ABSTRACT
Introduction:
The recall is a vertical accountability mechanism incorporated in several Latin American constitutions to a greater extent since the 90s. If the result of the referendum is to revoke the representative, he ceases in office and must be arbitrated to replace it according to the regulations.
Materials and methods:
The assumption that runs through the article is that the mode, electoral or non-electoral, of replacement of the representatives a relevant factor to define the use given to the mechanism: as a tool of societal accountability or as an instrument of electoral political dispute. From the review of the application cases, the aim is to clarify whether it is possible to establish a relationship between: the mode of succession of a revoked agent, the number of requests for recall submitted, the quality of their promoters and the type of use given to the mechanism. For this, an exploratory study of the Latin American countries that incorporate the recall in their national Constitutions is developed. First, a normative analysis of its fundamental laws and regulations is made, in order to know the mode way of succession provided by each State. Second, an in-depth case study is carried out to observe the performance of the recall in the facts.
Results:
After the development of the investigation, the following suggestion is made: if the replacement is carried out by non-electoral means, the cases of recall are usually scarce and mostly called by citizens to get rid of bad rulers. On the other hand, if the succession is defined by elections, the recall is used more frequently, and mostly by political actors who intend to gain early access to office.
Discussion:
These results call into question the true usefulness of a mechanism that has been created to favor citizen control the rulers, because its institutional design can enable its unwanted use, undermining governability and institutional stability.
KEYWORDS:
Recall; Succession; Accountability; Electoral incentive; Political manipulation