THE STEP OF PARMENIDES

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ABSTRACT: The present work aims to show how Jacques Lacan carried out the reading of Plato’s Parmenides in order to develop a logic based on the non-relationship and independent from an ontology. We start from two fundamental references of the Platonic dialogue in the teaching of the psychoanalyst and with the aid of the texts of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, psychoanalysts, scholars and thinkers of the same theme, we move to the operator There is Something of the One forged by Lacan. The naming function in the Borromean chain and the non-sexual relationship will be discussed. Two hypotheses of the Platonic dialogue about the unit of the multiple will be examined so that both the relationship and the non-relationship between Being and the One are looked into in terms of the barred subject, the signifier and jouissance.

Keywords: Parmenides; One; psychoanalysis.
Throughout his teaching, Lacan referred at least twice to Parmenides, Plato’s dialogue that discusses the unit of the multiple, problematizing the knotting between Being and the One advanced by the Parmenidic thesis that “all things are one” (PLATO, 128a, 2003), the universe is One. Considered enigmatic and aporetic since antiquity, qualified by Hegel as “the greatest masterpiece of ancient dialectic” (1992, p. 61), from Parmenides the neo-Platonists philosophers like Procles or Damascius withdrew the nomination of the One beyond the being, thus beyond the ontology as the theory of the being. A proposition that will resurface in the medieval negative theology, whose mystical slope will praise an ineffable and unknowable god, beyond the being and its attributes. In the words of the translator and commentator Brisson, Parmenides “remains as the most fascinating and controversial” (PLATO, 1994, p. 9) of the Platonic dialogues, mainly because this is where Plato argues against Plato, tensing to the extreme the relationship established in previous dialogues between the One of ideas, eternal and immutable; and the sensitive, multiple and changing diversity of the being.

Dialogue of the baffles of the One, Parmenides defies, astonishes, leaves the characters that he brings to the scene astounded, among them the thinker Parmenides himself. Asked to develop his hypothesis about the One, he answers, preoccupied, that he doesn’t know if he will be strong enough to “swim a so vast and great ocean of arguments” (137-a).

How and why was Lacan interested in Parmenides? What would make a psychoanalyst cross this “ocean of arguments”? Such questions demand us to go back to that dialogue, probably dating from 449 BC, in which Parmenides, the so-called Pre-Socratic thinker, lends his name and in which he appears, acting as a character next to his pupil Zeno of Elea, to the young Socrates and to another young man named Aristotle. By fictionalizing this historically unlikely encounter between Parmenides (approximately 514/450 BC) and Socrates (approximately 470/399 BC), Plato portrays his double membership: a transmission involving Parmenides at first, an ancestral master who is considered the founder of philosophy; and, in a second moment, Socrates, his immediate master. Let’s determine that the dialogue, using an indirect speech, reports the meeting of the four characters mentioned: the narrator is the character Cephalus, who moved from his hometown to Athens to hear from the character Antiphon what this one ages ago had memorized of what in turn Pitodoro, the character who witnessed the encounter, had told him. As to highlight the precariousness of the transmission, the fact that no orthodoxy can ensure its fidelity to the origins, we read that Antiphon, the character who narrates to Cephalus the meeting he had heard when still very young, decided to take care of horses afterwards...

In the narrative device of the dialogue, staged in two acts, in the first scene Zeno of Elea tries to refute his opponents about the thesis of his master, Par-
menides, which asserts that the One is an intrinsic attribute of the being, which refuses any differentiation, in such a way that the One is a synonymous to the being. The thesis is in fact inferred from a first ontological statement — being is, non-being is not —, made by Parmenides (1998) in the poem in which he urges that we should stay out of every and any way that indicates that the non-being is. Having said that the non-being is not and that the remaining path is that the being is, Parmenides infers that all the attributes of the multiple and the transformation (change, movement etc.) should be scratched, because they only depend on the opinion that values appearance. Although it does not deny the appearance of the movement and plurality to sensitivity and opinion, the philosopher states that, from the point of view of rational knowledge, they cannot be.

If Parmenides’s thesis asserts, as we see, that the One and the being are interchangeable terms, Zeno of Elea aims to reduce to absurdity the opponents seeking to contradict the postulation of their master and affirm the multiple. For Zeno, if there were multiple beings, they would be similar as they are all beings and dissimilar because of their reciprocal alterity. However, the principle of contradiction prohibits claiming at the same time A and non-A, thereby inferring that the beings cannot be many and that “all things are one”, as Parmenides used to say. In the words of Zeno, his writings are in truth a sort of support for Parmenides’ doctrine against those attempting to ridicule it on the ground that, if one is, the doctrine suffers many ridiculous consequences that contradict it. This treatise, therefore, argues against those who say the many are, and it pays them back with the same results and worse, intending to demonstrate that their hypothesis “if many are” suffers even more ridiculous consequences than the hypothesis of there being one, if one pursues the issue sufficiently. (PLATO, 2003, 128c).

However, since Parmenides’s thesis had been reduced to absurdity by his opponents, to reduce, as Zeno does, this thesis to absurdity doesn’t prove the validity of the master’s proposition, but it makes the supporters of the thesis and antithesis get stuck in a logical paradox beforehand. In doing so, Zeno looks like the Sophists who, before the two opposing thesis, boasted that they were able to take one and the other to a contradiction. As it can be noticed by the sarcastic tone of the passage above quoted, it all becomes ridiculous like that.

As a result, would it be up to the philosophical claim of building a rational ontology to join Parmenides’s dogmatic ontology or be enclosed in Zeno’s antinomies? How could we think about the beings as similar and dissimilar ones at the same time without harming the principle of contradiction? Soon after Zeno’s statement, Socrates takes the word and proposes a solution to the impasse: the
theory of ideas. Thanks to this theory, the possibility of a rational ontology would be preserved, but at the cost of its limitation to what’s rational in the being: the domain of unique, eternal and immovable ideas. As for the sensitive, multiple, temporal things, etc, they are certainly a domain, heterogeneous in relation to the first, which causes its apprehension to generate apparent contradictions. One thing can be similar to itself and dissimilar to another, but because they are connected, they are part of the ideas of similarity and dissimilarity, which would be absolute, eternal, unitarian, curiously taking to itself the determinations of the Parmenidic being.

This way, it is not surprising to Socrates that all things are similar and dissimilar; after all, he himself is not a man, thus participating in the unit; and multiple things, participating in the multiplicity, in that his body has a left side and a right side? At this point in the dialogue, Socrates even sets a real challenge to his interlocutors: “Nor, again, if a person were to show that all is one by partaking of one, and at the same time many by partaking of many, would that be very astonishing. But if he were to show me that the absolute one was many, or the absolute many one, I should be truly amazed.” (PLATO, 2003, 129b).

Once Zeno is refuted by Socrates, Parmenides intervenes with various issues that diminish not exactly the theory of ideas, but this version demonstrated by the young Socrates. If we admit the distinction between the realm of things (multiple, changing, mixed) and the realm of ideas (eternal, immutable, absolute), Parmenides asks, what would be worth subscribing to such perfection? It seems plausible that there’s an idea of similarity, dissimilarity, the beautiful, the good, etc., but what about “things that would seem really ridiculous such as hair, mud, dirt, or some other unseemly or trivial thing” (IDEM, IBIDEM, 130 c)?

Well, mud is a mixture of earth and water, thinking about the idea of mud is admitting the mixture in the ideas, that is, that they are not absolute: by definition, absolute is what is only related to itself. If for Socrates, limiting to the sensitive being the multiplicity of the unit in the being was a rational ontology condition, Parmenides shows him that the contradiction resurfaces in the field of the intelligible. In other words, the old philosopher suggests to young Socrates to think what for him is amazing, what challenges the thought: a multiplicity of the unit itself and a unity of the multiplicity itself.

We have reached then the second act of the dialogue: Zeno is refuted, the theory of ideas is deeply shaken, Parmenides invites his interlocutors for a game, a dialectical exercise that, taking the One as the object, examines all possible modes of a relationship between the One and that which is not the One. As there are two paths, if the One is and if the One is not, each time the two terms should be taken into account: the One and the non-One. In turn, the nature of the two terms at stake can be examined either by itself, or in a relationship to
the other, in a relative way. In short, it is a dialectic whose grammar produces hypotheses by using three pairs of terms: the One and the non-One, being and non-being, the absolute and the relative. As a rule, the first hypothesis should be the following: If the One is, what is its nature? However, an ambiguity of the text, sometimes speaking in “if it’s One” permits an argument that the first hypothesis is “If One is One”, in which the verb to be has the function of copulation and non-existential, as in “if One is”.

Once these elements are minimally presented, we can now return to our original question: how and why was Lacan, a psychoanalyst, interested in this dialogue? To try to answer such a question, let’s first collate the allusions that Lacan makes to Parmenides. Between the first and the second reference, a change of perspective becomes obvious, also from the starting point, which we can refer to as from the Other to the One.

The first mention is pronounced in the 50’s and portrays a Lacan (1954-55) committed to distinguish the small other characteristic to the imaginary relationship, engaged to the mirrorisms and the self, to the big Other, to essential alterity, core of the symbolic function of the word. This makes him say that “I begin with A, which is the radical Other, that of the eighth or ninth hypothesis of Parmenides, which is equally the real pole of the subjective relation and is what Freud ties the relation to the death instinct to” (p. 370).

A little earlier in that same seminar, Lacan had recommended his students, exactly in the chapter entitled Introduction of the big Other, to read Parmenides, since it would be “Where the question of the One and the Other was addressed in the most vigorous and single-minded way”, adding that this is why it is one of the “most misunderstood of all works”, although it requires only
worse, he goes further and uses a proposition with a similar construction: “Il y a de l’Un” (“there’s something of the One”), which is contracted sometimes as “Yad’lun” (t/n: a similar contraction here is not possible in the English language).

It is worth noting that our translation differs from the one that has been adopted since the Brazilian Edition of the seminar Encore (LACAN, 1972-3), in which the phrase “Il y a de l’un” was translated by “There’s One”, thus eliminating the partitive, a feature that is employed in French before a noun that refers to something uncountable, to indicate that this is an indefinite quantity of this thing. It is a resource that does not have a grammatical form in Portuguese, but that is shown in the famous Hamletian sentence “there’s something rotten in the State of Denmark”. (t/n: this article was originally written in Portuguese). Between “Il y a” and “Yad’lun”, something of the One operates, without which there would be no significant series or chain, but that doesn’t belong here. It is true that we are used to an imaginary of the similarity and to a differential of the symbolic, to the unary trait, but here the One that Lacan (71-2, p. 126) calls “unien” is at stake, an epithet with which he designates the field of the different aspects of the One.

Where did Lacan take this “Yad’lun” from? Was it from the sentence by Parmenides that we’ve quoted before, “all is one”? In our opinion, “Yad’lun” is an operator that Lacan draws from fragment 57 of another thinker, the so-called Pre-Socratic Heraclitus of Ephesus, which Heidegger and Fink change to “There is one” (2000, p. 44). With the introduction of the division indicated by the partitive, isn’t it possible that Lacan wants to show us that the concepts in psychoanalysis are not real definitions, but rather fragments such as “Yad’lun”? After all, this is what “Yad’lun” is: a fragment that is able to constellate with others, but does not integrate a system. The next seminar, Encore (1972-3), will open “Yad’lun” under the mode of an Other: the insistence of an other (signifier) is constitutive of the movement of the signifying chain, which weaves and reweaves at every moment.

We have therefore there is/there isn’t, the parallelism indicating that this is the articulation at stake: there is no sexual intercourse, two don’t make One, but there exists One (“Yad’lun”), which is not that of the sexual intercourse. More precisely, there is no written sexual intercourse; the speaker lacks the “program”, in the computer meaning of the term, that would instruct him as to what to do with the Other sex. There’s certainly a sexual element written in the speaker — the symbolic phallus — but it is not enough to write the sexual intercourse or to transmit the necessary knowledge to do so. For the Lacan of ...or worse (1971-2), the language is given, but it gets to the Other (or not) from the One. Just like in a recent anecdote of the young man who, having at last found love, would never leave his smartphone just because of that.
Inhabited by a gap, the absence of sexual intercourse, which is a knowledge hole in the real, the language will never completely include in its networks what is offered to knowledge, the real always escapes. It’s impossible to make a whole with the signifiers, there’s always at least One missing. According to Lacan, the Other is not to be confused with the whole, it does not make a whole One because it’s “One-minus” (1972-3, p. 116). In other words, the Other does not exist, at least in the mathematical sense of the term, that exists as a consistent being.

However, language is not chaotic, in the sense of absence of order, it does not connect anything to anything, but it makes the One of something with something. In the essay Logos, as a matter of fact translated to French by Lacan, Heidegger (2002) translates the Greek logos as discourse, stressing that the discourse allows one to see something as something, in that it takes place in conjunction with another. As a set of signifiers, language demands that there are among those a particular separation and unity; otherwise, there would be no meaning.

Then, where does the One which makes us meet the multiple as multiple Ones originate? And, above all, what does the One do in language? A problem of delimitation of the linguistic units whose delicacy Saussure considers in the Course in General Linguistics (2002). Just like in the game of chess, the pieces of language are only worth in their differences, ones in relation to the others, what makes it as hard as necessary to specify their units, since these are not given in advance. They depend on the cut that, for example, makes you listen to “flower” instead of “flour”. In the seminar Encore (LACAN, 1972-3), which follows the different issues raised in ...or worse, we find an echo of this issue raised by the founder of modern Linguistics: “The One incarnated in lalangue is something which remains, precisely, indecisive between the phoneme, the Word, the sentence, indeed all thought. It is indeed what is at stake in what I call the master signifier” (p. 131)

But wouldn’t we find a safe definition for the One in the exact sciences? In a work that Lacan refers to quite a lot ...or worse (1971-2), The Foundations of Arithmetic, Frege shows exactly the inconsistency of the unit concepts present in mathematics, even asking himself “How can a science (mathematics) rest on such a confused concept that tries to become remarkable precisely for its greater determination and accuracy?” (1974, p. 234).

A question about the One that Lacan will continue through the borromean knot, introduced exactly in ...or worse (1971-2). Made up by at least three rings, this one has two surprising properties: first, it supports itself, it makes the One without having its rings interpenetrated (getting into each other’s holes), because neither of the two rings is chained together by a third one. That is, they do not relate to each other. Secondly, by simply removing one of the circles so that the chain falls apart. However, in the borromean chain of three, the registers (real, imaginary and symbolic) are equivalent, any ring can take the place of the other,
and the structure is in need of guidance. Well, three indistinct consistencies do not allow the subject to be represented by a signifier to another signifier, as they are confronted either with an absolute signifier, separated from the others, or with a signifier that represents all the others, without any differences. For guidance, a subjective space representation, Lacan (1975-6) will determine that another ring is necessary. A duplication of the symbolic ring, this fourth ring has the function of giving a name to the hole of the symbolic, of substituting the inexistence of sexual intercourse. From the swarm (“essaim”, in French homophonic to S1) of signifiers, it is necessary that at least One stands out, makes an exception, and works as a base so that the signifying chain preserves its referral function. The function of naming that Lacan assigns to the father who nominates: to give a name, a version for jouissance, but not without leaving a nameless reminder, because it is impossible for the One to be everything. Naming always fails, therefore it is symptomatic and thus implies the unconscious. When a name intends to nominate all jouissance, just like the despot, it precludes the unconscious, the desire.

In this change of perspective, it is altogether for Lacan something like “Instead of examining one signifier, examine the signifier One (1972-3, p. 23). Let’s go back now to “Yad’lun”. He calls our attention that this an ontologically “weak” phrase, neutral, and states that there is but not that it is, he changes into a question the relationship between the One and Being, between ontology (the doctrine of the being) and henology (the doctrine of the One).

Therefore, to assert Yad’lun is to admit that language is discernible, and that there is a signifier: any signifier is worth one while it is worth for another, an other who could be he himself, which makes him different from himself. When Gertrude Stein was asked why she had written “A rose is a rose is a rose”, she replied that, by repeating such a used word, she could then make the rose red again for the first time in over a hundred years in English poetry...

An eminently ambiguous proposition, Yad’lun does not include only the One of the symbolic, but also the One of the imaginary, of the similarity, of the merger, of the whole. The fact that a signifier refers to another signifier is the principle on which free association is based, and this is where the One of the symbolic dissolves the imaginary units. But it hides that there is no relationship, but a separation among the elements of the signifying chain. Yad’lun originates this One of the cut, of the non-relation, that Lacan calls the real One in ...or worse (1971-2). As Jean-Claude Milner recalls, this real One is the One of singularity: “So, if says a woman, without having to listen neither to the signifier One that would characterize the discernment of each one, nor the unity that would reconnect them in an animal species” (1983, p. 31).
Rather a letter than a signifier, the real One is not intertwined with the multiplicity that, through this One, is unified and distinguished. Although it merges the units of meaning, it does not lie in the units that it differentiates. With this, for the Lacan of...or worse (1971-2), the speaker becomes much more dependent on the One than on the being because it is to the One that the meaning is brought.

Lacan turns to Parmenides of Plato to build his logic. But, why Parmenides, why Plato? It’s because each one of them took a step that Lacan considers conclusive. As to Parmenides,

Because a step had already been taken by Parmenides in this milieu where what was at stake in short was to know what was involved in the Real. We are all still there. After it had been said that there was air, water, earth, fire and that after that you just start up again, there was someone who noticed that, that the only common factor in all this substance that was at stake, was that it was sayable. (1971-2, p. 95)

Thus, Parmenides made a cut in relation to all these discourses that tried to establish the being in a principle. He says that what’s common among the beings is that they are sayable, it is the saying. Referring to Parmenides, Lacan adds the step of Plato:

The step taken by Plato is different. It is to show that once you begin to say it in an articulated fashion, what is outlined in terms of structure, as we would say in our...what I called earlier our crude language — the word structure is worth no more than the word free association — but what is outlined creates a difficulty, and that it is along this path that one must search for the Real. Eidos, which is wrongly translated as form, is something that already promises a tightening up, a circumscribing of what exists as a gap in what is said.” (Idem)

For Lacan, the Platonic idea anticipates the signifier, works the real not as chaos but as a gap that its articulation tries to encircle, thus outside the framework of representation. However, Lacan surprises us saying soon after that Plato is “A bit stupid”. How come, Plato stupid? This leaves us a clue that the stupid “Wavers between two discourses” (idem, ibidem). Which of those two would Plato waver? As we have seen, the second scene of Act one of Parmenides deploys precisely the criticism made by the philosopher under this name to the weaknesses of the theory of “participation” as an answer to the problem of the relationship between things and ideas. In its irony, the dialogue thus breaks the seam between the discourse of the One and the discourse of Being brought by the theory of participation, so that we are led to the abyss of the non-being, of the impossibility of ontology.
Those are the concepts of the One, the Other, Being, the All and Not All and that Lacan will elicit from the reading of *Parmenides*, with the aim of forging what he calls “New logic — the one to be constructed from that which is not” (1971-2, p. 18).

It is a logic of singularity, of the one by one, what might explain the refusal of ontology, identified by Lacan in the discourse of the master: “The entire dimension is produced within the movement of the discourse of the master” (1972-3, p.33).

Let us now turn to the hypotheses about the multiple unit raised in *Parmenides*. Due to the impossibility to present the nine hypotheses in the space of an article, we will highlight just two of them. On the first hypothesis, “if it’s one”, we have seen that the verb to be here carries out the function of the copula. Therefore, it must be read as “if one is one”, a statement in which the signifier one predicates itself. From this hypothesis, one can infer in the referred dialogue that the one is not multiple, is not a whole nor has parts, that is not knowable or electable and that “it does not even have the necessary being to be one”. The nor were multiplied to emphasize that the One is impredicable, it does not copulate with any other signifier. So we have a disjunction between Being and the One which we can represent by drawing two circles whose intersection is empty. Analytical judgment that destroys the entity itself on which it affects, the first hypothesis leads to an impredicable One, the One beyond the being that the Neoplatonic Damascius will call “ineffable”, a bladeless knife without a handle ...

As for the second hypothesis, “if one is”, it positions an existence, it is a sense of existence that Lacan translates as *Yad’lun*. This second hypothesis claims a reality, *Yad’lun*, to which all the predicates are assigned. Therefore, the intersection Being and the One is not empty.

Of course, this One without the predicates of the first hypothesis brings us to the barred subject of psychoanalysis, who lacks no substance, and is represented by one signifier to another signifier. As for the *Yad’lun* of the second hypothesis, it takes us to the buzz of the swarm of the signifiers of lalingua, a prerequisite to any link that, while highlighting a S1 in this chaos, generates a possible order, organizes a discourse. If we understand the Es, the Freudian this as a jouissance-producing body, *Yad’lun* is the intersection One/jouissance.

To better understand this, let’s return to the *Course in General Linguistics* (2002). In this compilation of lecture notes taken by compassionate disciples of Ferdinand de Saussure, the master states that he intends to establish Linguistics as a science, requiring to this end, to cut clear and precisely an object — the language — from the heteroclitic, the chaotic field of language studies. However, in one of Saussure’s manuscripts about anagrams collected by Starobinski (1974), we read the following:
In the case of linguistics, the torture [i.e., writing] is increased for me by the fact that the more simple and obvious a theory may be, the more difficult it is to express it simply, because I state as a fact that there is not one single term in this particular science which has ever been based on a simple idea, and that this being so, one is tempted five or six times between the beginning and end of a sentence to rewrite. (1974, p. 11)

People wished to base the science of Linguistics in clear language, in these manuscripts Saussure reveals how he was shocked by the fact that a clear idea has no place in Linguistics. A central notion in the Course in General Linguistics (2002), the value would depend on the equivalence, on the fact that we can change the signifier by the signified, yet the anagrams make us run into the mistake, with that which has no place in the Linguistics of the course.

I wonder if something like that would not have occurred to Lacan’s desire to make science, for he’s an author marked by Saussure’s readings. In Literatuerre, Lacan (2003) conceives the function of the letter as an erosive one and not anymore like an inscription, thus resuming a Freudian metaphor of analytic action as sculptural activity: as well as sculpture, psychoanalysis “proceeds per via di levare, since it takes away from the block of stone all that hides the surface of the statue contained in it” (FREUD, 1905/1996, p. 247). To better understand this excerpt, it is useful to take into account what Freud will write later about Leonardo da Vinci: the artist preferred painting to sculpture, because the former is done without dirt or the noise of a hammer and chisel, while “the sculptor is covered with small marble splinters, stone splinters and dust” (1910/1996, p. 74).

Sculpting is carving, a work that produces debris, as well as the analytical operation on lalingua drops remains of jouissance, produces some, traits that are not articulated, neighborhood areas in which jouissance is lost. This is because psychoanalysis is neither literal as mathematics, a pure combinatorial of letters devoid of sense, nor strictly rhetoric, argumentative, the case of hermeneutics, which make the meaning abound. It is necessary to take a step further, to take into account the material cause: for psychoanalysis, the letter limits the misunderstanding, a misunderstanding made possible by rhetoric, but the material cause implies jouissance beyond fiction.

Finally, let’s underline how strategic Lacan’s step is when, by reading Par- menides, he undertakes this desubstancialization and fragmentation of the One: the One is not just any signifier, and then the monotheistic religions should say so. These are covered by the metaphysical obsession of the One, of the first and last unit (of a one world, of a one-way direction etc.), but also by the suspicion that the truth of the One is in its contraction, in its dissemination in the multiple
and in the wandering of the sense. It is the irony of this dialogue, in which the character of Parmenides subverts, makes us experience beyond the thesis of the philosopher Parmenides, according to which the One and Being are synonymous, absolute, immovable and eternal terms.

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