The study of value is inseparable from the analysis of the concepts of good and the Good, so any methodological basis which serves as groundwork must take from these. Assuming the risks of non-sensicality, we propose to refuse a relativistic reduction of predicative good to attributive good and of good to good for, good from the point of view of and good-relative-to and discuss some attempts to identify good, particularly with pleasure, desire and choice. Following the effort to show how good is not liable to be ascribed to the psychological or subjective, the essay seeks to highlight the idea of the Good as the fundamental concept - therefore undefinable - to understand good as from its teleological structure. We therefore propose to establish good = what refers to the Good, and the concept of value as one which reflects the mediated relationship with the Good, inseparable from the ethical. Finally, we establish the possibility of a new foundation of a method of the theory of value based in the reached percepts, distinguishing between analytical, substantive and practical inquiries on value.
Theory of value; Good; Teleology; Ethics