Politics, Parliament, and the Penalty of the Lash: The Significance of the End of Flogging in 1886

Abstract
The Brazilian penalty of the lash was reformed (1886) by a cabinet and parliament opposed to abolition. While the penalty's abuse had been exploited by Abolitionists attempting the cabinet's fall, the cabinet unexpectedly supported its reform. This apparent contradiction has not been satisfactorily addressed; this article attempts to do so. It will demonstrate that the cabinet's support was a cabinet tactic designed to vindicate the cabinet's policies and strength. Nonetheless, the revocation of the state's role in flogging delegitimizing flogging on plantations, too, despite the cabinet's expectations. Indeed, the reform impacted plantation destabilization, which helped lead to the cabinet's fall and the 1888 law abolishing slavery. This complex series of events illustrates the Abolitionist struggle's interweave between parliament, the movement, and slave agency.

Keywords
Abolitionism, slavery, pena de açoites, Parliament

Palavras-chave
Abolicionismo, escravidão, lei dos açoites, Parlamento

Jeffrey D. Needell
Professor in the Department of History at the University of Florida (College of Liberal Arts and Sciences/UF – Florida/EUA) and Affiliate Professor of Latin American Studies, Center for Latin American Studies (UF – Flórida/EUA)
e-mail: jneedell@history.ufl.edu

Resumo
A punição pelo açoite prevista na lei brasileira foi reformada, em 1886, por um gabinete e um parlamento contrários à abolição. Se o abuso da norma foi explorado pelos abolicionistas para tentar derrubar o gabinete, este, inesperadamente, deu apoio à reforma. Essa aparente contradição ainda não foi satisfatoriamente explicada; é o que este artigo pretende fazer. Ele demonstrará que o apoio do gabinete ao projeto foi uma tática desenhada para dar suporte às suas próprias políticas, fortalecendo-as. Mas, contrariando as expectativas do gabinete, a revogação do papel do Estado na aplicação dos açoites acabou por deslegitimar, também, o açoitamento nas fazendas. De fato, a reforma contribuiu para a desestabilização da disciplina nas fazendas, o que, por sua vez, deu impulso à queda do gabinete e à lei de 1888, que aboliu a escravidão. Esta série complexa de eventos ilustra o entrelaçamento da luta abolicionista com o parlamento e o protagonismo escravo.

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1 This article draws upon archival research funded over the years by the National Endowment for the Humanities, the American Philosophical Society, and the Fulbright-Hays Commission, support that the author acknowledges with gratitude. An earlier version of this article was given as a paper at the Conference Honoring Boris Fausto, “Rethinking Brazilian History,” Center for Latin American Studies, Stanford University, May 2010.

DOI - http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/2236-463320120406
In 1885, five captives were accused of murdering an overseer in the Province of Rio de Janeiro. Passions in the region ran high, and the captives had to be guarded in jail for fear of their being butchered. Between 21 June and 1 July 1886, after trial and sentencing, they were punished according to the Law of 10 June 1835.2

The Law of 10 June 1835 is notorious in the historiography of Brazilian slavery. Its origins may be noted quickly. It was passed by the Moderate Party’s parliamentary majority, which dominated the imperial state in the early Regency (1831–1840). At the time, Dom Pedro I was in exile, and his son and heir, Dom Pedro II, was in his minority. The regime was going through a period of violent instability, in which social divisions and geographic distance played a part, and in which an ebbing imperial authority was weakened by repeated coup attempts against the Moderates by both restorationists and radicals. While many historians have assumed that the law was part of a reaction to the 1835 Malê slave revolt, it seems clear now that the law was one of five proposed in 1833, comprising the Moderados’ response to its opposition’s repeated attacks. In this case, the law was a reaction to a failed partisan conspiracy – not the 1835 Malê revolt in Salvador, but a 1833 rural slave revolt in Minas Gerais associated with the restorationists.3

If there has been confusion over the law’s origin, however, its intent was obvious: to try and punish slave violence, particularly homicide. Execution was prescribed for slaves who killed their masters, overseers, or their families, or were involved in insurrection or any other capital crime. However, over the years, the death sentence was generally commuted by the emperor, often to the pena de açoites. This generally consisted of tying the convict up to the jail-house pillory (or, lacking a pillory, to some other fixed structure), stripping his back and buttocks, and striking him there again and again with a whip. The law held that the convict was to be whipped with a maximum of fifty strokes at a time. If, as usual, he was given the penalty of 200 strokes, these were given to him over a period of days, with medical supervision to ensure he was capable of bearing the successive sets. One wonders about the nature of the medical supervision, for, despite these precautions, one contemporary recalls cases in which the muscles of the buttocks were entirely destroyed.4

In the 1885 case with which we began, each of the men sentenced to flogging were given 300 strokes, with intervals of one or two days between sets. They were then allowed to recover in jail over 26 days and then handed over to agents of their owner. These agents, mounted on horses, bound the captives’ upper bodies and then forced them to follow them on foot en route to their plantation. Two collapsed and died before they got there. Subsequently, their bodies were disinterred for an official investigation, to see if the crown officials overseeing the flogging were responsible for their deaths. It was alleged that they had not died of the whipping, but of “pulmonary congestion.” That is, they had most probably suffered heart attacks, their lungs had filled with bloody fluid, and they died as a consequence.5

The case of these two men came to the attention of Abolitionists. One of these, Joaquim Nabuco, published an account in a sympa-

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2 See Manuel Dantas, Jornal do Commercio [hereafter, JC], 31 July 1886, 1; Ibidem, 18 August 1886, 1; Ribeiro da Luz, JC, 23 August 1886, 1. I should note that one of the five captives was sentenced to life prison with hard labor (galês perpetuo – the gales is a reference to the antique Portuguese punishment of being sent to the galleys); it was the remaining four who were flogged. The JC was the Monarchy’s journal of record for the parliamentary debates, Dantas raised the issue for reasons to be discussed below; Ribeiro da Luz was minister of justice at the time, and presented a report on the incident as demanded by Dantas.

3 For the larger context of the law, see BARMAAN, Roderick J. Brazil: The Forging of a Nation: 1798–1852. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1988. ch.6; and NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. The Party of Order: The Conservatories, the State, and Slavery in the Brazilian Monarchy, 1831–1871. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 2006. ch.2. On the Maîls and the law, see, e.g., FLORY, Thomas, Race and Social Control in Independent Brazil. Journal of Latin American Studies, [hereafter, JLAS], v.9, n.2, p.216, May 1977; or the now classic (or, lacking a pillory, to some other fixed structure), stripping his back and buttocks, and striking him there again and again with a whip. The law held that the convict was to be whipped with a maximum of fifty strokes at a time. If, as usual, he was given the penalty of 200 strokes, these were given to him over a period of days, with medical supervision to ensure he was capable of bearing the successive sets. One wonders about the nature of the medical supervision, for, despite these precautions, one contemporary recalls cases in which the muscles of the buttocks were entirely destroyed.4

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Nabuco's credentials were disputed in the Chamber explicitly or implicitly, for political reasons. However, the Liberal Party split on the issue, and a moderate minority, in alliance with the Conservatives in the Chamber, voted no confidence. The emperor, however, supported the cabinet; he dissolved the Chamber, and new elections took place, in December 1884. In these elections Nabuco was denied a seat again, clearly defrauded. Indeed, although other reformists did form a critical minority in the new Chamber, the majority elected were far more conservative. Again, as in 1884, enough Liberal moderates voted no confidence in alliance with the Conservatives to undercut Dantas once more. This time, the emperor, seeing that Dantas could not cull adequate Chamber support, withdrew his support and compelled Dantas to resign.

These details point to an aspect of the political history generally overlooked or misunderstood by the analyses most of us depend upon. Both the complex weave of parliamentary history, and the critical role of the monarch in it, are critical to comprehension of what actually took place. These lacunae affect our understanding of how formal politics articulated with the movement on the street or in the rural sector. The issue of the penalty of the lash, which opens this chapter, is particularly important. How formal politics articulated with the movement on the street or in the rural sector is a critical issue in the history of abolitionism in Brazil. It is well known that the movement for abolitionism was one of the most important movements in Brazilian history, and it had a profound impact on the development of the country.

The Cabinet that Nabuco had returned to support in 1884 was that of Manuel Dantas, an established Liberal reformist with abolitionist connections. Months of hot dispute within his own party, Dantas sought to pass a reformist Abolitionism piece of legislation. However, the Liberal Party split on the issue, and a moderate minority, in alliance with the Conservatives in the Chamber, voted no confidence. The emperor, however, supported the cabinet; he dissolved the Chamber, and new elections took place, in December 1884. In these elections Nabuco was denied a seat again, clearly defrauded. Indeed, although other reformists did form a critical minority in the new Chamber, the majority elected were far more conservative. Again, as in 1884, enough Liberal moderates voted no confidence in alliance with the Conservatives to undercut Dantas once more. This time, the emperor, seeing that Dantas could not cull adequate Chamber support, withdrew his support and compelled Dantas to resign.

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As has been demonstrated elsewhere, the Law of the Free Womb, often called the Rio Branco Law, was passed in 1871 because the emperor made it critical to the mission of the new prime minister, the viscount do Rio Branco. It was the emperor's project, something he had attempted to impose upon the nation since the mid 1860s. It did not arise out of a groundswell of public opinion. It did not arise out of organized abolitionist parties. It did not arise out of a movement from within the established political parties, Liberal or Conservative (although the reformist Liberals made abolitionism a party cause – when the party was out of power and without influence). The most radical party of the time, the Republican Party of 1870, was split on the issue and did not support it; it was also a party without political

Almanack. Guarulhos, n.04, p.91-100, 2º semestre de 2012
he was denied. He entered the Chamber shortly afterwards only because he could run in another pemambubucano district by-election where his followers could assure an uncontested majority. See CONRAD, Robert. The Destruction of Brazilian Slavery: 1850-1888. Berkeley: Univ. of California, 1972. p.219.

8 See NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. Brazilian Abolitionism, Op. Cit., II


Once passed, the law was hollowed out by bad faith, evasion, and willful neglect. After all, all those who were in a position to implement the reform were precisely from the fraction of the ruling class with most at stake in stable slave labor. It was observed that more people were freed by private initiative during the 1870s and early ‘80s than by the execution of the law. Indeed, the hunger for more slaves continued unabated. At least one periodical pointed to the ongoing theft of free people of color and their sale into the labor force through fraud. Nor are these things to be blamed on the Conservative Party alone, which was in power from 1868 to 1878. When the Liberals returned to power, they sponsored an Agricultural Congress (1878) that explicitly supported the great landholders and their labor concerns. Indeed, the Liberal Party, in power, consistently relegated active abolitionists to the party’s fringe. That helps explain why Nabuco and other reformists had to struggle, and often failed, in their bids for election. 11

Liberals’ reaction against abolition may not have been anticipated by the emperor. Indeed, some observers on both sides of the aisle thought that the emperor’s decision to return the Liberals to power in 1878, while ostensibly to carry out a long-awaited electoral reform, indicated, instead, the emperor’s private desire to implement abolitionist reform. On the one hand, he may have been frustrated with the Conservatives’ failure to implement the 1871 reform after having passed it. On the other hand, the Liberal Party’s manifesto of 1869 had included an abolitionist plank, as noted earlier. In effect, the emperor may have hoped that abolitionism stood a chance with the Liberals. If this was his expectation, he must have been terribly frustrated. The Liberal cabinets that followed, one after another, between 1878 and 1884 consistently opposed their own reformist minority. The latter, in turn, allied with the Conservative minority in the Chamber to vote against each of these cabinets, compelling their resignations. 12

All the while, Rio’s urban reformists, in alliance with the parliamentary abolitionists of 1879-1880, organized an Abolitionist movement, first in societies and then around an Abolitionist press. Their foremost militants, particularly the noted journalist, José do Patrocínio, began to reach out to the urban public. As was demonstrated years ago, the growth and metamorphosis of the free population, particularly the middle class, provided a sector without a vested interest in slavery itself, one frustrated with Brazilian backwardness and elite control, and one suffering the consequences of the repeated financial crises of the last twenty-five years. As the Vintém Riots of 1880 demonstrated, there were enough people suffering in the middle and working classes to mobilize unprecedented urban demonstrations in the hundreds, focusing on an issue that knit together...
have left analyses of the national movement for local movements, particular issues, and, especially, aspects or explorations of slaves’ agency.

10 NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. The Party of Order, Op. Cit., cap.6, 7. This analysis explicitly engages and revises the previous literature on these points.


13 If their opposition radicalized to the right, the Abolitionists did so to the left. They gave up gradual reform and united behind rapid, unconditional abolition. Their tactics, already involving illegal activity by 1883, now increasingly emphasized it. Accompanied by their more aggressive and polemic press, Abolitionists were involved in burning fields and organizing mass flights, and their parliamentary spokesmen and their lawyers started a more aggressive attack on the both economic pressure and lack of political representation. Abolition offered such people a great deal more: a moral crusade against a barbaric oppression, linked to the aspiration for a “civilized,” progressive society.12

Between 1882 and 1884, without Chamber representatives, the movement radicalized and mobilized support in Ceará, São Paulo, Rio Grande, and Amazonas, and founded a national organization, the Confederação Abolicionista (1883). Abolitionists not only mobilized support, they engaged in public emancipation and clandestine liberation. Indeed, Ceará, and then, Amazonas, abolished slavery. Such a movement was unprecedented; it threatened the established pattern of political behavior. It was clear to the party leaders in Rio and to the emperor that the movement had to be engaged. Indeed, its radicalism provided the political shelter for the emperor’s renewed abolitionism. It justified his decision to empower the reformist wing of the Liberal Party to move abolitionism forward, however timidly. In this way, the emperor could not only satisfy his own desire, he could also hope to contain the destabilizing reality of these new, radical, urban politics.14 In 1884–1885, all of these concerns were hung about the shoulders of Dantas, who was burdened with carrying out a reform that might contain the mobilized national movement, satisfy the monarch’s reformism, and yet not divide his party. As noted, however, he failed. He could not muster sufficient support in the Chamber. His failure radicalized further both the Abolitionists and their opposition.15

Their opposition, first in the Liberal Party, then in the Conservative, sought to contain the Abolitionist movement by promoting a clearly reactionary version of Dantas’s 1884 proposal, now explicitly designed to “tranquilize” the slaveholders. This law, passed in 1885, actually strengthened slaveholding and delayed emancipation, while allowing the Conservatives who finally passed it to claim themselves “abolitionist.” They then made it clear that no other abolitionist legislation would pass; indeed, they repressed the Abolitionists in town and country. This aggressive defense of the new status quo was captained by the chief of the Conservative Party, João Maurício Wanderley, barão de Cotegipe. Cotegipe, who succeeded Dantas’s immediate successor, José Antônio Saraiva, was perfect for the role. Tough, profoundly conservative, and opportunistic, Cotegipe had practiced hard-ball politics successfully for forty years. While the Liberals had split repeatedly on reform issues, the Conservatives, while they had both a reformist and reactionary wing, were more disciplined, hungry for a return to power, and fearful of further reform. They united behind Cotegipe.16
The Abolitionists' strategy involved two coordinated tactics, targeting the state and its traditional constituency. First, they sought to use traditional parliamentary and press tactics to embarrass and obstruct the cabinet, to render Cotegipe's position untenable and compel his resignation. Second, they undercut slavery itself, by destabilizing slave labor in the rural sector through violence, through encouraging resistance, and through mass flight. One was designed to obstruct, even replace, the state's leadership. The other, to compel a change in state policy, by threatening the socio-economic and legal order.¹⁷

It is this context which makes the issue of the penalty of the lash intelligible. In contrast, it makes no sense as it stands in our historiography; this generally states that the revocation of the penalty occurred because the Abolitionists shamed parliament into it. More, the literature claims that, afterward, masters no longer had the right to beat their slaves, thus undercutting plantation discipline.¹⁹ Such analyses are mistaken. Both houses of Parliament were dominated by Conservative majorities and the party was led by an unabashed reactionary. It makes no sense to argue that they could be shamed into undercutting slaveholding by abolishing the lash. Indeed, given Cotegipe's personal interests, his historical, explicit and obvious opposition to emancipation, his acknowledged chieftaincy of the party, and his commanding majority in the Chamber, he could easily have lost the lash, not the slaveholder.

The reform was made possible by a cabinet crisis. The case, it appears, was decided in November 1886 when the emperor granted Cotegipe a Chamber discharge. The Abolitionists' strategy involved two coordinated tactics, targeting the state and its traditional constituency. First, they sought to use traditional parliamentary and press tactics to embarrass and obstruct the cabinet, to render Cotegipe's position untenable and compel his resignation. Second, they undercut slavery itself, by destabilizing slave labor in the rural sector through violence, through encouraging resistance, and through mass flight. One was designed to obstruct, even replace, the state's leadership. The other, to compel a change in state policy, by threatening the socio-economic and legal order.¹⁸

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The reform was made possible by a cabinet crisis. The case, it will be recalled, began with Nubuco's late July 1886 report of the gruesome death of two captives; his report pointed to the horror as one associated with the barbarism of slavery itself. Dantas raised Nubuco's report in the Senate, but also asked whether the deaths derived from particular brutality in the whipping – in effect, a mat-

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barbarism and legal standing of slavery itself. Dantas and Nubuco exemplify the latter patterns. Dantas went from gradual reformism to calling for immediate abolition in the Senate, where he led both parties' reformists against Cotegipe. Nubuco, who had unexpectedly regained a Chamber seat in a by-election in mid 1885, was thrown out of parliament when the emperor granted Cotegipe a Chamber dissolution later that year. Nubuco was then defeated again in the new elections, elections held under close Conservative control. He refused to accept marginalization, however. He simply shifted entirely to another battlefield, remaining the public leader of the movement and continuing to work closely with the urban radicals, his allies since the early 1880s, whose propaganda and organization had made his earlier election in 1885 possible. Now, as a journalist, he fired the faithful with biting, radical criticisms in pamphlets and in the press.¹⁷

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This clarifies the political situation. Dantas, indeed, had successfully put together an ephemeral opposition majority in the Senate. The penalty of the lash was only one of his tactics in doing so. Indeed, Prado’s speech makes it clear that Dantas’s tactics were succeeding even before the lash issue had matured: for Dantas had already successfully led a vote in the Senate which actually obstructed passage of the Ministry of Agriculture budget. While it was traditional to indicate a lack of confidence in a cabinet by obstructing passage of a budget, it was not traditional to do so from the Senate. Confidence in a cabinet was traditionally demonstrated in the Chamber. However, in this case, faced with an overwhelming Conservative majority in the lower house, the Abolitionists had decided to work through the upper house. There the Conservative majority was very, very thin, and there were Abolitionist allies among them. In sum, while the opposition could not win a vote in the Chamber, they could in the Senate, and, under Dantas’s adroit leadership, they had done so. How had they succeeded? Prior to the issue of the penalty of the lash, Dantas and his allies pulled together a bare majority by dismissing Cotelge’s claims of being an abolitionist by attacking his controversial implementation of the 1885 abolitionist reform, persuasively arguing that Cotelge’s alleged abolitionism was false and betrayed true Abolitionist reformism entirely.

While, for obvious reasons, Cotelge did not announce it, this unprecedented Abolitionist success, calling his administration’s moral and political coherence into question (and, thus, effectively undermining its public strength), apparently compelled him to undertake two related actions. Cotelge had to eliminate the opposition’s unexpected majority in the Senate and then had to demonstrate his strength in parliament as a whole. This provides the plausible explanation for his handling of the penalty of the lash issue in the Senate, over the course of August and September. In word and deed, his cabinet representative, Ribeiro da Luz, the minister of justice, supported the penalty’s reform. Cotelge’s unexpected support for the reform can best be explained as part of a calculation to reduce his Abolitionist opposition, by embracing this particular legislation, in order to reassert his own abolitionist credentials. If this was the plan, it apparently worked. After taking this position on the lash, Cotelge made the cabinet’s position on the larger question, his implementation of the 1885 Abolitionist law, a matter of a vote of confidence in the Chamber (5 October). The cabinet was vindicated by a landslide. This process then reached its partisan apotheosis (in a general assembly of both houses for a vote, 9 October), when parliament voted in massive support for Cotelge. In effect, the penalty of the lash reform was simply a component in an attack by Cotelge’s opposition to undermine the cabinet.
In the Senate, the cabinet was vulnerable because of an ephemeral Abolitionist alliance between the Liberals and a Conservative fraction. This "accidental" majority suggests the reason for Cotegipe's response to this particular reform. While he would not yield to the Abolitionists' pressure for emancipation, he met the Abolitionist attack on their own terrain by seizing upon this reform; it allowed the cabinet to claim itself abolitionist and civilized. Cotegipe's minister of justice publicly asked a Senate Liberal to propose the reform, debated the amendments, and then supported it. In effect, Cotegipe's cabinet denied their Senate opposition the moral "high ground" on this particular issue, and apparently this helped them in the larger debate over the cabinet's abolitionist credentials and coherence.

The question then becomes, why would Cotegipe support this reform, when he determinedly obstructed all others? The obvious answer is, to the cabinet, the reform paid significant political dividends without significant cost – it helped them to maintain power but had no direct bearing on plantation slaveholding. Indeed, Cotegipe and his minister stated this limit explicitly, dismissing the more radical, abolitionist claims his opposition tried to pin upon the reform. In one instance, Cotegipe answered such claims with cynical euphemisms regarding both the 1885 reform and plantation punishment. When the Abolitionists argued that the reform had far-reaching implications, and sought to exploit them, Cotegipe stated:

...considerado o projeto tal como o entende o nobre ministro da justiça, e como S. Exa. e os seus colegas do governo, não pode ter ele semelhante alcance.

Trata-se apenas de comutar uma pena de açoites em outra qualquer que não seja essa que o nobre senador considera infamante, e que, na realidade aplicada a homens que amanhã podem ser livres, em virtude da lei, torna-se um pouco bárbara...

O Sr. Silveira da Motta: – Um pouco?

O Sr. Barão de Cotegipe (presidente do conselho): – O fim é este apenas; mas daí não se vá inferir que os escravos não estejam sujeitos aos castigos moderados que podem receber de seu senhor, assim como do pai os recebe o filho, e de seus mestres o discípulo.

O que se quer é acabar somente com a pena de açoites; em tudo o mais conserva-se a lei antiga; não há alteração alguma.

... A inteligência que quis dar o nobre senador não é a dada pelo governo ...O governo há de se guiar pela lei e não pelas ilusões que dela se pretenda tirar.

As we shall see, however, it was Cotegipe's own illusions about the reform which proved problematic to the regime of law he sought to defend.

Given historians' misunderstanding of the context and the reform, what, then, is this parliamentary reform's significance in the
Abolitionist struggle and our understanding of that struggle? First, the debate, and the larger debate of which it was a part, indicate the clear impact of Abolitionism on the Senate. By 1886, the Abolitionist movement was so politically powerful at all levels, that, even in the Senate, the cabinet was challenged and had to meet its challenge to maintain power. Second, that, while the reform had only to do with state flogging, as Cotegipe insisted, its erasure struck a blow at the moral economy of the plantation. While the cabinet presumed that the reform would be inconsequential for slaveholding, such was not always the perception, and, in moral economy, perception is critical. Indeed, although Cotegipe explicitly sought to dismiss them, the reform’s implications for private plantation repression were anticipated by parliamentary supporters and enemies alike. More important, the perception of the captives themselves may be indicated by their actions. Two credible contemporaries, from opposite sides of the aisle, recorded the notable ebb of slaves’ discipline over the course of 1886-1887, and one stated directly that the abolition of the lash had a clear impact on that shift.

This man, Cristiano Otoni, a senator at the time, could not have been clearer:

Lego que se propagou no país a notícia – não há mais açoites – começaram a modificar-se as relações entre os senhores e os escravos. Estes aforruxaram no serviço, furtavam-se a ele, fugiam; aqueles, sentindo-se desarmados e compreendendo afinal que a escravidão não podia durar...31

Thus, while the historiography does not recover the political reality with which to comprehend the meaning of the reform’s passage, much in the historiography’s conclusions still rings true. As demonstrated, Cotegipe did not pass it out of shame, but in a successful political calculation to reassert his parliamentary strength. Nonetheless, in passing it, he lent himself to Abolitionism’s triumph. In this reform, Abolitionists exposed the regime’s barbarism, challenged a cruel practice, and undercut slavery in law and in public opinion. Indeed, as feared among slaveholders in the parliament and seen shortly afterwards, the impact of these victories may well have had material influence on the plantations. As Otoni’s words indicate, such victories probably spurred the captives’ resistance.

If this is so, that is, if the reform did have an impact on slavery’s more rapid erosion, what does it matter that the reform’s origins have been misunderstood? It matters because the origins help us to recover the complicated nature of the Abolitionist struggle, and, obviously, an accurate analysis of that struggle is central to our work. Without such an analysis, we misunderstand the political process; we fail to understand how Abolitionism actually went forward. This one incident indicates a larger truth, for it reveals how parliamentary struggle, the Abolitionist movement, and the resistance of the captives interacted. Indeed, the dramatic 1886-1887 deterioration of plantation discipline, spurred by Abolitionist subversion, propaganda, and the reform of the penalty of the lash, was central to the crown’s and parliament’s shift favoring some immediate form of Abolitionist legislation, to
contain the destabilization of slave labor and the consequent sapping of the established social and political order. This shift at the highest levels of the formal political structure forced the fall of the Cotegipe cabinet, the ascent of João Alfredo’s reformist administration, and, under continued, dramatic Abolitionist urban and rural destabilizing pressure, the passage of the Golden Law, ending slavery immediately, on 13 May 1888.22

See NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. Brazilian Abolitionism, Op. Cit., III.

29 See the debates in JC 30 Sept.1886, 1, 2; ibidem 1 Oct. 1886, 1; ibidem, 5 Oct. 1886, 1; and the final debate, ibidem, 14 Oct. 1886, 2.


32 See NEEDELL, Jeffrey D. Brazilian Abolitionism, Op. Cit., III.