Um novo consenso sobre a política monetária?

HERON, EDWIN LE

doi:10.1590/0101-31572004-0605

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Brazilian Journal of Political Economy

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Articles • Brazil. J. Polit. Econ. 23 (4) • Oct-Dec 2003 • https://doi.org/10.1590/0101-31572004-0605 copiar

Um novo consenso sobre a política monetária?

Autoria SCIMAGO INSTITUTIONS RANKINGS

RESUMO

Ao analisar os documentos emitidos pelo Banco do Canadá, uma política monetária original pode ser vista. A política monetária canadense tenta manter sua autonomia e, ao mesmo tempo, respeitar as taxas de câmbio flutuantes. As numerosas inovações são a base de um novo consenso sobre política monetária. Longe da regra do dilema versus discrição dos antigos métodos monetaristas e keynesianos, um novo dilema será o foco: o da credibilidade versus confiança. Aqui, as antecipações dos agentes econômicos, o comportamento dos mercados financeiros e o preço dos ativos desempenham um papel dominante. Com base no experimento inovador do Banco do Canadá durante a década de 1990, as características do Novo Consenso serão explicadas. Longe de tornar bancos centrais independentes algumas instituições de alta potência, isso os mostra como “estátuas com pés de barro”.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE:
Banco Central; política monetária; metas de inflação; Banco do Canadá; credibilidade versus confiança

Monetary system	Keynesian Consensus	Monetarist Consensus	“New Consensus”
Type of liberalism	Social democracy Importance of “Reason” and of normative choices of man. Discretionary action of the State	Naturalist liberalism, general equilibrium of market, rejection of the reason of statesman except for money	Liberalism, partial market equilibrium, asymmetry of information and of power of agents, the State interacts with markets
Approach, foundations	Macroeconomics	Macroeconomics	Microeconomics
Neutrality of money	No	No in the short-term Yes in the long-term	No, but it depends on expectations and information
Monetary and financial environment of the period specialization	National. Strong intermediation, economy of indebtedness, banking specialization	Deregulation, disintermediation, capital market economy	Globalization of financial flows and financial markets

Monetary system	Keynesian Consensus	Monetarist Consensus	“New Consensus”
Foundational theory	IS-LM-BP model, endogenous demand of money, exogenous supply of money	Quantitative equation, exogenous demand and supply of money	Game theory and theories of expectations
Type of expectations	Extrapolative	Adaptive and others	Self-fulfilling
Financial markets	Not important	Neutral	Very important
Financing of the State	Yes, budgetarism	Without any foundations because of the neutralization of public spending	Forbidden, but fiscal policy is possible in certain limits
Origin of inflation	Excess of demand and costs of production, Phillips curve	Excess of money	Excess of demand and expectations
Exchange rate system	Fixed	Floating	Flexible
Demand for money	Unstable	Stable	Unstable
Central bank	Depends on the Government	Independent	Independent

Monetary system	Keynesian Consensus	Monetarist Consensus	“New Consensus”
Determination	Government	Central bank	Central bank
Scale of political action	National	National	National, regional and global
Effectiveness of monetary policy	Rather low	Strong on inflation	Strong if credible
Final objective	Magic square	Price stability	Price stability
Intermediary targets	Interest rate and exchange rate	Money supply or monetary base	Inflation-control target so, expected inflation, financial asset prices, and exchange rate
Instrument	Adaptation of the supply to the money demand	Short-term interest rate	Real interest rate, transparent information
Time-scale of monetary policy	Short-term	Long run	Medium and long run
Transmission channel of monetary policy	Interest rate r, loan (financing of the economy), exchange rate e	Quantitative theory, wealth effect	Multiple and complex (r, e, loans, expectations, announcement effect, financial asset prices, balance sheet)
Strategy	Discretionary and contra-cyclical	Rule, strict monetary discipline and surprise effect	Credibility and/or confidence, stabilization of expectations, transparency and permanency

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