Effects of Federalism on Social Policies in a Comparative Perspective: Argentina and Brazil *

This article analyzes the relationship between federative institutions and social policies in the new constitutional order in Argentina and Brazil. It draws on literature and data to describe two characteristics of federalism in both countries and relate this with the equitable advancement of policies such as education, health, and social assistance: jurisdictional centralization, which refers to the capacity of the central government to produce legislation about policy design; and fiscal federalism, concerned with the definition of revenues and social expenditure by the different levels of government. The conclusion is that Argentina and Brazil are example of centralized federalism and that this is not an impeditive to the advance of egalitarian social policies; but there are important differences between them. In Brazil there is greater jurisdictional centralization combined with fiscal federalism that includes centralized and stable rules to compound public revenues and a better definition of social expenditure, which structures more favorable conditions for universal and egalitarian social policies. In Argentina, jurisdictional centralization is lower and is combined with fiscal federalism with ample latitude for bargaining between the federated entities to divide revenue and define expenditure, factors which better accommodate territorially segmented social policies with a lower equalizing potential, as is the case of health.

government to formulate and coordinate social policies, potentializing alterations in the status quo and great social inclusion, while fiscal centralization can favor a greater allocation of social expenditure and more equitable policies in the national territory (OBINGER, LEIBFRIED, and CASTLES, 2005). The text is divided into three sections, in addition to the introduction and conclusions. The first discusses the relationship between federalism and social policies, considering the institutional dimensions of this type of state which can affect equality. In the next section jurisdictional centralization and fiscal federalism in Argentina and Brazil are compared and analyzed, highlighting similarities and differences which can affect universality and equality in the offer of social policies. The third and final section explores the effects of federalism in the design and results of education, health, and social assistance policies in the two countries.
It is concluded that Argentina and Brazil are centralized federations in terms of the jurisdictional and fiscal aspects, enabling the federal government to advocate universal and equanimous policies. However, there are important differences in the level and manner by which these centralizations were established in both countries, which has impacts on social policies. In Brazil the federal government has more institutional resources that affect the design and funding of social policies. This has favored a more equanimous treatment of these policies, especially in health and social assistance. In Argentina, the combination between Effects of Federalism on Social Policies in a Comparative Perspective: Argentina and Brazil (2020) 14 (3) e0005 -4/37 reduced jurisdictional centralization in relation to social policies and dependence on bargains between the federated levels of government, over the division of public revenues and expenditure rules, favors territorially segmented social policies with a lower potential equalizer. This reality can be observed in three policy areas, but with important specificities.

Federalism and social policies
The Research treating federalism as a limiting factor has focused principally on processes of political and fiscal decentralization. Federalism is characterized by dispersing power, increasing the number of actors with veto power in the legislature, which hinders the obtaining of majoritarian support by the central government to establish social welfare policies (SWANK, 2001). In the fiscal aspect, decentralization disperses social expenditure and resources, with the effect being the reproduction of territorial inequalities and restrictions on the expansion of expenditure in social programs. This is because subnational units suffer constraints to fund social policies, since higher taxation and the offer of services can drive away private investors and attract great demand for these policies (PETERSON, 1995).
Criticism of this approach focuses, above all, on its generalization; federations such as Austria, Belgium, and Germany have strong social welfare systems. Comparative studies show that federalism varies considerably between countries and that the fiscal and political decentralization observed in the United States, where this thesis is most widely accepted, is not observed in other federations, suggesting different impacts on social policies (OBINGER, LEIBFRIED, and CASTLES, 2005).
The conclusion is that "federalism clearly matters, how it matters will depend on the characteristics of a particular federal system and the ways in which federal institutions interact with other important variables" (PIERSON, 1995, p. 449). Following the establishment of this point, what has gained relevance is the debate about the definition of which characteristics of federalism are important for social policies and how much they matter. This is a challenging task when the multiplicity of factors which interact in the production of social policies are considered. From this perspective, the treatment of federalism has been associated with its interaction with factors such as party systems, political and economic configurations, and the characteristics of social policy. Social policies have their own elements, such as stakeholders, the distribution of competences, the type and scope of goods and services offered, funding and other aspects which are affected and which affect the dynamic of federalism generating, for example, varied types and levels of decentralization.
From this perspective, studies on federalism and social policies have analyzed how the variability of federative configurations affect social policies, especially their scope, development, and results. In this paper it is proposed to identify the institutional arrangements adopted in Argentine and Brazilian federalism and the shaping of three social policies: education, health, and social assistance. For this reason, we sought to select those characteristics of federalism which most directly impact on universality and the equality of social policies.
The focus is not on the formal rules which define federalism in these countries' constitutions since these provide little information about the effective reality of this form of state. In other words, the constitutional pact of autonomy for the Union and subnational governments points more to a normative directive in the distribution of political power than reality. The shaping of this autonomy depends on other variables, whether defined or not in legislation: the distribution of financial resources, the ways in which political parties are structured at the national and subnational level, and electoral systems amongst others.
In the literature, according to the authors mentioned below, it is possible to identify institutional characteristics associated with federalism which The organization, functioning, and connections of political parties at the different levels of government are also important for jurisdictional centralization.
Political parties, as highlighted by Riker (1964), are not part of the federative constitutional pact, but are fundamental institutional actors for the analysis of political decentralization. Democratic federations are characterized by the existence of autonomous levels of power, in which governments are formed through elections based on party competition. The way parties are organized at national and subnational level characterizes party systems in federalism, which can be more or ______________________________________________________________________________________________ 1 Another institutional aspect which has emerged with important social policy impacts in the Brazilian case, but which does not seem to have the same importance in Argentina, at least from the literature surveyed, is the role of the Supreme Court in relation to social policy. Under the auspices of the phenomenon known as 'the judicialization of politics', the Brazilian judiciary has moved into the sphere of social policies, affecting the definition and compliance of social rights, as well as the obligations and prerogatives of the different levels of government in this aspect. Some Brazilian authors (CAMARGO, 2013;OLIVEIRA, 2009) have pointed to a centralizing perspective in the actions of the Brazilian Supreme Court (Supremo Tribunal Federal), with faster and more favorable decisions to the interests of the Union when there is a conflict of interest with subnational governments. This is a new area of research which was not considered here due to the distinct weight which the variable seems to have in the Argentine case, and also due to the lack of more robust data for comparison. less centralized. It is necessary to consider some factors to analyze this level of centralization: the level of party fragmentation (LIJPHART, 2008;TSEBELIS, 2009), the level of nationalization of the party system (RIKER, 1964;STEPAN, 1999), levels of cohesion and party discipline in the parliamentary arena (TSEBELIS, 2009), and the relations between social cleavages and the political party system (LIJPHART, 2008), in which are situated the presence and strength of national pro-welfare state parties (OBINGER, LEIBFRIED, and CASTLES, 2005).
Jurisdictional centralization is favored when federalism can count on cohesive and disciplined national parties in the national legislature, with the capacity to form a coalition of support for the national executive in proposing public policies. In the context of presidentialism and multiple parties, as in the Argentine and Brazilian cases, a governing party coalition -with a significant number of parliamentarians -and with relevant pro-welfare state forces favors social policies.
Fiscal federalism, in turn, is one of the perspectives most present in the institutional debate about the effects of federalism on public policies, as is highlighted in the classic works in Public Choice Theory, begun by Tiebout (1956), and in more recent works focused on the search for equalization in the offer of social policies (BOADWAY, 2006;DAFFLON and VAILLANCOURT, 2003;HIERRO, ATIENZA and PATIÑO, 2007). This dimension covers the distribution of revenues and public expenditure among national and subnational governmental organizations, but also regulatory authority over public finances, as highlighted by Rodden (2005); and here there is a point of intersection with jurisdictional centralization. It is an important dimension of intergovernmental relations and has significant effects on social policies, principally for its universal and equalizing nature in relation to the distribution of the offer of services and the results achieved.
Fiscal federalism tends to favor social policies when it is more centralized, this is, when the Union concentrates fiscal legislation and tax collection and can minimize vertical and horizontal inequities between federated entities by establishing perennial mechanisms for the distribution of resources and fiscal responsibility. more rare has been comparative production. This essay presents itself as relevant and challenging in this aspect, advancing in the description of institutional characteristics highlighted above to deal with social policies as diverse as education, health, and social assistance.
The next section will describe fiscal and jurisdictional centralization in Argentina and in Brazil, in their more general characteristics associated with social policies.

Jurisdictional centralization
The 1994 National Constitution of the Argentine Republic (CN/94) establishes the form of the federal state in its first article and during the text discusses aspects of its shaping, autonomy, and relationship between the two principal levels of government, the Federal Government, and the provinces. In the jurisdictional aspect, the 1994 Constitution attributes the provinces any powers not delegated to the national government, in other words, the residual competence to legislate. Provincial legislative autonomy is established in Article 05, where it is defined that each province can its own constitution under a representative republican system, create their own institutions without the interference of the national government, as well as legislate in areas such as education, health, and social assistance.
The autonomy of the municipal level is also established in the Constitution, however, this has to be stipulated by the provinces in their constitutions (BARRIENTOS, 2009, pp. 57-58), which in practice signifies low municipal autonomy and an enormous diversity in the shaping of local power, something very distinct from the Brazilian case. Iturburu (2012) points to the lack of clarity about the meaning of the municipality in Argentine federalism, which has a direct reflection on its jurisdictional configuration in the provincial constitutions. e0005 -9/37 There is a lack of recognition of municipal autonomy in three important provinces (Buenos Aires, Mendoza, and Santa Fe) and "limiting regulations in the majority of provinces which recognize it" (ITURBURU, 2012, p. 170).
The analysis of jurisdictional centralization not only involves verifying the division of legislative competences, but also assesses the capacities of the national executive to obtain success in the approval of its initiatives. Argentine federalism, pointing to the operation of 'real forces' (STEPAN, 1999) which, more than the formal legal structure, define the balance of power which maintains a determined federalism (RIKER, 1964). Thus, the Argentine federalist organization of the party system is marked by the strong influence of governors in the organization of subnational political forces and also in the National Congress, In terms of legislative competences, the Constitution reserved for states residual competence to legislate (art. 25, § 1º), similar to the Argentine case.
Municipalities were given responsibility for legislating on 'questions of local interest' and 'supplementing federal and state legislation where applicable' (art. 30).
In practice, due to the amplitude of national legislation, the legislative authority of states and municipalities is restricted. The Constitution is extensive and detailed, is Brazilian fiscal decentralization, unlike the Argentine case, preceded the transfer of responsibility for social policy. Moreover, the expressive increase in constitutional transfers discouraged the tax-raising efforts of subnational entities and did not ensure a better redistribution of income at a national dimension (REZENDE, 2010;VARSANO, 1996). In addition, the absence of fiscal responsibility mechanisms led to the growing indebtedness of governmental entities, especially states.
Jurisdictional centralization allowed the national government to carry out 'recentralizing' fiscal reforms, starting in the middle of the 1990s, minimizing health, education, and social assistance.
Argentina and Brazil are federations whose fiscal centralization gives the Union power to define social expenditure. They also share fiscal problems related to the low redistributive capacity of constitutional transfers, economic instability, and public indebtment. However, Brazilian fiscal federalism has clearer and more stable distributive rules among governmental entities.

Federalism and education, health, and social assistance policies in Argentina and Brazil
Education, health, and social assistance are policies with universalist and egalitarian perspectives in Argentina and Brazil, according to constitutional and infra-constitutional legislation. It requires, in accordance with the assumptions of this paper and taking into account the territorial inequalities of  (MALLOY, 1986;OLIVEIRA and TEIXEIRA, 1985). In the economic crisis of the 1980s initiatives were adopted to integrate the medical care system based on social insurance, centralized in the national government, and the public primary health care network, administered by states and municipalities, leading in practice to the universalization of access and coordinated decentralization before the 1988 Constitution (STRALEN, 1996). With redemocratization, the 1988 Constitution established the right to health and a unified and decentralized public health system, with shared administration between the Union, state, and municipalities, at the same time that it reserved space for a private system with a supplementary nature. In Brazil, the social protection system originated in the 1920s with the retirement and pensions funds aimed at specific sectors of urban workers.
Unlike Argentina, social security advanced more slowly and in a restricted manner.
In the 1940s new categories of workers were incorporated in the social security system, including rural workers and self-employed, the elderly, and disabled people with low incomes, groups with an irregular contribution history. Parallel to this, the offer of social assistance services was the responsibility of private