In this article, I propose an interpretation of Hugh Lacey epistemology in respect to the relationship between the concept of rationality and the concepts of cognitive, human and life flourishing. I argue that the criticism of the author to the theoretical and practical aspects of technoscience involves replacing the concept of progress by the flourishing, which is consistent with a conception of human nature that values their unique and individual aspects, without compromising with theoretical and practical forms of selfish individualism. These positions allow the elaboration of an ethic of flourishing contrary to the moral of progress and the scientific activity driven by the commercial scientific ethos. This approach, according to my reading, compromises the autonomy of the individual scientist, the research institution and, ultimately, of science itself. I also discuss the analysis of the values that Lacey performs taking beliefs and desires as causes of adopting values. I propose that the desire to know is associated with some degree of spontaneity (which, according to the author, it can be argued as being a value in itself) and that, with creativity, are two values that are part of the ethic of flourishing. In conclusion, I characterize the rationality underlying the model of the interaction between science and values as flexible, pluralistic and committed to a conception of science toward a legitimate human existence, not separated from the world of life. Such attributes are also linked to rationality as intelligent responsiveness to reasons, which marks the common life and the communicative practices that intertwine intentionality and rationality.
Rationality; Rationality models; Epistemology; Spontaneity; Creativity; Commercial technoscience; Ethics; Values; Human flourishing; Lacey