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Twight (1994Twight, C. (1994), "Political transaction-cost manipulation. An integrating theory", Journal of Theoretical Politics, Vol. 6, N. 2, pp. 189-216.) |
Political TransactionCost Manipulation. An integrating theory |
This paper develops a model of government manipulation of politically relevant transaction costs, and presents a taxonomy that classifies several forms of governmental transaction-cost manipulation. |
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Patasksnik (1996Patashnik, E. (1996), "The contractual natural of budgeting: A transaction cost perspective on the design of budgeting institutions", Policy Sciences, 29, pp. 189-212.) |
The contractual natural of budgeting: A transaction cost perspective on the design of budgeting institutions |
This paper provides an overview of transaction cost theory and its implications for the design of budgeting institutions. It contrasts the behavioural premises of the transactional approach with those of more traditional budgetary theories and examines whether commitment and agency costs have structured budget actors´ institutional choices. |
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Weber (1997Weber, K. (1997), "Hierarchy amidst anarchy: a transaction costs approach to international security cooperation", International Studies Quaterly, 41, pp. 321-340.) |
Hierarchy Amidst Anarchy: A Transaction Costs Approach to International Security Cooperation |
This paper provides an interest-based explanation for hierarchy in international politics. The key to understanding countries´ international institutional choices is in focusing on transaction costs. It tests the theory via the case study of the creation of a European Defense Community. |
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Jones and Hudson (1998Jones, P. and J. Hudson (1998), "The role of political parties: An analysis based on transactions costs", Public Choice, 94, pp. 175-189.) |
The role of political parties: An analysis based on transaction costs |
This paper explores the proposition that political parties reduce the transaction costs of electoral participation. Political parties reduce voters´ information costs. |
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Laffont and Martimont (1998Laffont, J.J. and D. Martimort (1998), "Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers", European Economic Review, 42, pp. 673-684.) |
Transaction costs, institutional design and the separation of powers |
This theoretical paper discusses how an institutional design relying on separation of powers among specialized agencies may improve policy outcomes. The choice of specialized agencies is better because it increases the overall transaction costs of capture. |
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Hindmoor (1998Hindmoor, A. (1998), "The importance of being trusted: Transaction costs and policy network theory", Public Administration, Vol. 76, pp. 25-43.) |
The importance of being trusted: Transaction costs and policy network theory |
This paper develops policy network theory using a transactional approach. Policy communities develop and survive because they reduce transaction costs that would otherwise threaten the exchange of resources between government and pressure groups |
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Gallego-Calderón (1998Gallego-Calderón, R. (1999), "Institutional design in the public sector: the role of political transaction costs", ECPR Joint Session, Mannheim, 26-31 March.) |
Institutional design in the public sector: the role of political transaction costs |
This paper studies the extent to which political transaction costs may influence the decisions that politicians make when designing public sector organisational arrangements. It points out that political transactions are mediated though relations of public authority. |
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Estache and Martimort (1999Estache, A. and D. Martimort (1999), "Politics, transaction costs and the design of regulatory institutions", World Bank Policy Research.) |
Politics, transaction costs and the design of regulatory institutions |
This paper studies the design of regulatory institutions from a transaction costs approach. Structures and processes will affect regulatory outcomes, by which the paper analyses the role of transaction costs in the government organizational structure. |
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Majone (2001Majone, G. (2001), "Nonmajoritarian institutions and the limits of democratic governance: a political transaction-cost approach", Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, N. 157, pp. 57-78.) |
Nonmajoritarian Institutions and the Limits of Democratic Governance: A Political Transaction-Cost Approach |
This paper shows that delegation of powers to nonmajoritarian institutions is best understood as a means of reducing certain political transaction costs. It argues that the fiduciary principle should be recognised as the central element in the governance structure of nonmajoritarian institutions. |
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Murshed (2001Murshed, S. M. (2001), "Transaction cost politics, institutions for commitment and rent-seeking", Discussion Paper N. 125. WIDER. United Nations University.) |
Transaction Cost Politics, Institutions for Commitment and Rent-Seeking |
This paper addresses the issues of commitment, compromise and rentseeking, all of which are relevant to institutional design and the formulation of policies. It assumes some foundations from transaction cost politics. |
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Jones and Hudson (2001Jones, P. and J. Hudson (2001), "Political parties, political integrity and public policy: a transactions costs approach", Political Studies, V. 49, pp. 70-88.) |
Political Parties, Political Integrity and Public Policy: A transaction costs approach |
This paper presents a transaction costs theory of political parties. It points that if voters reduce transaction costs by relying on party signal, politicians have an incentive to maintain party reputation. |
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Acemoglu (2003Acemoglu, D. (2003), "Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment and politics", Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4), pp. 620-652.) |
Why not a political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, commitment and politics |
This paper discusses various approaches to political economy and develops the argument that there are strong empirical and theoretical grounds for believing that ineffi policies and institutions are prevalent. |
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Ter Bogt (2003Ter Bogt, H. (2003), "A transaction cost approach to the autonomization of government organizations: a political transaction cost framework confronted with six cases of autonomization in the Netherlands", European Journal of Law and Economics, 16, pp. 149-186.) |
A Transaction Cost Approach to the Autonomization of Government Organizations: A Political Transaction Cost Framework Confronted with Six cases of autonomization in the Netherlands |
This paper applies a transaction cost framework to politically governed organizations. The results of exploratory case research into six government organizations in the Netherlands suggest that such factors as bounded rationality, opportunism, political efficiency, and social institutions may have played an important part in the autonomization of the organizations involved. |
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Berggreen and Karlson (2003Berggren, N. and N. Karlson (2003), "Constitutionalism, division of power and transaction costs", Public Choice, V. 117, N. 1-2, pp. 99-124.) |
Constitutionalism, division of power and transaction costs |
This paper expands the framework of Buchanan and Tullock (1962Buchanan, J. M. and G. Tullock (1962): The Calculus of Consent. Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.), and it argues that a division of power can be beneficial and that it is not necessarily the case that a division of power does entail high transaction costs. |
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Henisz and Zelner (2004Henisz, W. J. and B. A. Zelner (2004), "Explicating political hazards and safeguards: a transaction cost politics approach", Industrial and Corporate Change, 13, 6, pp. 901-915.) |
Explicating political hazards and safeguards: a transaction cost politics approach |
The paper applies the logic of comparative institutional analysis to the question of the governance of the relationship between private investors and the government. The paper identifies political hazards as a crucial determinant of the choice of political governance and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards. |
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Wood and Bohte (2004Wood, B. D. and J. Bohte (2004), "Political transaction costs and the politics of administrative design", The Journal of Politics, V. 66, N. 1, pp. 176-202.) |
Political transaction costs and the politics of administrative design |
The paper proposes a political transaction cost theory of the politics of administrative design. It assumes that the enacting coalition alters political transaction costs to optimize expected benefits. The paper evaluates the theory using data for the designing US administrative agencies. |
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Caballero, Caballero and Losada (2006Caballero, A., Caballero, G. and A. Losada (2006) "Credibility, rules and power in the European union institutions: a transactional analysis of the stability and growth pact", Brazilian Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 26, N. 3 (103), pp.445-458.) |
Credibility, Rules and Power in the European Union Institutions: a Transactional Analysis of the Stability and Growth Pact |
This paper opened the "black box" of the European Union institutions and analyses the problem of credibility in the commitment of the Stability and Growth pact, which constituted a formal rule that tried to enforce budgetary discipline on the European States. Compliance with this contract could be ensured by a "third-party enforcement" or an interest in reputational capital, but some countries failed to comply with the ruling and managed to avoid the application of sanctions. |
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Ruiter (2005Ruiter, D. W. P. (2005), "Is transaction cost economics applicable to public governance?" European Journal of Law and Economics, 20, pp. 287-303.) |
Is Transaction Cost Economics Applicable to Public Governance? |
This paper studies the applicability of transactional analysis to the public sphere with the use of institutional legal theory. An attempt is made at solving some fundamental problems concerning the applicability of transaction cost economics to public governance. |
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Sorensen (2006Sorensen, R. J. (2006), "Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs", Public Choice, 127, pp. 75-95.) |
Local government consolidations: The impact of political transaction costs |
This paper studies the effect of political transaction costs on the consolidation of local authorities for the case of the Norwegian local governments. |
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Caballero (2011Caballero, G. (2011), "Institutional foundations, committee system and amateur legislators in the governance of the Spanish congress: An institutional comparative perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain)", pp. 157-184, in Schofield, N. and G. Caballero (eds) (2011): Political Economy of Institutions, Democracy and Voting. New York: Springer.) |
Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain) |
This paper continues the research programme of Weingast and Marshall (1988Weingast, B. R. and W. J. Marshall (1988), "The industrial organization of congress; or, why legislatures, like firms, are not organized as markets", Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 96, 1, pp. 132-163.) to compare different models of Congress governance in Spain, Argentina and USA. The traditional industrial organization of the US Congress is based on a candidate-centered electoral rules, strong committees and professional legislators in a presidential system. The Argentine Congress is based on party-centered electoral rules, weak committees and amateur legislators in a presidential system. The Spanish case is similar to the Argentine model but in a parliamentary system. |
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Caballero and Arias (2013Caballero, G. y X. C. Arias (2013) "Transaction cost politics in the map of the new institutionalism", pp. 3-31, en Schofield, N., Caballero G. y D. Kselman (eds): Advances in Political Economy: Institutions, Modeling and Empirical Analysis. New York: Springer.) |
Transaction Cost Politics in the Map of the New Institutionalism |
This paper shows the different types of new institutionalism and presents Transaction Cost Politics in the map that incorporates all those types of institutionalisms in social sciences. |
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Baccini (2014Baccini, L. (2014): "Cheap talk: Transaction costs, quality of institutions, and trade agreements", European Journal of International Relations, Vol 20 (1), pp. 80-117.) |
Cheap talk: Transaction costs, quality of institutions, and trade agreements |
This paper defends that the quality of institutions raises the quantity and the quality of information available to potential member states during the bargaining phase of a trade agreement. In turn, this inflow of information reduces the negotiation period of an agreement and, in doing so, dampens the transaction costs associated with it. As a result, countries with good institutions are more likely to form trade agreements. |
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Krutilla and Alexeev (2014Krutilla and Alexeev (2014), "The political transaction costs and uncertainties of establishing environmental rights", Ecological Economics, 107, pp. 299-309.) |
The Political Transaction Costs and Uncertainties of Establishing Environmental Rights |
This paper deals with the costs and uncertainties associated with establishing the right to use resources and models the political process around the rights establishment. The model is solved to give unique Nash equilibria for the transaction costs of lobbying and for the probability of the policy´s political success. |
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Gilligan (2014Gilligan, M. (2014), "The transaction costs approach to international institutions", in H. V. Milner & Moravcsik, eds. (2014): Power, Interdependence, and Nonstate Actors in World Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.) |
The transactions costs approach to international institutions |
This paper studies the role of transaction costs in the creation of international institutions and departures from the decentralized cooperation theory to incorporate transaction costs and international institutions. |
