Paragraph 62 of the Critique of Judgment, which was designed by Kant to define the concept of objective finality (objektive Zweckmässigkeit), begins with a statement of the philosopher, which says that all geometrical figures relates itself to a admirable and objective finality. Even though it is not key to defining the principle of this finality here, Kant's declaration that more often than not it is worth admiration plays a significant role in its very definition. The purpose of this paper is to discuss how the strictly logical principle of finality relates to general sentiment, either as admiration of nature or throughout the range of all of its variations, as subsequently shown in this very paragraph 62: Enthusiasm, joy, and stupefaction. Admittedly, such sentiments cannot intervene in the strictly logical mechanism of said principle, which is transcendental for Kant, still this paper will try to show how its usage relates to a sentiment at all times somehow. This requires showing that Kant's declaration that the teleological judgment holds no relation with the pleasure and displeasure sentiment does not necessarily imply that this type of judgment does not relate to any type of sentiment at all.
admiration; feeling; principle; finality