The administrative architecture of transparency in Spain: Regulation-inside-government and institutional design of Transparency Authorities

Abstract:

This article is based on the premise that the proliferation of transparency laws and authorities is one of the manifestations of the growing regulatory approach applied to the public sector itself known as regulation-inside-government. The rise of this administrative architecture also has an important constitutional value. In the present work, a detailed study of the institutional design of transparency authorities is carried out, both at national and sub-national level, in order to determine the elements that may favour their independence and impartiality. To check whether the deployment of these authorities is framed within the theoretical framework of regulation-inside-government, the article has analysed three fundamental axes: the legal nature of the authority; the composition of the authority and the statute of the members serving at its governing bodies, especially when they are competent to resolve complaints regarding access to public information; and the provision of effective resources for the fulfilment of their functions. The results of the analysis show that, beyond the heterogeneity of the formulas used by legislators, there are necessary requirements and elements that correctly employed can influence the independence of the transparency authorities.

Keywords:
Transparency authorities; transparency councils; independence and autonomy; complaint and right of access; regulation-inside-government