Power and administration on nineteenth-century Maranhão: the case of the Military Settlement of Gurupi

Abstract
Study concerning the administrative practices and social relations established by the directors of a microcosm of the brazilian administration: the Military Settlement of São Pedro de Alcântara do Gurupi. It investigates, stemming from the diverse historiographical approaches on the thematic and by an exhausting documentary research, the different forms in which the imperial administration in the Second Reign was carried through, taking as both starting and arriving point the Military Settlement of Gurupi. Created in 1853, this colony was an enterprise of the Brazilian government in the Empire, installed in the right edge of the Gurupi river, in the border between Maranhão and Pará. The guardianship of the State ended in the year of 1878, excited by the recurrent questionings on the efficiency of this enterprise. This study stems from the historiographical debates about State and power, as well as the debate about the public administration in Brazil. It is based, basically, in primary documentation, resting upon the historical and sociological literature concerning the thematic.

Resumo
Estudo acerca das práticas administrativas e relações sociais estabelecidas pelos diretores de um microcosmo da administração brasileira: a Colônia Militar de São Pedro de Alcântara do Gurupi. Investiga, a partir das diversas abordagens historiográficas sobre a temática e de exaustiva pesquisa documental, as diferentes formas pelas quais a administração imperial no Segundo Reinado se realizava, tomando como ponto de partida e chegada a Colônia Militar do Gurupi. Criada em 1853, essa colônia foi um empreendimento do governo brasileiro no Império, instalado na margem direita do rio Gurupi, na fronteira entre o Maranhão e o Pará. A tutela do Estado findou em 1878, suscitada pelos constantes questionamentos sobre a eficiência deste empreendimento. Este estudo se insere no debate historiográfico sobre Estado e poder, bem como naquele sobre a administração pública no Brasil. Baseia-se, fundamentalmente, em fontes primárias, apoiando-se na literatura histórica e sociológica sobre essas temáticas.

Keywords
Military Settlement of Gurupi, Military Colonization, Administration, Maranhão.
Introduction

The following text is part of a broader research project, now completed. In it, I develop a study about the administrative practices perpetrated by the directors of a microcosm of the Brazilian administration: the Military Settlement of São Pedro de Alcântara do Gurupi. The objective was to investigate, stemming from the various historiographical and sociological approaches on the subject and extensive documentary research, how the imperial administration took place, taking as both starting and arrival point the Military Settlement of Gurupi. I also intended to perceive the level of autonomy of the directors who have engaged in it while facing the regulatory action of the different bureaucratic bodies responsible for this establishment. Built in 1853, this colony was a project of the Brazilian government in the Empire, located on the right bank of the Gurupi River on the border between Maranhão and Pará. The guardianship of the state ceased in 1878, brought about by the constant questionings about the efficiency of this enterprise. In this article, I intend to resume the administrations of the first two directors of the Military Colony of Gurupi because I believe their administrations will help us understand both the mishaps and objectives of the project itself, as well as shed light on the more general framework of the imperial bureaucracy; it will also allow us to observe some specific social relations brought about by the constitution of this settlement at that time and place.

Thus, on the specific analysis of the administration of the first director, I try to unveil how he conducts the administration facing the supervening regulation both from the Ministry of War (central government) and the president of the province (provincial government). Also, how he (the director) conducts himself regarding his “subalterns” (deputy director, clerk, chaplain, settlers and soldiers designated to be the local garrison), to understand the director’s level of autonomy and the barriers for its achievement. In the analysis of the subsequent director, the problem of the “subalterns” remains, but I shall emphasize the relationship with the soldiers and outline the relationship established with other authorities. Stuart B. Schwartz, on an already classic work in the historiography about the subject, pointed out some difficulties and implications concerning the utilization of weberian thought in its entirety, especially the difficult articulation of the two ideal-typical models (legal-rational and traditional model) that, for him, could be observed in Brazil. Nevertheless, he decided to incorporate a particular concept of Weber, “patrimonial control”, in which “the ruler embodies the legitimacy and authority, and bestowed offices on the basis of particularistic criteria, not on merit.” Such inclusion allowed fruitful evaluations in his analysis. Thus, taking in consideration the richness of the concept and one of the problems tackled by this work, I decided to follow his suggestion and incorporate the concept of patrimonial control, along with patrimonial bureaucracy, as a guide for the analysis undertaken here, seeking to overcome the problems identified on a part of our historiography.
The Military Settlement of São Pedro de Alcântara do Gurupi

The Military Colony of Gurupi “was a military colonization settlement implemented in Maranhão, in the mid-nineteenth century”\(^9\). It was a Brazilian government enterprise that sought to create there an advanced point of civilization. It should have gathered about 150 soldiers\(^10\) to carry out its activities.

The military settlement installed in Maranhão was created under specific regulation\(^11\) and, in general, it did not distanced itself much from the guiding perspective of what might be called the “project” of military colonization of the country\(^12\). Among the main points present in the regulation, it should be noted that the Military Settlement of Gurupi had among its tasks: destroy quilombos, bring the Indians to “civilization” through catechism and protect shipping and trade that would be wrought on Gurupi river. In fact, in the case of military settlement of Gurupi, Regina Faria emphasizes the large presence of quilombos as the main motivator for its creation:

\[\text{[The] decision to prioritize the establishment of the Military Settlement of São Pedro de Alcântara do Gurupi [...], besides the fact that the region of Turiaçu-Gurupi had been newly attached to this province, was certainly due to the circumstance of the many mocambos there and that this president engaged them with fierce persecution. He [Eduardo Machado Olimpio, president of the province at the time and proponent of the creation of this military settlement] even announced having managed to exterminate them.}\]

The man responsible for founding it and execute the missions was the reformed Lieutenant Colonel João Raimundo Carneiro Junqueira. Son of Antonio Manuel Carneiro Junqueira, he was 18 when “enlisted in the defunct first line Regiment” of Maranhão province with “height [of] five feet and a quarter” (about 1.59 meters), “brown hair, brown eyes, born in Itapecuru and single”. As stated in his functional form, “he swore oath on August nine of one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three in his functional form, “he sworn oath on August nine of one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three” (about 1 meter and 59 centimeters), “brown hair, brown eyes, born in Itapecuru and single”. As stated in his functional form, “he sworn oath on August nine of one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three” (about 1 meter and 59 centimeters), “brown hair, brown eyes, born in Itapecuru and single”. As stated in his functional form, “he sworn oath on August nine of one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three”. As stated in his functional form, “he sworn oath on August nine of one thousand nine hundred and fifty-three”.

In early 1854, in charge of the aforesaid commission, he set himself on the way with his entourage to install the Gurupi settlement with only 45 soldiers. Despite the contingent deficit, Lt. Col. Junqueira departed intending to settle the colony in an area hitherto wild, which could be considered as an “internal frontier” of Maranhão at the time, since the state’s institutions of control were only dimly present in the region (which, thus, justified the installation of Gurupi military settlement there). As José de Souza Martins punctuates,

\[\text{[This] frontier situation is a privileged reference point for research [...] because it encloses a greater abundance of historical possibilities than other social situations.} \]

That is, we have “the encounter of historically divergent social relations, mentalities, and orientations”\(^15\); or, in the sense of Pierre Clastres, state agents, imbued with an ethnocentric fixation perhaps
unconscious, would lead an encounter with societies without state, “on the sidelines of world history”, because they would have known, in this view, that “the state is the fate of all society” and such people should fatally overcome this anachronistic phase of its development and reach civilization.

The Ministers of War were quite emphatic when talking about the desirability and need to foster the development of military colonies, as these were - in the words of the future Duque de Caxias - fundamental to the “civilization of thousands of men living in barbarity and the most profound ignorance” and “also serve against unjust claims of territory annexation and powerful aid to good intelligence cultivation with neighboring nations [...]”. Two distinct claims of the Ministers of War are representative of the argument:

“It’s about establishing population centers in central and depopulated remote places where, in principle, only individuals accustomed to passive obedience, acquired by severe habits of military discipline, can withstand the hardships, and remain as settlers. The choice of these points is, as a rule, on our borders or in some centers, where they have accumulated vagrants and criminals who threaten the safety and property of the inhabitants of the nearby villages”.

“In a vast country like ours, in many ways almost entirely absent of civilized population; in other inhabited only by wild people; also bordering with states in similar but less flattering conditions, the establishment of military colonies is not only an administrative convenience, it is also a political measure of recognized need”.

The first years of administration

Our analysis begins with the appointment of the first officer to the post of Director of the Settlement. In the documentation consulted we are informed that on March 15, 1854, the Lt. Col. Junqueira acknowledges the receipt of the “Notice of the Ministry of Empire Affairs of 21 of February”, in which he was appointed, by the decree of February 14 of that year, Director of the Military Colony of Gurupi. The then president of the province, Eduardo Olimpio Machado, informs us that “the following employees were appointed to the Colony”: the Director (Lt. Col. Junqueira), the Deputy Director (Lt. José Miguel de Araújo Lisboa), the Chaplain (Francelino Octavio Pavolide) and the Physician (Raimundo Nonato Nunes Berford). It is necessary to note that the only official appointed by the Ministry of War was the Lt. Col. Junqueira in 07.18.1854; the provincial president appointed, on an interim basis, the Deputy Director, the Chaplain and the Colony’s Physician. Despite the apparent temporary nature of this administrative body, Pres. Eduardo Machado Olimpio seemed satisfied with the progress of the colonial settlement, which, according to the information he had, “had already completed the construction of most buildings”, with the project fully able to do “their trade” and “to become in the future an important establishment [...]”. In order to provide minimum conditions for that to occur, the provincial president referred to the colony a detachment of the 4th Company of pedestrians, with 45 soldiers, which should compose the town garrison.
Before tackling other issues, an interesting event drew our attention. When the director acknowledges the appointment of these three employees to occupy positions in the Colony, he addresses, immediately, an official letter to the provincial president, questioning whether such employees should or should not be paid by him and, if they are, if they have the right to feed. Well, an official in charge of managing such an establishment that does not have any indication (including regulation) of how he will pay his subordinates, points to how hazy the functions of an executive agent could be on such occasions. It’s only on March 19, 1855 that the Director receives the regulations that will govern this colonial settlement and is made aware of his duties (which, by regulation, could only be put into effect when ratified by the president of the province). Thereby, he is aware that it is his duty: to refer the nominal list of the inhabitants of the colony; report the progress of the works; observe the flow of navigations that runs by it and take charge to quickly make the connection of his administration site to nearby villages. He should also, among other things, be responsible for paying the settlers living there, as well as the soldiers, workers and laborers.

Thus, based on the guidelines outlined by the presidency of the province, the position of Director of the colony starts to concentrate a greater capacity to rule. In order to continue to undertake the external activities of action, a space is opened for a relative deviation of influence from the center, since there is “a virtual concentration of administrative powers in the figure of the director of the Colony [...]”. By opening space for the action of the Director over his subordinates, it allows the concentration of the capacity to exercise authority and deepens the autonomy of the Director over that undertaking, in relation to other instances.

Rubens Campante maintains that the subjective and casuistic rationality and the non-professionalization contribute to both an administrative framework which tends to corruption and low government efficiency. Insofar as, after the above, all our thinking is correct, just a brief debate with Weber would suffice to make us realize the reasons why certain sectors of the Brazilian government in the Empire would turn away from what, for him, would be a rational-legal administration. For the German sociologist, modern bureaucracy is a kind of domination that governs the principles of fixed and official jurisdictional areas, ordered according to regulations, that is, by laws and administrative rules. Regular activities necessary to the bureaucratically governed structure objectives are distributed fixedly as official duties. The authority to give the orders necessary for the implementation of these official duties is distributed stably, being strictly circumscribed by the rules related to the physical means of coercion that can be made available to the officials or authorities. Methodical steps are taken to the regular and continuous fulfillment of these duties and the execution of the corresponding rights, where only people who have the qualifications provided in general regulation are employed. That’s an administrative organization that, for now, seems quite distant from the Military Colony of Gurupi.

Taking again the reasoning of Visconde do Uruguai in consideration, we see that he endorses what it seems to be the greatest danger and one of the outstanding problems in the external means of admin

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29 This discussion is in direct dialogue with the perspectives on public administration of the analyzed period, such as, for example, regarding the work of Visconde do Uruguai. In his words, “the appointment of these assistants is also a difficulty. It must not centralize too much, while leaving the direct agents the necessary action over their assistants and subordinates.” URUGUAI, Visconde do. Ensaio sobre o direito administrativo. 1862 (1ª Ed.). In: CARVALHO, José Murilo de (org.). Paulino José Soares de Sousa, Visconde do Uruguai. Coleção Formadores do Brasil. São Paulo: Editora 34, 2002, p. 205.


31 For this study, the thesis of bureaucratization “in spite of”, formulated by Uricoechea, seems narrow.


Junqueira does not do that shows us if not of those individuals. The fact that Lt. Col. in flagrante delicto” . We can see that, from thus, arrested will be understood arrested while running pursued by public outcry. Those, of justice are obliged to arrest and bring to 131 estipulates the following: “Any person performed without written order, “ the Article Code, “From prison without charge, can be punishable. Indeed, if characterized as a “chronic” condition, it would be considered not only an offense but a crime, as stated in September 12, 1851, both from CLI ), it was a constant in this period. An offense due avulsos. APEM

“Art. 10° The Clerk shall: § 1. Notarize all the books in the Colony, especially those regarding accounting […];” BRASIL. Decreto N° 820, de 12 de setembro de 1851. CLI


Trying to escape the submission to work was a constant in this period. An offense due to the law (art. 2, 3 and 14 of the Imperial Decree n.° 729 of November 9, 1850 and art. 25 of Chapter IV of Decree No. 820 of September 12, 1851, both from CLI ), it was punishable. Indeed, if characterized as a “chronic” condition, it would be considered not only an offense but a crime, as stated in Sec. IV, art. 125, of the Empire Criminal Code, which legislates on vagrancy and begging, and estipulates for this offense a punishment of one to six months of imprisonment with work. And in chapter III of Empire Procedure Code, “From prison without charge, can be performed without written order,” the Article 131 estipulates the following: “Any person of the general population can, and officers of justice are obliged to arrest and bring to the presence of the district’s justice of peace anyone who is found committing a crime, or while running pursued by public outcry. Those, thus, arrested will be understood arrested in flagrante delicto”. We can see that, from a meticulous appraisal of the legislation, it would not be difficult to frame the insolvency of those individuals. The fact that Lt. Col. Junqueira does not do that shows us if not istration:

“In places where every special service branch offers little occupation, and where the qualified personnel is deficient, it’s necessary to accumulate various branches as far as they are not absolutely incompatible. It is essential that the legislation gives some latitude to the Executive so that it can accommodate the circumstances”31.

This “latitude” is precisely the precedent for, at worst, endemic corruption or, at best, the feasibility of administration. All this helps to better understand some of the main factors that contributed for the characterization of the administration of the Military Settlement of Gurupi as a “suffering”34, in the words of Lieutenant Colonel Junqueira. We shall, therefore, engage on a longer examination.

The letter of February 13, 1855 instructs us that “24 soldiers […] arrived at the Settlement, including a sergeant, one Furir, and one Horn belonging to the 4th Pedestrian Company, having deserted in Turiáçu Pedro José de Araújo […]”35. To that date, despite the number of detached soldiers being less than what had been declared by Eduardo Olimpio Machado in his report, it was possible, according to the Lt. Col. Junqueira, to carry on the agricultural work. The sole, more incisive, consideration of the director regarding this issue was the need for troops to advance services, because “with it, we work more, spending less; in here there are only a few that would submit themselves to this”36. What had become really inconvenient was the absence of a clerk. The absence of this lower official delayed the bookkeeping of the Colony and forced the director to pay a man to do a part of this service. In spite of this artifice, some documents, according to the regulation, as noted by Lt. Col. Junqueira37, could only be done by clerk for bookkeeping38. The president of the province tried to resolve this impasse by sending Sergeant Freitas for the clerk’s position of this colonial settlement, “but continued drunkenness put him in a state such that since […] he arrived he could do nothing until the 8, when he gave his soul to the Creator […]”39. The Lt. Col Junqueira found himself in poor conditions for administration. Through this precious document we were made aware of the why: the “Furir […] barely knows his own name […], is useless”; the “Deputy Director”40, who is of no use, […] suffered from chronic diseases and laid here with no use at all “; the “Chaplain, very weak, torn from a serious illness, never managed a day of health, so I found myself in the hard need to send him to this capital […]”; and finally, the “Physician, despite his little practice, and no contribution, also had an illness as an excuse and went to capital to be treated[…]”. That was, until then, the situation of the colony.

When reporting the progress of work of the Military Colony of Gurupi31, on September, still in the year of 1855, the Lt. Col. Junqueira thoroughly complains about the inability to go up the river and explore the lands above so that he can give reliable news to the president of the province, because of the mere absence of a replacement for his post. He continues, “in all honesty”, admitting his lack of patience with the emancipated slaves because, being free, they cannot suffer anything harsher than mild rebukes, despite the great will of the aforesaid director to apply them “due punishment”42. Even arresting them would seem preposterous because “they really like to be lying in good shade”.

Almanack. Guarulhos, n.12, p.184-207 artigos 189
ignorance of the law, simply the fact that those who lived there did so of their own free will, and if they wanted to, they could leave to other sparsely populated and controlled location. It is important to remember, though, that residents of Colony were subject to military discipline. BRASIL. Código Criminal do Império do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Tip. de Quero e irmão. 1861, p. 211; id. Código do Processo do Império do Brasil. II tomos. Rio de Janeiro: Tip. Laemmert. 1874, p. 74.


44 Of 3.0005000 (three contos de) réis. The amount planned for expenditure on military colonies by the Ministry of Finance this year was 60.0005000 réis. The overall expense of the Empire was expected to be 34.450.0005000. The money was allocated to the Ministry of Empire and would be redistributed from there to the respective provinces. BRASIL. Ministério da Fazenda. Relatório do Ministro de 1855. Rio de Janeiro: Tip. Nacional, 1856, p. 3

45 In addition to this value, it was authorized but not yet performed, the payment of 1.0615360, divided into two parts: the first, of 8885000 réis, concerned the salaries of officials included in payroll; the second of 1735000 réis, referred to the supplies concerning the Colony. Of the total credit voted, the authorized amount already charged and received, the remaining amount was 9385640 réis, sum deemed insufficient to remedy the costs of the colony in this year. In comparison, we note that on the accounting of previous spending (January-April 1855), the Lt. Col. Raimundo Junqueira spent 1.3515930 réis with employees and workers of the Colony. MARANHÃO. Secretaria de Governo. Diretoria da Colônia Militar do Gurupi (1854-1878). Oficio de 10 de maio de 1855 do Ten. cel. João Raimundo Carneiro Junqueira ao presidente da província. Setor de Documentos Avulsos. APEM

46 "It should also be noted" that because of the amount of one conto (5605000), by the demonstration received, had been employed in the payment of the colony workers' salaries in the months from May to June for the financial year 54/55, a compensation of the amount would be done as soon as they presented "the accounts in order." In order to regularize the payments, "it would be helpful that he received sufficient quarterly payments to cover such expenses" and, "seeing that he spent 8705000, with the remaining balance of 305000, it seems now that by delivering him 8005000 réis he [would] make due with the costs of the subsequent quarter, with the same deliveries in future quarters being carried. Ibidem, Despacho da Segunda Seção da Contadoria da Tesouraria da Fazenda do Maranhão de 13 de outubro de 1855, em ofício do Ten. cel. João Raimundo Carneiro Junqueira ao presidente da província. Setor de [were] considered settlers, and as such subject to the colony's Director orders: 1 lower officers and more soldiers, which were engaged according to regulations [...]; 2 workers needed for the work of the Colony; 3 who by consent of the Director dwell in the District of the colony."

And with the small contingent of soldiers available (eighteen, six of them assigned to an expedition), he could not even have a guard on the barracks, otherwise he would risk not having enough men for the services. In these wastelands, he says, he found himself helpless.

On the next official letter, in a less dire tone, he requests the objects indispensable to the administration of the military colony of Gurupi, especially lead and gunpowder, because, on the chance that the reader still recalls this, this is an establishment responsible for the security of the region. Anyway, in this documentation, we are told that, finally, he had sent the current expenses accounting for what had been spent with the conto de réis he had received along the letter of 30 June of that year, delivered through the Police Delegate of Turiaçu Village. The way the money was used illustrates the operation of the complicated mechanism required for raising funds for that part of the public administration at the time. Let’s take a closer look.

On October 11, 1855, by order of the National Treasury, a credit was granted to cover the expenses of the military colony of Gurupi. Of this credit, one conto de réis had already been delivered to the Director, as aforementioned, and checked as being received. It would be up to the Provincial Treasury, therefore, to request the increase of credit after the Director’s statement regarding the expenses necessary for the administration of the establishment at that time. For this reason, a clerk was essential, and the delay of the registry of the colony would entail (as it did) delays in transfer of funds for payment of salaries of workers and debts. This generated the vaunted demobilization proclaimed by Raimundo Carneiro Junqueira: the services were unfeasible because the workers would not be employed without the perspective of being paid.

But if the lack of clerk would be a big obstacle to the progress of the colony, wouldn’t it also be a facilitating factor for patrimonial use of public property? To better answer this question, I performed a simple procedure: I divided the expenses of the colony into two types, the expected (workers/settlers, roads, laborers, residents and soldiers of the colony) and forewarned, which do not appear either in regulation or in the general guidelines, and thus the director is made aware of them by order of the president of the province (usually the payment of soldiers detachments). Of the forewarned expenditure that could occur in the year of 1855, the only one I identified was the one where the Director of Gurupi Colony is made aware that it is his obligation to pay, via tax office of the Village of Turiaçu, the soldiers of the 4th Company of Pedestrians. On the planned expenditure side, the situation is somewhat more complicated. According to the regulation of the Colony,
that the total spent would be 249$600 réis, monthly. In January 1855, “the importance spent on employees and workers of the colony” was 400$000. The value is justified due to the existing balance in December 1854. In February, 386$953; march, 290$000; and april, 270$000.\textsuperscript{53} Deducting expenditures on food, the amount accumulated in the four months of exercise would be 348$553, if not included the monthly gratification of 70$000 that the director should have received until February of that year (until this month because he was deprived, provisionally, from the value of 20$000 réis and two daily wages due to the review of his gratification ordered by the president of the province. The deprivation of this amount would be definitive in October of the same year\textsuperscript{54} and of the Physician (12$000). And even if we included that amount, approximately 102$000 réis would still be in balance. There is no indication of how this money was used (and if it was). Moreover, the Provincial Treasury had the expectation that, for future expenditures (July/August/September) an amount of 870$000 réis would be spent on employees. It is important to note that as early as September 1855, the number of inhabitants of the colony rose, according to the director, to 97\textsuperscript{55}. So, the estimate made by that supervisory body quickly became obsolete, resting on the Director of the colony the responsibility to apply for credit review. It seems easy to reach the conclusion that, in one way or another, in the early years, it was always up to the director, despite some restrictions outlined by the Provincial Treasury and the President of the Province, to solve everything related to the administration of this colonial settlement. Luckily (or unluckily), it not as easy as it sounds.

Increasing the scale\textsuperscript{56}, and leaving aside the micro context of our analysis, it can be observed that on the provisions of the provincial budget laws for the financial years 1854-1856, invariably, the military colony of Gurupi was not covered by funding from the Province\textsuperscript{57}. From the more general tax structure of the Empire\textsuperscript{58}, it is possible to consider that, if the costs undertaken by the Province on that colonial settlement, which concerned only the payment of soldiers (allocation of the Ministry of Empire, which transfers resources to the provinces); primary instruction (on the budget law: Art. 7. Public Instruction, paragraph 2. primary education) and public works (Art. 18. §4°, with roads) that might contemplate the region, it was simply because they were all actions that were within the range of action provided by the central government to the provinces. Otherwise: the analysis of the resource allocation structure reinforces the view expressed here that the military colony of Gurupi is an initiative of the central government that, administratively, was under the responsibility of the provincial government, the local reinforcement of imperial authority, a focal point of the centralization. Still, based on this information, it can be shown that even if the President of the Province could quickly replace the staff of the colony, there was no guarantee of the qualification of these employees (in fact, it was very difficult for someone to be qualified - to be professionally able to exercise certain position – in the auxiliary bureaucracy and/or proletarian bureaucracy\textsuperscript{59}, levels of bureaucracy that should make up, for the most part, the staff of the Military Colony of Gurupi), which, ultimately, in addition to the delays and difficulty of communication, represented the biggest setback to achieving the
most basic tasks of administration of the Military Colony of Gurupi. Last but not least, it is possible to strengthen a previously sketched argument that

in the documentation examined, all administrative elements of this place [in that period] refer to the person of the director, so it is possible to conclude that he is the privileged censor of himself. And, in spite of it showing an body such as the Provincial Treasury, which is responsible for ascertaining and control the spending of the Colony, it also shows us that in very few opportunities any investigations were made, on site, to see how the aforementioned director proceeds in his work. Thus, the military colony can be understood, at the same time, as an agent of the central and provincial governments and defender of their interests, and, to the same extent, as an expression and reinforcement of the administrator’s local power. These two realities, rather than form an opposition, blend together. 

This can be seen through an official letter of 1855. In it, Lt. Col. Junqueira answers objections made by the Provincial Treasury of Maranhão regarding his procedure concerning the accounts of the Colony. First, the lieutenant colonel was asked about the existence of a nurse who would be receiving undue payment because, according to the regulations, there is no such employee. Secondly, They also asked him about the absence of a blacksmith in the Colony, since a blacksmith tent with due belongings was ordered which, without the blacksmith, would be underutilized. Thirdly, the form of bookkeeping was not consistent with the ordered standard regulation. To all this inquiry, Raimundo Junqueira responded reassured of his honesty. He began by noting that he had “not brought or paid a nurse,” and the confusion occurred just by a naming problem, because in the first article of the instructions apothecary is called a nurse. He continued his explanation confirming the existence of such a tent only, soon after, to bring to light the reason for its underutilization: there weren’t anyone who wanted to be employed “as workhorse” for so little money. And “without error,” he did not reorganize the “sheets and accounts as regulation” simply because of the absence of a Clerk to manufacture them and the deputy director to sign them. In this sense, he did not understand how, with such faults, it would be possible to comply with which he was commanded, which amounts to an impressive demonstration of respect for the law by the director! Maybe it would be possible to sustain such judgment if it was not for the most serious charge that he would yet defend himself: the improper purchase of a Igarité (small boat), whence a “thousands of questions” appeared. The director enunciates that he made the purchase in compliance with Article 10 (instructions of January 24, 1854), which says, “you Sr. is authorized solely to buy 2 igarités and […] those things which become indispensable, giving notice to this government”. Moreover, such a purchase would be supported by the positive evaluation of the director’s administration by the president of the province, which would have approved the actions of the military officer that were relevant to the founding of the colony (such approval existed but took place almost a year before). The accountant of the Treasury of Finance, with this information, retorted harshly the claims of the colony’s director, noting that the aforementioned instructions could not “allow other
One may argue that the utilization of this term evokes, once again, the structural condition of the external service - to recall Uruguai - in imperial Brazil. However, there is insufficient empirical evidence to affirm to what extent this more general condition affected, specifically, the Military Colony of Gurupi.

We must not forget that the facts with which we produce our narrative are not given nor therefore could be fortuitous their organization when uttering an argument. About this, see: WHITE, Hayden. Trópicos do discurso - ensaios sobre a crítica da cultura. São Paulo: Editora Edusp, 2001, specially the second and third chapters and SANTOS, Arthur Roberto Germano. Linguagem e História: o caráter literário do texto histórico. Revista Urutáguia (Online), v. 19, p. 153-160, 2009.

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The outcome of this case, unfortunately, is hazy. As soon as the financial year of 1856 starts, the Lt. Col. Junqueira reiterates its call for a three-month license to deal with his illness in the capital, as soon as it allowed him to undertake such a journey. In November 1855 he had asked for a replacement for his position. Thus, we do not know whether he returned or justified the purchase of the Igarité, or if he actually came to buy one; I cannot, either, state categorically that the money he says he used to pay the workers of the colony was actually used for this purpose, which reinforces the claim that, most of the time, the director of the colony was the privileged censor of himself. It is noteworthy that in addition to the concentration of powers in his figure, a movement undertaken by the president of the province, the accumulation - due to the contingency of the absence of other officials also responsible for overseeing the work there - of other functions that did not concern his duty, made the possibility of private appropriation of public goods a virtually feasible reality. Were it not for the great difficulty that was to receive such resources at that time, and the scarcity of information on the documentation of how that money was applied (which endorses the possibility of illegal use of public goods), one might make a more emboldened examination and more categorical statement on the issue. Anyway, if the craft of the historian does not entail speculations when the documentary evidence does not “allow” it, nothing prevents a contemporary of doing it.

On the February 12, 1856 report, a sickened Lt. Col. Junqueira “participates” to the president of the province the state of Gurupi Colony. Until that time, he had concluded a road of 32 leagues for communication with Turiaçu Village; carried on the construction of houses, with special attention now to the four that were close to completion and two in the initial phase; he had done and started planting a field of 300 square fathoms, and continued the construction of the brickyard and kiln. During this period 10 canoes, had gone up the river with business of “retail and down 19 with the same business” and the number of inhabitants of the colony was of 92 “souls.” The site already presented...
72 We must not forget that the facts with which we produce our narrative are not given nor therefore could be fortuitous their organization when uttering an argument. About this, see: WHITE, Hayden. Trópicos do discurso - ensaios sobre a crítica da cultura. São Paulo: Editora Edusp, 2001, specially the second and third chapters and SANTOS, Arthur Roberto Germano. Linguagem e História: o caráter literário do texto histórico. Revista Urutá (Online), v. 19, p. 153-160, 2009.


75 Ibidem, p. 120.


better health conditions, although at the beginning and end of winter, some “intermittent and catarrhal fever” still occur. On the outskirts of the Colony “some people with different crops” began to settle, including the citizen “Agostinho Pedro da Maia”, a canna farmer who built a “sugar mill” with the permission of the director, who recognized the usefulness of such development in the region (the director craved the approval of this attitude by the president of the province). Some indigenous leaders, Tuxauas had “sought to establish themselves closer to the colony with their huts,” an action that the director had allowed. Even so, they were at a distance of six to eight days trip. Finally, he recalled that he was aware that the set value of the feed was 160 daily réis, and that he was abiding to this value when paying the settlers, but complained that they were not satisfied with what they received, and continually protested to their increase. Given this situation, the Lt. Col. Junqueira realized how small the workers’ payment was; moreover, that it did not correspond to the toil they faced. Therefore, it was imperative that the president of the province raised the value of feed “to see if they [others] decided to engage,” because they all believe that engaging (for this value), “subject them to the 1st line soldiers situation”70. This detailed testimony of Lt. Col. Junqueira delineates a very particular situation that, according to him, was taking place in the military colony of Gurupi. The small sum received while working, an amount that equaled their condition to a 1st line soldier - condition at the time, according to contemporaries, that only surpassed that of a slave71 -, would make the workers not want to be subjected to a work routine. The solution, however, was not the use of force, but consent to the demands of the workers. Hence it is possible to draw some hypotheses, here, to be tested. Others are possible, but I shall limit myself to three: 1st - the director of the colony did not have enough military force to hold the settlers; 2nd - he had such strength, but refused to use it for this purpose because he truly believed in the smallness of the gratification; or 3rd – he requested this increase with interests other than those of settlers. The first conclusion is not easily refutable: although the 4th Pedestrian Company, stationed in Turiaçu with detachment in Cururupu and Gurupi, had a contingent of 61 soldiers72, the number of soldiers that were in Gurupi Colony at the time did not exceed 1773. Not a large detachment, but one that could perform both successful pressure or fail miserably in the attempt. Given this possibility, I shall give the first case the benefit of the doubt. The second has the confirmation of the future replacement of Lt. Col. Junqueira, the Captain Francisco José de Almeida. For the latter, there was no doubt that the state of backwardness that the colony was in was due to his predecessor, Junqueira director who left the workers and employees “at their will, rather than obliging them to be assiduous to work (and why they sorely miss him)”. The Deputy Director (Clementino Delgado), “[...] in addition to following example of the former director, employed most of the time on his travels and private services”74. The third is the one that lacks substantial information, despite the evidence already raised previously. In this sense, even with the inability to make nothing but suggestions about the dubious use of funds received by the administration of the colony, when taking into account Captain Almeida’s testimony, the...
In this first part, I believe I have been able to demonstrate how the concept of “patrimonial bureaucracy” can be fruitful to analyze the bureaucratic structure of the military colony of Gurupi. This is because that is an organization that preserves and is guided by both rational features (laws, regulations, administrative rules) and traditional ones (lack of professionalism of employees, of a regularly paid salary, appointment regulated by a free contract).

It became clear, too, that in the early years of the administration of the colony the prerogative of the interim appointment (discussed here as patrimonial control) was not successful in solving this settlement problems. For this situation, some explanations are possible.

John Schulz maintains that it is only with the law of 1850 that the military career “opens itself to talent”; instituting “strict rules of promotion by seniority by abolishing the aristocratic system that allowed well-connected officers the achievement of high command posts at an early age”. The Lt. Col. Junqueira, who became a reformed lieutenant colonel in 1838, was not part of that generation and, most likely, did not studied at the Military Academy. Actually, Junqueira was part of the generation that Schulz called “ancien régime” of the Army, divided between elite and non-elite and where the lower positions were basically the career prospects of this sector (which, according to the author, explained the large number of retired colonels lieutenants, category in which, once again, the Lt. Col Junqueira fits). So João Raimundo Carneiro Junqueira is the product of a time when academic education was restricted and training, therefore, did not follow a pattern based on prior qualification.

Aided by this initial characterization, it is possible to see, promptly, that even if we admit that the choice of Lt. Col Raimundo Junqueira for the position was due to his time of service, which could entail him broad experience in military discipline - he received his highest-ranking 36 years after enlistment and was appointed to be head of the colony more than 50 years after this event - still, he was not professionally capable to carry out a directorial bureaucratic office, nor he had the necessary structure to do so. That is, even if he was appointed by consideration to any merit in particular, the rationale that guided that choice was other than the rationality that guides the modern bureaucratic administration, “which usually requires a specialized and comprehensive training”. Anyway, it was a choice based on an exclusive and personal criterion. And grounded on the interpretation uttered until this point, one can, with some reservations, generalize this inference to most of the bureaucratic body that composed the military colony of Gurupi in the period from 1854 to 1856. I say with reservations because I believe that even if it had a highly specialized bureaucratic body, efficient management of the Military Colony of Gurupi was,
84 “Art. 16. The Director of the colony will be an army officer, who will be at the same time commander of the detachment; and shall have a monthly gratification of fifty thousand reis, in addition to his military salaries.” BRASIL. CLI, Decreto Imperial n.º 729, de 9 de novembro de 1850. p. 230.

85 Captain José da Silva e Almeida, director of the colony and non-consecutive predecessor of Lt. Col. Altino Lellis, also was an official of the National Guard.


87 Ibidem, Ofício de 16 de junho de 1859 do Cap. Henrique José de Carvalho ao presidente da província, grifei.


89 Ibidem, Ofício de 16 de junho de 1859 do Cap. Henrique José de Carvalho ao presidente da província, grifei.

above all, on the horizon of expectation. This statement is particularly justified because, as it turned out, that was a wild region with communication difficulties, the Colony of Gurupi being the establishment responsible for exploring the area and facilitate communication there. Still, there was no regularity in payment, in monitoring and maintaining the administrative structure (responsibility of the provincial and central governments), pointing to a macrocephaly of the imperial government. Also, even though the Weberian bureaucratic model represented a fundamental reality in certain historical processes, one cannot state categorically that this administrative organization would be the long yearned panacea for Brazilian society82. So, for this project, I sustain the argument that in this period, the high administrative efficiency was not the key point. Instead, it was trying to consolidate, maintain and ensure the control of the region regarding the numerous social groups considered “dangerous” who settled there83. It is clear that there were limits, sometimes clear, sometimes tenuous, to the imposition of such authority (remember the case of the settlers who would not be subjected). This does not mean, however, that the advancement of the control had not been effectively carried out.

From the interregnum to the administration of Altino Lellis

Some years passed until, for one reason or another, a director could settle again in command of the military colony of Gurupi. And in a quite peculiar fashion, considering that Altino Lellis Moraes Rego, the new director, did not have military training, but was an official of the National Guard84.

In fact, not only in this context the likewise Lt. Col. Altino Lellis seemed to differentiate himself to the majority of its predecessors85. This is because in the official letter86 in which claims to be aware of the tasks regarding his appointment (interim, it should be said) to the post of director of the Military Colony of Gurupi, he denotes unusual knowledge of the regulations governing the establishment, even before moving to the site. In possession of the “reports submitted to Treasury by the former director,” in addition to the “Decree No. 729 of 1 November 1850 that [allow] urgently, to complete the number of soldiers on the art. 2 of the Regulation which issued the above decree,” the newly appointed official urges the president of the province to complete the contingent of only 22 detached soldiers in the colony, since the “Decree of 26 November 1853, dictates that the colony [was created] with a personnel of 45 soldiers.” We will return to this later. Rather, it is necessary to make a brief digression to at least discern the current state of the Military Colony of Gurupi and whether, with the passing of years, something has changed.

Actually, the recurring messages concerning the miserable state of the colony continued to proliferate87, blaming the former director Raimundo Junqueira by the iterative imbroglio to which the colony was subjected. It is difficult, however, to identify to what extent such debasement was just rhetoric in the discourses of the competent authorities, especially since, as I have previously argued, little or nothing was done to assess the successes (or lack thereof) of the previous
administrations. Up until Altino Lellis’ investment in office, the military colony maintained what so far can be considered as the “normal” routine of the establishment: difficulty in receiving funds, payments due, deficit of soldiers and workers and questionings about the suitability of the directors. In the meantime, a fact among these is noteworthy, inasmuch as it threads through my entire argument.

In a letter to the president of the province, the then director Captain Henrique José de Carvalho shares the confuse narrative that tells us that “are entirely false the rumors that were told to all in this city against Lt. Luis Felix de Azevedo Sá, deputy director of this colony” It was not just gossip, because they were able “[…] to bring him to a deplorable state of demoralization as a result of lack of respect and discipline”, by claiming that the said deputy director had took “[…] to drinking with some employees after the late director Francisco José da Silva e Almeida had left for the city”. Such rumors were due to “great insubordination constantly practiced […] by the 2nd Sergeant […] of the battalion Jeara Mendes Pereira, whom returned to this capital to be shad[y, threatening the deputy director with his charged actions […]”. He proceeded, noticing, however, that “he [did] not mean to say that the same deputy director had not enough strength to discipline nor that it was necessary to bring the colony to such a deplorable state of demoralization […].” That is, by fathoming the possibility of being “misunderstood”, which in this situation would imply letting slip out, it seems, the imminent collapse of the established military authority, the director appealed to the coherence of the president of the province; for him, he did so on perfectly clear grounds, because he [the president] “[…] as a military can’t currently ignore that for the due punishment of this sergeant it was necessary that the deputy director executed a swift solution for the sake of discipline”. Not only for its sake, but also for the sake of “the offense to his superior in the presence of other soldiers […]”. On a “[…] deserted place like this, however, the deputy director [Luiz Felix Sa] ponder[ed] as certain what could result from the battalion Jeara Mendes Pereira, whom returned to this capital to be shad[y, threatening the deputy director with his charged actions […]”. He proceeded, noticing, however, that “he [did] not mean to say that the same deputy director had not enough strength to discipline nor that it was necessary to bring the colony to such a deplorable state of demoralization […].” That is, by fathoming the possibility of being “misunderstood”, which in this situation would imply letting slip out, it seems, the imminent collapse of the established military authority, the director appealed to the coherence of the president of the province; for him, he did so on perfectly clear grounds, because he [the president] “[…] as a military can’t currently ignore that for the due punishment of this sergeant it was necessary that the deputy director executed a swift solution for the sake of discipline”. Not only for its sake, but also for the sake of “the offense to his superior in the presence of other soldiers […]”. On a “[…] deserted place like this, however, the deputy director [Luiz Felix Sa] ponder[ed] as certain what could result from the swift punishment he could bestow upon the sergeant as senior officer” and thus “moderated his anger […].” Furthermore: “[…]he said Sergeant [Jeara was] in collusion with the dealer Antonio Rodrigues and Professor Francisco Maria Ramos […]” who brought “[…] not only some other dealers, but also the deputy director and some soldiers […] into a maze of intrigue, to a point where some employees, and even workers asked for their health guides from this colony”.

This account gives us elements for a profitable perquisition about the limits to the imposition of authority by the deputy director, and the winding strategies to undermine them employed by individuals in/from the Military Settlement of Gurupi. We’ve seen that although the deputy director Luiz Felix de Azevedo was the authority in charge and sergeant Jeara Mendes Pereira his direct subordinate on both the bureaucratic structure of the colony and the military hierarchy, the deputy director (then acting director), on captain’s Henrique de Carvalho account, hesitated to punish him because of the correct consideration that this would be harmful rather than beneficial, especially considering the swiftness and severity of the punitive action that should be acted upon the sergeant. The aggravating factor would then be the location of Colony in a secluded place, where one could ask: for
what reason would these two factors be detrimental to the administration of this establishment? A plausible answer would be that military discipline, as demonstrated by Hendrik Kraay, “although formally rigid, was moderated by several factors, including the resistance of soldiers [and] the attitude of the wider society regarding discipline". In addition to these elements, other limits also restrained discipline – such as “second grade uniform [and weapons], [the] contempt of the soldiers for exercises and ultimately, [the] desertion of recruits” - which transformed it in a “much more complex social relationship, [sometimes] negotiated, that, finally, made military service tolerable for most of the enlisted”.

As such, we confront an established perspective of part of our historiography, the one that states that a fundamental aspect of “being a soldier” was that this was a condition imposed as “punishment, reason for humiliation, and the fate of incorrigible elements.” More than that: that “the punishments of imprisonment and fine, common in the colonial period, were [in the imperial period] carved by corporal punishment, erected as standard. The military chroniclers of the time [...] have left numerous testimonies of the coarseness of disciplinary punishments.” I do not wish to deny here, of course, the precariousness of the soldier’s condition in Brazil at that time. What I want to point out is precisely the possibility of intervention of an agent - commonly considered underprivileged in power relations – in a process of military disciplinary imposition, like the one that took place in this instance and that apparently was a successful tactic to the point of eroding the already tenuous rule of the commander, driving him to lay off workers and soldiers, “giving them 24 hours” to leave (and despite the idea that Capt. Henrique José tried to convey, he did this by acquiescing to the request of those who no longer wanted to be employed because of the mood of distrust that surrounded the colony, and not by “prudence of a sober man [the deputy director] [that], using his authority, [...] had them fired”).

The outcry of the director, Capt. José Henrique, to an understanding of the situation by the president of the province, “a military,” seems to have worked, as the deputy director Luis Felix remained in office; although the same president had appointed, on May 17, 1859, the Lt. Col. Altino Lellis for the position of director of the colony and decided, therefore, to change the direction of the enterprise. When he took office on 11 June of the same year, Lt. Col. Altino delivered to the Provincial Treasury the balance sheets of the colony, which contained all the money used in the administration of services. To the beginning, then.

The image of officer committed to legality that we could have apprehended from the legal knowledge displayed on the 1859 letter quickly disappears upon a closer reading of the regulations cited by Altino Lellis himself. We observe, promptly, that the emergent request of soldiers, even if needed, has no bearing on the legislation. Moreover, even after almost a year, not even an attempt was made by the presidency of the province to detach new troops to the colony, despite the seemingly truthful growth of this enterprise, composed, at the time, of a population of 224 inhabitants, "[...] [containing] eight houses, of which five are well, two covered with tile; [...] it has a coffee plantation and a large garden for cane and rice and two for mandioca, in the best state possible"; and of being surrounded by "two formi-
dable quilombos [...], one being placed between Montes Áureos and this site [...]. [there] had been occasions of possible smoke coming from the side in which the quilombo is situated". An unquestionable threat, the mocambo should be quickly destroyed because of the risk of violent attacks by the "savages". Fortunately, the military colony of Gurupi bravely "resisted" this obstacle and to the researcher’s satisfaction, it was not destroyed. As we know, if the adjacent “human forest” so wanted, it would be difficult, with such little resources to bring order to the "hordes" of “black aquilombados “ and “wild Indians”, even though it was expected of the colony to perform the role of aggressor, not besieged. It is true that, according to the director of the establishment, this would not be the greatest problem that he would face. And on two occasions, it really wasn’t.

In a letter of April 13, 1860, the Lt. Col. Altino Lellis angrily protests, “in the public service interest”, against the deputy director Luis Felix de Azevedo Sá. According to the detailed testimony of the director of the Military Colony of Gurupi, the lieutenant had been, for six months, incurring sequentially in impostures, impairing “the improvements, [...] of discipline and police of the small detachment.” “Recluse at home,” the director proceeds, “where he is repeatedly drunk, he has, with his evil doctrines, contributed to insubordination of the troops, which fortunately he had not succeeded for the most part”. The seemingly prosaic air of insubordination cannot obscure what was really at stake, because “[...] it is true that yesterday on the occasion of the Director’s order [...] of arrest of the soldier Luiz Antonio, Sá reduced the penalty, taking him to his house of residence, thus rendering useless the fulfillment of the order”. Having requested three times the release of the prisoner to Lieutenant Sá, Altino Lellis drafted an ordinance and sent it to the deputy director; “before [the soldiers in charge of the task] he torn it apart, spewing insults against my authority.” Not being met in any instance, the director of the colony, rather than imposing his authority by force, decided to follow the path of “prudence”, awaiting the position of the presidency of the province regarding the official letters. Certain that he shall exert “every effort to bring some calm,” Altino Lellis opts, instead of severe and exemplary punishment, for a search in the archives of Colony, where he finds two complaint petitions to the same presidency of the province forwarded by different soldiers; both complaining about lieutenant Luis Felix de Sá. It is strange, therefore, that the position of the director of the colony greatly diverges from the established historiographical tradition of violence as the primary response. We must – also – not read too much into it, since it is fully plausible that such behavior is an idiosyncrasy of director Altino Lellis, since he is an official of the National Guard, not the army. But, let’s turn to the other, very interesting, question, which is directly related to this: Lt. Luis Felix de Sá had not been accused and acquitted of similar behavior before?

It is exciting to realize how we can be easily captured by the documentation, even when we believe to be making a close examination of it. In an analysis that privileges the levels of autonomy, seeking, in this section, the singularities of the relationship between the director and the soldiers, his immediate subordinates, these dangers are even greater. This is because, and it never hurts to remember, the Mili-

107 There is no statistical data to make a full statement in this sense regarding Maranhão. I stand, however, on the more general indications that scholars of Brazilian military history have done on it. Just to illustrate, the number of Maranhão slaves in 1861 was 84,755, and the free population was of 227,873, totaling 312,628 (the number of slaves accounted for approximately 27% of the population). See MARANHÃO. Presidência da Província. Relatório do presidente da província de 3 de julho de 1861. Typ. Const, 1861, Mapa nº 5.


109 Ibidem, p. 245.
tary Settlement of São Pedro de Alcântara do Gurupi is in a sui generis situation and location, an area with two frontiers (intraprovincial and interprovincial), in which at the same time it garners social groups considered undesirable in the vicinity of Turiaçu-Gurupi, it has the colony which itself is possibly formed by soldiers who commonly come from the non-white social strata. This, coupled with the fact that

[The] Imperial State holds very limited capabilities of independent monitoring, information collection and implementation of policies [and that the] first deficiency that blocks the rationalization of administrative routines, and in particular the recruitment process, stems from the ignorance of the territorial boundaries and population, [eg] [of] the invisibility horizons of the population makes the frontier area a founding vector of an ever possible depletion of any authority, because the paths for defection, for example, are a permanent possibility. Nevertheless, Hendrik Kraay does not let us forget that “focusing on the high rates of desertion makes us lose [...] sight of the utmost important notion: that about 90% did not deserted, at no time, and chose to make the best of their condition”.

Perhaps now we have more elements to evaluate in greater detail Captain Henrique José’s and Lt. Col. Altino Lellis’ maneuvers. As an administrator responsible for the enterprise, Capt. Henrique José claimed to have investigated the case and found to be untrue all the rumors about the ethylic incursions of deputy director Luis Felix de Sá. However, the aforesaid captain made this claim based on the knowledge of an alleged plot uttered by an insubordinate officer, Jeara Mendes Pereira. If, as we have seen, the alleged addiction of the deputy director Luis Felix was twice foretold, it is possible, even likely, that an insubordinate officer would use this as a ruse to not be subjected to routine work. And it was also possible that such disobedience of soldier Jeara had encouraged similar behavior on other soldiers, making it impossible, for Lieutenant Luis Felix, to run the colony of Gurupi, which would make the presence of soldier Jeara undesirable (and in the worst-case scenario, would culminate in direct physical confrontation). On that extreme - both of mutual hostility and of an exemplary punishment, regardless of the rightfulness of reasons of one or the other - the few soldiers who were still employed in the military colony could simply defect, given the precariousness of the daily situation that they were subjected and the virtuality of suffering the same reprisals. A less traumatic resolution would be, in this sense, more convenient; so maybe Lieutenant Felix did not hesitate to give, quickly, safe passage to those who doubted his suitability.

When we consider the case of Lt. Col. Altino Lellis, the situation seems to be a bit more sensitive. In the first situation - and it should be noted that Lieutenant Luis Felix de Sá takes part in both events – we have the clear perception that Lieutenant Felix was attacked. In the second we see the opposite: he clearly appears as the aggressor. What does this tell us about the position occupied by the director, despite all of our exercise to demonstrate the various factors that could limit his authority and mitigate his autonomy in relation to his subordinates? It shows us precisely that a high rank in the bureaucratic structure may be a factor, if not decisive, but extremely advantageous to maintain a privileged position in power relations,


111 Ibidem, Ofício de 22 de agosto de 1860 do Ten.cel. Altino Lellis de Moraes Rego ao presidente da província.

112 I use this term to refer to the already mentioned case of soldier Jeara that “headed for the province to be shady.” The director, enjoying the control of the (tiny) bureaucratic repressive machine of the Colony, could have chased him, but did not. The strategy of acquiescing to desertion was much less expensive, after all, soldiers that really wanted to stay there would (as they did), making it unnecessary to pursue the ones who did not want to stay.

113 José Murilo de Carvalho argued (2007, p. 123) that, “[...] the presidency of the province, despite all the emperor’s efforts to the contrary, was much more a political office than an administrative one, as indicated by the high mobility of presidents and the little time that they remained in office.”
114 See MARANHÃO, Secretaria de Governo, Diretoria da Colônia Militar do Gurupi (1854-1878). Setor de Documentos Avulsos. APEM

115 He was director between 1859 and 1866.

116 MARANHÃO. Ofício de 7 de fevereiro de 1862 do Ten. Cel. Altino Lellis de Moraes Rego ao presidente da província. Documentos avulsos, n° 95. Maço de 1862. APEM


118 Art. 3º., § 10º: “Prestar o auxílio, que momentaneamente lhe for requisitado, [...] por qualquer Autoridade legal, dando imediatamente parte para ao Presidente da Província”. Decreto nº 820, de 12 de setembro de 1851, Capítulo II, p. 244. BRASIL. CLI


121 Ibidem.

122 Decreto de 23 de dezembro de 1831. BRASIL. CLI.

123 ALMEIDA, Adilson José de. Uniformes da Guarda Nacional (1831-1852): a indumentária na organização e funcionamento de uma associação armada. Anais do Museu Paulista. 2001, vol.8-9, n.1, p. 84. He also was, for a long time, municipal and orphans judge in the decades of 50/60, prosecutor and provincial deputy. Cf. MARANHÃO, Almanack Administrativo, Mercantil e Industrial da Provincia do Maranhão. Hemeroteca Digital – Biblioteca Nacional, 1858-1868; MARANHÃO. Publicador Maranhense (27/01/1858) and (30/06/1858), Biblioteca Pública Benedito Leite.

124 Almanack. Guarulhos, n.12, p.184-207

125 “In contrast to the “class situation” determined in a purely economic way, we designate as “status situation” all typical component of men’s fate determined by a specific social estimate, positive or negative, of honor”: WEBER, Max. Classe, Status e Partido In: VELHO, Otávio Guilherme; PALMEIRA, Moacir Soares; BERTELLI, Antônio Roberto (Orgs.) Estrutura de classes e estratificação social. Rio de Janeiro: Zahar. 1973, p. 71.


127 Actually, Fernando Uricoechea (O Minotauro..., Op. Cit., p. 134 e 136-137) emphasizes that “the mission of the National Guard was widely understood as a tool for the institutionalization of a new legal order: it should give a powerful aid to the annihilation of any group, institution or anti-establishment faction regarding the new imperial authorities and their monopoly of legitimate coercion [...]. The most widespread and sustained of them was the daily supply of militiamen through the request made by local judges and police chiefs, to catch criminals; the transfer of defendants from one city to another or removal under court custody; transport of safer and public values; patrolling and policing of cities, as well as the garrisons of cities and prisons”.

128 As Brüggemann demonstrated on the Colony of Santa Thereza, in Santa Catarina, provincial deputies also held the position of director of the military colony. This points, if not to the economic importance of the position, but to it’s status. BRÜGGEMANN, Adelson André. A sentinela isolada: o cotidiano da colônia militar de Santa Thereza (1854-1883). Dissertação (Mestrado em História). Florianópolis: UFSM, 2013, p. 95-96.


130 This point is particularly remarkable when we observe that the discipline was already difficult to maintain between individuals of the same corporation (in this case the National Guard). See Ibidem, p. 198-216.

I started this section pointing to the apparent peculiarity of the presence of an officer of the National Guard on the Direction of the Military Colony of Gurupi. I did not, however, explain the reason.

The National Guard, also known in history as the “Citizen Militia”, suffered a major setback in its democratizing character after the Conservative Regresso. “The electivity of officials [was put down] and it was determined [that] the posts would become lifelong, provided by residents of the cities that had an annual fixed income of 400,000 réis [...]”206. Thus, it is possible to assume that Altino Lellis was one of the men who participated in this “assenhoreamento”212 of the National Guard, since he had the second highest patent in the corporate chain of command22, a part of the so-called “senior officers”213. Moreover, if Jeanne Berrance is correct on her characterization, and this is indeed a time when the National Guard advances in its electoral character224,
From the standpoint of repression, the administration of Altino Lelis carried out expeditions of attack and destruction to mocambos in the years of 1860, 1861, 1862, 1863, 1864, 1865 and 1867 (not always successful, but constantly living up to its position in the region). It is worth remembering that, as I pointed out earlier, the power and, to some extent, control, is exercised not only ‘negatively’, an indicative factor of this point in this period was the assemblage of a population group of over 700 people around a state settlement managed under military discipline, that performed and ensured a constant channel of trade in the region. See MARANHÃO. Secretaria de Governo. Diretoria da Colônia Militar do Gurupi (1859-1866). Setor de Documentos Avulsos. APEM. For further developments on this issue, see GOMES, Flávio dos Santos. A Hidra e os pântanos. Mocambos e comunidades de fugitivos no Brasil (Séculos XVII-XIX). São Paulo: UNESP, 2005.

After meeting a period of exponential financial stimulus – from the $ 200,000,000 réis budgeted in 1859, to $ 376,000,000 in 1866 - the military colonization also experienced a significant decrease in the later period until 1870 (around $ 134,000,000 réis). It is intriguing to note that in the same period, while the central government was following the trend to lower investments in the sectors of War and Navy, having thwarted it only during the Paraguayan War, the military colonization experienced a reverse trend. That is, when the funds directed to the War and Navy ministries increased, financial support to military colonization decreased. In 1871, the central government outlines a recovery of the former investment ($ 372,000,000 réis), but through the rest of the lifetime of the military colony of Gurupi, it never comes to match this, entering steady decline (reaching a budget of only $ 126,000,000 in 1877, lower than at the beginning of the period), following the more general trend of defense spending carried out by the central government. BRAZIL. Ministry of Finance. Report of 1859 Ministers to 1878. Rio de Janeiro: Tip. National, 1860-1879 and CARVALHO, 2007, p. 275-280. The “militia trend” of our society, which led to the creation of an organization of the nature of the National Guard, and that needed relatively low costs for maintenance, coupled with the late professionalization of our army, both influenced by “intense process of militarization [of society] from the colonial period”, is a consensus explanation for this pattern of investment. “In other words, if the European experience, the disarmament of the manor aristocracy and the state armament is a strategy to preserve a rule that the first could becoming able to bring together symbols of distinction and status, we are faced then with a director of relative means who might not seriously need this job to support himself and which could, by law, make use of the guards in active service without needing to send an authorization request to the competent authorities. From this standpoint, Lt. Col. Altino Lelis, by taking office of director of the Military Colony of Gurupi, could be, in addition to a military authority itself, an important depot for the maintenance of the “order of things” in the region, preventing seizures and ensuring the rule of the provincial government and reproduction of the scenario considered favorable to it. Similarly, the Lt. Col could accumulate another distinguishing sign and aggregate it to an expectation of real economic gain. The longevity of its administration and the ability to deal with conflicts in a favorable manner, refraining from the use of violence, points out, if not to an inscrutable idiosyncrasy, to the leading position in the social relations ensured by his function, a position that would unnecessarily be put at risk in a direct conflict with “subalterns”.

Thus, in view of the above, I once again argue in favor of the accuracy of the concept of patrimonial bureaucracy to convey this experience in Imperial Brazil. The patrimonial control, once again used by the president of the province, this time, it seems, brought about great benefits. To see this, one should only realize that the Military Colony of Gurupi could hardly function otherwise, given the structural obstacles to which it was also subjected; it is clear, however, that this time the establishment operated at a relatively high level of performance (given, always, the proper proportions), driven, especially, perhaps, by the impetus given, at the time, to the funding of the military colonization across the country. Nevertheless, it is interesting to see the dissatisfaction, after the Paraguayan War (1864-1870), of the military authorities regarding these undertakings, believing that “by misplacement, or failures in their regime, they surely did not present the beneficial results that were expected”. This is because “[...] they did not meet the overriding principle of this institution, which is the defense of the borders”. So that after the armed conflict that caustically burdened the finances of Brazil, the military colonization project underwent a rigorous resizing process to ensure that the obsolete elements of its constitution could be overcome. The question, then, is to some extent how the subsequent Directors were affected by this new reality and, given the imminent advance of the central government on the colonies, how they proceeded when the dispute involved predicates beyond the “horizontal powers” against which they constantly battled.
no longer engage directly, in Brazil, where the building of the national state intends to preserve slavery, the landlords need to keep the instruments of coercion under their direct or indirect control as the condition of preservation of slave relations [...], creating an alternative force under private control such as the National Guard." URICOECHEA, O Minotauro..., Op. Cit., p. 87 and COSTA, Wilma Peres. A Espada de Dâmocles. O Exército, a Guerra do Paraguai e a crise do Império. Campinas/São Paulo: Hucitec/Unicamp, 1996, p. 278-277, respectivamente.

134

135

136
The event that seems to have motivated the Ministers of War to create a "breakdown of military colonies and prisons" seems to be related to the status of the "Military Colonies of Mato Grosso Province, which were beginning to form a such and such a defense system [... ill-conceived, however, and poorly armed, they were completely destroyed by the Paraguayan invasion." BRASIL, Ministério da Guerra. Relatório do Ministro de 1871. Rio de Janeiro: Tip. Universal, 1872, p. 60.

137

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