This work examines the connections between writing and recognition. Derrida's work shows that the distinction between oral and written forms of language is of philosophical importance, and that many philosophical problems have to do with writing. Within this framework I consider the philosophically charged distinction between connotation and denotation, specifically, the idea put forward by Mill and endorsed more recently by theories of denotation inspired by the work of Kripke, that denotation may take place without resorting to connotation. I proceed to draw a relation between the distinction between connotation and denotation on the one hand, and that between oral and written language on the other. It is in this context that the idea of Anerkennung becomes important. Its nuances in written and oral forms are then elaborated. I analyze Lévinas critique of recognition from a grammatological perspective (i.e. from a perspective that focuses on written language). I conclude with some general remarks on recognition and writing, and on occasions where recognition can be deemed irrelevant.
Anerkennung; Writing; Orality; Denotation; Connotation