macroeconomic level, the unique theoretical contribution of the CRM is to justify “vertical” interventions of government in financial markets, through financing policies to sectors or projects which risks are more difficult to estimate, notably, in infra-structure, R&D and new-technology sectors.
KEYWORDS:
Credit rationing model; monetary policy; countercyclical policy; credit market
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