ABSTRACT
Introduction:
The COVID-19 pandemic has critically affected Latin America. The economic contraction increased inequality, poverty, and unemployment. In this context, the different countries mobilized resources to mitigate the negative impacts of the pandemic and implemented different socioeconomic policies. For their part, when the policies affected the interests of the elites, they responded with various actions. In this article, we analyze the influence of economic elites and their actions against the redistributive policies implemented by the governments of Argentina and Mexico between 2020 and 2022.
Materials and methods:
From a comparative empirical analysis, we used two original databases of primary sources. One of them was made up of statements and public communications from the main business chambers; the other, with the public policies implemented in both countries.
Results:
The fragmented nature of the elites in Argentina allowed the government to implement redistributive policies. However, the elites have a double power of veto, political and economic, and they conditioned the framework of the economy, leading society towards a zero-sum game. On the contrary, in Mexico the cohesion of the elites conditioned the decision-makers of public policy, limiting the possibility of carrying out measures tending towards redistribution.
Discussion:
The study is a contribution to the discussion on the structural and instrumental power of the elites in Latin America, carrying a situated and historical view of power with a multi-causal approach.
Keywords
redistributive policies; economic elites; political influence; business chambers; COVID-19