This article argues that the National Council of Justice (CNJ), created in Brazil in 2004, was the result of a political arrangement based on the achievement of the Reform of the Judiciary. In this arrangement the interests of the Federal Supreme Court (STF) prevailed over the others and therefore the result of a constitutional amendment number 45 was a CNJ directed by members of the Brazilian Court. To achieve it we use a review of literature and data analysis. The argument is developed from the logic of approving institutional design CNJ tied to the interests of the STF is the best strategy to be developed by the members of the Court. This can be explained by: 1) The judges of the Supreme Court are important political actors; 2) The existence of judicial independence guaranteed by institutional prerogatives; 3) Political systems with a high degree of fragmentation increases the likelihood of judges (STF) to approve their interests; 4) the existence of the mechanism of judicial review extends the degree of influence of the Supreme Courts and 5) Finally, the existence of informal mechanisms of persuasion facilitate the success of the judges of the Supreme Court. From the case study we conclude that: the Brazilian institutional design and the fragmented political system generated a powerful Supreme Court (STF) which is responsible for centralized the judicial policy-making. The STF becoming, in this respect, a third chamber of the decision-making process.
STF; CNJ; institutional design; decision-making process
