Rawls’s Point of View: A Systematic Reading of Justice as Fairness*

This paper offers a systematic reading of justice as fairness. By ‘systematic reading’ I mean an interpretation capable of presenting the rawlsian political conception as a coherent theoretical framework with all its stages of justification. I argue that the concept of point of view allows for this kind of interpretation. In the first part of this paper, I briefly discuss the difficulties of obtaining a comprehensive understanding of justice as fairness from some proposals previously set forth in the literature. In the second part, I make a formal definition of the concept of point of view and expound the main points of view in justice as fairness. Finally, I set out in detail what I will call here ‘Rawls’s point of view’, the starting point of justice as fairness.

n A Theory of Justice, the philosopher John Rawls aimed to "construct a workable and systematic moral conception" that was sufficiently robust to rival utilitarian theories (RAWLS, 1999a, p. XVII). Utilitarianism has established itself as a popular and dominant moral theory due, in Rawls's view (1999a), to its progressive theoretical expansion and clarity thanks to constant collaborative revisions. This collective approach resulted in the creation of a comprehensive theory that can address issues ranging from moral dilemmas such as abortion, euthanasia and animal ethics, to global political problems, such as guarantees of rights and liberties, reforms in the penal system and the distribution of public goods and services. In this sense, justice as fairness represents a monumental effort to establish an alternative moral conception based on the contractualist tradition 1 . To this end, Rawls (1999a) intended to maintain the virtues of utilitarianism, such as clarity and systematicity, and to establish a productive criterion for solving questions of justice in order to avoid a purely intuitionist alternative.
Although this goal is an uncontroversial point in the literature, the problem of what we might understand as Rawls's systematic (1999a) conception of justice is not the object of such a consensus. It is nonetheless a fact that a significant part of the readers of justice as fairness have devoted some attention to understanding how this conception could be organized into a unified and coherent theoretical framework. How can we justify, for example, the use of a moral decision-making procedure as abstract as the original position in relation to our most basic intuitions about justice? How can we unite distinct procedural elements such as contractualist theory, the method of reflective equilibrium and political constructivism 2 ? How can we correctly understand the passage from the first argument of the original position, which deals with the choice of the principles of justice, to the second argument, which confirms the stability of a political ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 It is known that Rawls have restricted his theory to principles concerning social institutions (the basic structure of society). To address various moral dilemmas, justice as fairness would need to establish (or at least allow for the establishment of) principles for moral agents. This was done, as is known, in 'A Theory of Justice', which provides a programmatic theoretical framework for discussing normative concepts concerning individuals, such as obligations, natural rights and permissions. For this, see RAWLS (1999a, §18). 2 Hare (1973), Dworkin (1989), Cohen (1989), Qong (2007), and Larmore (2008). of Justice as Fairness (2020) 14 (2) e0003 -4/32 in justice as fairness. This concept makes it possible to unify the stages of the theory and to draw together the contributions of various authors on the subject of partial views of justice as fairness. Finally, I set out in detail what I will call here 'Rawls's point of view', which marks the starting point of justice as fairness.

Partial views of justice as fairness
To address the problem of a systematic reading of justice as fairness, I will discuss two paradigmatic cases in the literature: 01. the relationship between the two arguments of the original position, the argument for the principles of justice and the problem of stability; and 02. the 'starting point problem', that is, the supposed foundations or basis for the Rawlsian political conception (2001, 1999a). The general idea here is to review previous efforts addressed at understanding justice as fairness as a coherent and unified theoretical framework. All the interpretations raised here say something true about justice as fairness. However, they fail to provide a systematic interpretation. In the end, as I observed above, I will argue that the concept of point of view is the most appropriate and economical option for doing so.
The first paradigmatic case deals with the relationship between the first argument of the original position, the choice for principles of justice, and the second argument, which discusses the stability of a reasonable political conception to achieve free and collective adherence on the part of citizens in a fair institutional arrangement. Until a few years ago, the discussion of both arguments was little explored. Most readers and critics focused on the argument for the two principles of justice and treated the second argument as superfluous or inconsistent 7 . Jürgen Habermas (1995), in his famous review of 'Political Liberalism', for example, argued that the Rawls's method of presenting the second argument is intractable. After choosing the principles of justice, Rawls should have left the acceptability test of his political conception to 'real citizens of flesh and blood'. Such discourses cannot be incorporated into political theory in the same way. Habermas claimed that this kind of approach was a very simplified and inaccurate anticipation of public deliberation (HABERMAS, 1995, pp. 120-121).
______________________________________________________________________________________________ 7 A summary of this debate can be seen in Laden (2003).

Marcos Fanton
(2020) 14 (2) e0003 -5/32 Benjamin Barber seems to have expressed a feeling common to some readers about this passage between arguments. For him, justice as fairness tried to reconcile incompatible elements: a certain 'Hobbesian contractarianism' of an individualistic and consequentialist nature, with Kantian psychological foundations based on duty and sociability. According to Barber (1989), there is some exaggeration in the justification; Rawls "seeks to burn his candle at both ends ... the brighter the better" (BARBER, 1989, p. 817). In other words, Rawls (1999a) modeled a kind of inconsistent moral agent.
At the beginning of his theory, it owns some of the characteristics of a 'Hobbesian agent', which helps justify the choice of certain principles of justice that favor rational interests. Subsequently, in dealing with issues of mutual cooperation and obedience to political authority, Rawls (1999a) adds 'Kantian characteristics' to the agent in order to justify the priority given to obeying just norms instead of acting out of self-interest 8 .
Paul Weithman's book (2010), 'Why Political Liberalism?' presents an interpretation that seeks to clarify the unity of these different arguments. Weithman's goal is similar to the one proposed here: to develop and defend an interpretation that unifies different partial readings of justice as fairness 9 . His key reading is the idea of stability and its role in the so-called 'political turn' of the 1980s: "By asking what Rawls means by 'stability' and what threats to stability he wanted to avoid, we can unify the various perspectives on Rawls's work" (WEITHMAN, 2010, p. 05). Thus, Weithman's claim vis-à-vis justice as fairness is that it proposes a just and 'stable' political conception in a free and plural democratic society. The process of justifying the original position involves identifying collectively rational terms for social cooperation and demonstrating how, after the institutionalization and publicization of these terms, members of a just society would resolve tensions between the demands of justice with our views of justice (WEITHMAN, 2010, pp. 12-13). The two-step model of the original ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 8 Leif Wenar discusses in detail the two parts of the original position argument and the possible contradictions between the stability argument with the principles of political liberalism (WENAR, 1995). 9 For Weithman (2010), this goal is best accomplished if one asks for the reasons for Rawls' socalled 'political turn' and his view of political stability. position does not eliminate the public debate between real citizens, but only deepens and details the political ideals and values of justice as fairness 10 .
The second paradigmatic case involves what we might call the 'starting point problem' of justice as fairness, which was raised in the very first reviews of 'A Theory of Justice' and resonates even today 11 . The objection here arises while questioning the relationship between our political intuitions (as Rawls, 1999a) would say, our considered judgments) and the original position. It seems that the latter presupposes arbitrary moral elements, such as a specific principle of treatment between persons or a specific moral motivation to adopt this specific device. As abstract as the original position is, say such critics, we find no moral justification for reflecting from it 12 .
According to Ronald Dworkin, one of the most famous representatives of this critique, the original position, to be sustained, needs to be understood as an  (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 07); 03. the exposition of moral psychology and, thus, the development of a sense of justice (RAWLS, 1999b, p. 429); 04. the assessment of the ability of citizens to reconcile the strains of commitment to justice and the demands of their own conception of the good (the 'unity of reason') (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 491); 05. the assessment of political stability upon 'special psychological tendencies', such as envy, self-interest and tendencies towards dominance or submission (RAWLS, 2001, §54). Political theory has this dual structure is due to the influence of Rousseau (RAWLS, 2007, p. 207). 11 The problem was named by Carla Bagnoli (2014) in her article on moral and political constructivism. This kind of problem affects not only political constructivism but also reflective equilibrium and contractualism. For more on this, see Hare (1973), Dworkin (1989), Cohen (2008), Raz (1990), and Larmore (2008). 12 Richard Hare (1973) and Ronald Dworkin (1989) may agree on one point in their criticisms of justice as fairness: as it is presented, the justification of the principles of justice is accomplished by an arbitrary normative procedure. Hare (1973) defines Rawls as a 'subjective intuitionist', while Dworkin (1989) seeks to remedy this problem by setting out the 'constructive method'.
Very briefly, it can be said that the purpose of reflective equilibrium is, according to the constructive model, to select different publicly recognized moral intuitions to support principles of justice and make suggestions of models of social and political institutions (DWORKIN, 1989, p. 31). Thus, Dworkin suggests that Rawls's contractualism expresses such intuitions in a rightbased theory that protects fundamental interests, which the parties seek to secure through their veto power (DWORKIN, 1989, p. 46). That is, the original position presupposes a condition for the establishment of rights that protect the interests of individuals that must be taken into consideration by all. For Dworkin, Rawls's deep moral theory presupposes a "right to equal concern and respect in the design and administration of the political institutions that govern them" (DWORKIN, 1989, p. 50). Thus, we have the development of justice as fairness based on a specific moral element, which will regulate the choice of alternatives on distribution of rights and opportunities and on the regulation of the social, economic and political institutions of a given society.
This line of reasoning brought two strands of interpretation that have been developed in the contemporary literature. The first strand emphasizes the moral aspects (principles or ideals) that must be presupposed to admit the original position. That is, it is necessary to clarify the moral criterion that motivates the adoption of the original position. For Charles Larmore (2008), the original position only makes sense because it presupposes a moral commitment to reasonableness. We have taken the original position because we are already committed to being reasonable to each other and accept that this principle belongs to an order of moral values that is independent of our will 13 .
The second strand emphasizes the 'sociological aspect' of Dworkin's (1989) interpretation in relativizing the model of the original position to the public political culture. That is, the original position is developed so that we may reflect on certain existing social practices and their agents. From this we can draw two ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 13 Larmore (2008) explicitly opposes political constructivism. His position is that of a rational intuitionist. Gerald Cohen was also famous for his general criticism of political constructivism. However, in his case, the problem lies in the incompatibility between different kinds of questions of justice: questions of justice as such (consideration of pure justice) and questions of rules governing the regulation of political and social institutions (considerations of the application of principles of justice) (COHEN, 2008, Ch. 07 James (2005), the fundamental difference we must note here is the kind of social practice that Rawls takes for granted. In his major works, Rawls (2005Rawls ( , 1999a  Dworkin's interpretation (1989) and its offshoots, while sticking to a detailed reconstruction of the 'foundational basis' of justice as fairness, give rise to two problems. In James' case (2013James' case ( , 2005, we have no element common to all steps of the constructivist method, and worse, there is no separation between the two arguments from the original position. Larmore (2008) has the problem of making the argument from the original position a circular argument (a problem that Rawls himself was aware of). It is as if Rawls was presupposing a specific moral motivation (the principle of equal respect) for choosing principles of justice in the original position. In justice as fairness, this circularity is avoided by distinguishing between a thin theory and a thick theory of the good, that is, a theory based solely on the rational interests of the parties and a theory that later embodies the desire to be fair (the sense of justice informed by the principles of justice) (RAWLS, 2005, p. 492). There is therefore a need to distinguish different stages of development from Rawls's political conception to account for his explanation.
As I said at the beginning of this article, I believe both approaches say something true about justice as fairness and seem to be complementary. The concept of point of view is the most interesting formal element from which we can account for this integration and thereby to establish a systematic interpretation of justice as fairness. It is interesting not only due to its structure, as we shall see, but My intention, therefore, is to rescue this reading and establish the concept of point of view as the organizing element of justice as fairness. However, in order to get real gains from this reading, we need to better define the complex structure of this concept and track its main modifications throughout the stages of presentation of justice as fairness. This will be done in the next section.
I will further argue that Rawls establishes four points of view on justice as fairness. In addition to the three points of view established by the Rawls himself, I believe that, from an analytical point of view, it is relevant to assume the point of view of the philosopher, which underwrites the procedures and elements that form the 'basis' for the construction of the political conception. I will call this ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 16 For more on this subject, see Bercuson (2014) and Lloyd (2014).
starting point 'Rawls's point of view' and it should be considered, in general terms, as historical and intuitive. It is historical, because it starts out from an understanding of a particular social and political context and is intuitive because it selects and excludes political convictions without a definite procedure (later, I will return to and develop these two characteristics) 17 .

A systematic view of justice as fairness
In his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Rawls sets out some maxims that guide him in interpreting the classical authors from the tradition. One of these maxims is: "To understand their works, then, we must identify those points of view and how they shape the way the writer's questions are interpreted and discussed" (RAWLS, 2007, p. 103). This quote refers to the remark made by the philosopher Collingwood (1982) that the history of political theory is made up of ever-changing problems and solutions. Rawls (2007)  With that in mind, we may be surprised at the content of Rawls's lessons (2007) and his attempt to scrutinize the tradition of political philosophers from their point of view. This is his way of distancing himself from the standardized interpretations of each contractualist. Hobbes (1996) and Locke (1988), for example, are read in the light of how they each interpreted the difficulties of their social context and what solutions they thought of these political stalemates. Hobbes (1996), says Rawls (2007) In a later paragraph in the same work (s. 61), Rawls (1999a) analyzes the expression 'the good' in the sense of rationality and formalizes the above considerations. Something is good, in a first formulation, if and only if, it has the ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 18 As is well known, Rawls' lectures on moral philosophy and political philosophy at Harvard have been compiled into two works (RAWLS, 2007;2000) and have no direct relation to his systematic theoretical works, in which he expounds his own theory. However, the lectures here serve only as a limited reference: to further clarify the thinking behind his systematic works. Even without them, the interpretation remains intact. I would like to thank the reviewers for emphasizing this point.
properties that are rational for someone to want things of its kind. However, this is not enough, Rawls observes, because the definition of such standards presupposes a similarity in the interests, capacities and circumstances of persons who desire such an object. In this sense, it is necessary to add such factors to the point of view of each particular person, and thereby relate them to criteria by which an object can be judged as excellent: There always stands in the background a point of view from which an artifact, functional part, or role is being appraised, although of course this point of view need not be made explicit. This perspective is characterized by identifying the persons whose concerns are relevant for making the judgment, and then by describing the interests which they take in the object (RAWLS, 1999a, pp. 353-354).
Thus, we can only discuss the excellence of an object, such as a bicycle, if we have information about the 'relevant interests' of the person who will use that particular object in certain circumstances. In this case, it can be the type and distance of a trip, the personal reasons for it (leisure or competition), the financial budget and/or the aesthetic and/or technological considerations relating to the bicycle. There is no such thing as an absolutely good bike; the evaluation of its excellence will always depend on the cyclist's point of view.
Based on this explanation, I argue that Rawls (1999a) will assume this same conceptual framework when discussing political issues. One point of view forms the basis for making a moral decision or making a political judgment. Justice as fairness, in this sense, intends to establish a suitable moral point of view for the evaluation of social, political and economic institutions of modern democratic societies.
Basically, Rawls here denies the possibility of an answer to the classic question 'What is justice?' as formulated. To repeat myself: there can be no philosophical answer, as such, because there is no absolutely good principle of justice; the evaluation of the excellence of justice will always depend on the point of view of the moral agents and the circumstances of a given society 19 . Therefore, in Rawls's view, there are many possible contractual theories. Depending on how we model its main elements (rationality, information and interests of the parties, ______________________________________________________________________________________________ object and circumstances of the agreement, moral or political problems), we will have different theories (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 147) 20 . What differentiates Hobbes (1996), Locke (1988), Rousseau (1997), Kant (1991)  ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 20 The formal structure of the initial situation of contractual theory is elaborated in Rawls, 2007, §17. 21 This problem is characteristic of contractualism and is current today. We can see this in Brian Skyrms (2004), who discusses the best formal models to exemplify the social contract problem. For Skyrms (2004), the best formal model is neither the original position nor the prisoner's dilemma, but the stag hunt game. We also find parallels with the discussion about the pluralism of models in economy, recently conducted by Rodrik (2015). 22 Formalizations of the concept of point of view or, more specifically, of perspective, in contemporary political theory can be found in Gaus (2016) and Muldoon (2016). The table is organized in the following way. In the columns we find each formal element of the concept of point of view. In the rows, we have the points of view of justice as fairness provided in a logical order of exposition and with their elements fulfilled. This is the explicit advantage of a systematic reading of Rawlsian theory: we can gain greater control over the methodological procedures and concepts involved in each step and verify changes in them without assuming statements or concepts from one step to another.
As I present it, justice as fairness should be read as follows. However, Rawls does not deny the important role that intuition plays in shaping political conceptions: "No doubt any conception of justice will have to rely on intuition to some degree" (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 36). Therefore, political theories should gradually restrict its reference to moral convictions or intuitions. This can be accomplished, for example, by developing decision-making procedures.
Reference to such intuitions is not removed but restricted. The problem with intuitionism, in this sense, is not referring to our moral intuitions, but refusing to establish a criterion for moral decision-making. This is why Rawls can state that "the feeling that this conception of justice is egoistic is an illusion fostered by looking only at but one of the elements of the original position" (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 129). Although the first argument involves such simplifications, the second does not. It becomes important to make the idea of society as a system of social cooperation, which is now considered a wellordered society, more complex in the first place. And secondly, to determine the idea of a citizen with a determined sense of justice (i.e. informed by the principles of justice). In other words, Rawls (1999a) wants to know if persons who grew up and lived under a society regulated by justice as fairness will acquire a sense of ______________________________________________________________________________________________ justice strong enough to opt for a plan of life that establishes interests of justice as priorities over selfish interests.
The structure of the stability problem is formulated on the basis of the prisoner's and the mutual assurance dilemmas. The general question that arises is a matter of individual rationality with detrimental collective consequences, not a problem of collective decision. Will citizens in a just society opt for justice even when faced with special psychological temptations such as envy, self-interest or the desire for domination/submission? Will a well-ordered society have a sufficient number of citizens who will develop such a sense of justice to maintain justice as fairness stable, and furthermore, will this willingness to act fairly be the object of mutual cognizance? Rawls (1999a)  It is characterized as indexical, as it is always undetermined; it basically depends on the relationship that 'we' have with political conceptions and the reflection we make on which political conception is most reasonable for 'our' society. In this sense, this point of view will always depend on the reader and the social and political circumstances in which s/he lives.

Rawls's point of view
Now ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 26 It is worth mentioning here two things. The first concerns the ambiguity with which Rawls treats the method of reflective equilibrium: is it a process of reflection or a state of mind that serves as a normative ideal? Moreover, Rawls is ambiguous about the kind of person who performs reflective equilibrium: are they ordinary citizens or are they philosophers? The discussion of these issues can be seen in Scanlon (2003) and Daniels (2015).

The specification of the problems of a given social practice
At the very beginning of the first conference of 'Political Liberalism', Rawls (2005) clearly sets out the two fundamental problems that justice as fairness seeks to address. The first is the problem of social justice, understood as the political conflict of the 'last two centuries' of democratic thought. We have not yet found, says Rawls, a common ground of agreement on how we should organize society and ensure the defense of the ideals of equality and freedom for all its citizens. This disagreement is described through Benjamin Constant's classic conceptual distinction between the "liberties of the ancients" and the "liberties of argue that for utilitarians society is considered an "efficient administration of social resources" (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 29) and persons are taken as agents who seek to maximize the fulfillment of their wants (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 24). From these two fundamental ideas, Rawls will say that utilitarianism gives priority to the increase of aggregate welfare over individual rights and freedoms, and thus realizes his famous critique that "utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons" (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 24). At bottom, even though Rawls is making comparisons between justice as fairness and utilitarianism, he cannot do much more at this point, as he is referring to the initial intuitions of each political conception (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 47). The decision on which best conception can only be realized through reflective equilibrium, which requires the complete development of each conception.

Description of the social and political circumstances
Part of the literature has credited the publication of 'Political Liberalism' as a 'step back' against communitarian criticism of the abstract model of the original position. Rawls (1999a)  ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 27 For the purposes of this paper, however, I set aside any discussion of Rawls' 'political turn' and the central issue of 'Political Liberalism'. Implicitly, I follow the proposal set forth by Weithman (2010) in 'Why political liberalism?'. 28 The idea of the circumstances of justice is paramount for the discussion of the function of realistic utopia and the proposition of an ideal theory of justice. The current discussion in the literature is based on the idea of feasibility. For more on this, see Wiens (2015Wiens ( , 2012 and Valentini (2012). For more on the different moments in which Rawls defines and restates this concept, see RAWLS, 1999a, §22;2001, § §24 and59 (in particular, 59.1) and2005, Intro. 29 Other facts are also allowed, such as those that fall under the term "general facts about human society" (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 119). 30 A view of the social and political world and this view can create conflicts and problems of political consensus is one of the main topics discussed by Gaus (2016).

Identification of the persons involved and their interests
Rawls advocates a democratic conception of political philosophy. This means, among other things, that philosophy is part of the cultural background of contemporary democratic societies. Philosophers enter the political debate as equal citizens, who offer reflections that may be part of the collective knowledge of persons. While asserting a symmetrical political relationship between author and reader, Rawls assumes that philosophers possess not only the same moral authority but also the same moral and intellectual capacities of any other citizen.
Philosophy demands only the exercise of reason and "has no special access to fundamental truths, or reasonable ideas, about justice and the common good, or to other basic notions" (RAWLS, 2007, p. 01). Thus, from the philosopher's point of view, the persons involved are all the politically engaged moral persons in a society.
However, upon entering the public debate, philosophers do so from a "philosophically motivated inquiry" (RAWLS, 1999b, p. 288). Its main interest is not to defend a specific political conception, but to investigate and systematize viable political conceptions for the political debate. As Rawls puts it, in defining the 'point of view of you and me', we assume that we are using justice as fairness to organize considered judgments at all levels of generality into a coherent view (RAWLS, 2001, p. 10).
In an even more precise sense, philosophical interests thrive upon practical interests, which are described by Rawls through the functions of political philosophy. We enter philosophy to solve problems of political conflict by developing a normative framework for guidance (RAWLS, 2001). This will be even clearer in the next section.

Description of the appropriate mode of reflection and/or deliberation of persons.
To understand the philosopher's mode of deliberation, I would like to quote a historical reference made by Rawls in 'Political Liberalism': We turn to political philosophy when our shared political understandings, as Walzer might say, break down, and equally when we are torn within ourselves. We recognize this if we imagine Alexander Stephens rejecting Lincoln's appeal to the abstractions of natural right and replying to him by saying: the North must respect the South's shared political understandings on the slavery question. Surely the reply to this will lead into political philosophy (RAWLS, 2005, pp. 44-45).
Using this episode, Rawls (2005) shows that Lincoln sought a political foundation for equality of persons that could be recognized and endorsed by the parties involved through the articulation of the abstract idea of natural law. That is, slavery was not attacked in public debate either from a particular moral conception or from an alternative view of human nature (something Stephens certainly did on the basis of the idea of racial supremacy). Instead, Lincoln argued that the institution of slavery violated the political principle of equality, as stated in the Declaration of Independence.
This philosophical engagement on public issues aiming for consensus has as its starting point a kind of "role modification" (RAWLS, 1999b, p. 290). In his article 'The Independence of Moral Theory', Rawls emphasizes the need to "put aside the urgency we feel to discover the true method of determining what we ought to do" and insist on observing different methods and moral positions that exist from a "neutral position and as impartially as possible" (RAWLS, 1999b, p. 290 Regarding the process of abstraction, I would like to make a final comment. We know that Rawls restricted, but did not remove the role of intuitions from his political conceptions. Thus, we may ask ourselves: is there any decisionmaking procedure for the characterization and choice of considered judgments or for the political ideas and values fundamental to Rawlsian theory? Or is there any procedure for prioritizing one idea over another, such as the inviolability of people or the idea of society as an equitable system of cooperation? How abstract should the initial set of ideas of a political theory be? In 'The Independence of Moral Philosophy', Rawls states, in a rather intuitionistic tone, that we must develop those conceptions that "strike us as most promising" for political consensus (1999b, p. 289). In 'Political Liberalism', this tone is maintained when Rawls mentions the "fact that we feel coerced", "impelled" or even "surprised" by the development and deepening of certain judgments weighed on principles and criteria for a political conception (RAWLS, 2005, p. 54).
Therefore the intuitive selection or exclusion of such 'first' elements is only justified after understanding the general framework of the political conception and serving its political objectives.

Conclusion
My main intention in this article was to offer a systematic reading of justice as fairness. The immediate gains derived from this can be seen in the kind of understanding we now have of the Rawlsian theory of justice. This interpretation is first and foremost complete, as it covers all stages of the argumentation of justice as fairness. Secondly, it is structurally comprehensive because, in addition to allowing for the differentiation of stages, it allows for the definition and distinction of the main elements of each stage and thereby maintaining a certain conceptual and methodological control. Finally, and thirdly, it seeks to make clear the coherence of the theory by showing that the relationship between its components is free of gaps and contradictions.
As argued in the first part of the text, there is a continuing concern in the literature to account for this kind of interpretation. From Ronald Dworkin (1989) to Paul Weithman (2010) and Aaron James (2013)  political and social world? 31 If we can agree, for example, that issues of distributive justice and mutual tolerance are central to our society and that our society should be viewed as a scheme of social cooperation between free and equal persons, then, it seems that this agreement is the first step while agreeing with later theoretical developments of justice as fairness.
Finally, one last gain can be seen in the capacity that this type of reading allows for the formation of a research program. As some readers familiar with Rawls's work may have noticed, certain elements or stages are absent from my interpretation. For example, the sequence of stages of application of the principles of justice following the choice in the original position was not set out in detail. The ideal of public reason or the principle of liberal legitimacy, which creates particular difficulties, is also absent given the current discussion of its exact location. If the idea of point of view and the orderly presentation of justice as fairness, as proposed, help us reflect on such concepts and can be further developed, then I will have achieved my goal. The purpose of this reading is also to serve as a basis for the integration of different studies on political liberalism and the improvement of diverse political conceptions.
As Rawls said (1999a), utilitarianism has only become a consistent and widespread moral theory due to its capacity for constant reformulation through integrated work between different thinkers. Likewise, I believe that by elaborating a systematic and complex framework, Rawls did not intend, in isolation, to create an alternative to utilitarianism, but rather to allow for a theoretical framework capable of establishing a theoretical point of convergence point that could be refined over time. It seems that this was his intention while denying the claim of originality of justice as fairness, since it should be understood as an update of political contractualism: ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 31 There is a growing literature among liberal public reason theorists regarding the divergence between political perspectives. These authors argue that there is a deep divergence between conceptions of the social and political world that cannot be retranslated in terms of preference and priorities. In this sense, there is a concern to understand h ow social and legal norms can be justified for different political perspectives. Among the authors who discuss such problems, we can refer to D' Agostino (1996), Gaus (2016), Muldoon (2016), Vallier (2019), Chung and Kogelmann (2018).