Civil Society and Paths to Abolition

A sociedade civil e os caminhos para a abolição

Seymour DRESCHER
University of Pittsburgh
Contact: syd@pitt.edu

Abstract: Through a comparative analysis, this article aims to present an overview of British, French, Russian, American and Brazilian abolitionist action, between the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century. Indicating the struggles of pro-abolition civil associations, the paths taken in Britain, France, the US and Brazil are presented in parallel – either to emphasize approaches, either to highlight the undeniable peculiarities – revealing the marks of violence and negotiation present in the emancipation process.

Keywords: abolitionism; Britain; France; Brazil; United States; Russia; civil society.

Resumo: Através de uma análise comparativa, este artigo procura apresentar um panorama da ação de abolicionistas britânicos, franceses, americanos, russos e radicados no Brasil, entre finais do século XVIII e ao longo do século XIX. Ao indicar os percalços das associações civis pró-abolição, os caminhos tomados nos domínios supracitados são colocados em paralelo – ora para ressaltar aproximações, ora para ressaltar as inegáveis particularidades –, revelando as marcas de violência e de negociação presentes no processo de emancipação dos cativos.

Palavras-chave: abolicionismo; Grã-Bretanha; França; Estados Unidos; Rússia; Brasil; sociedade civil.

On May 9, 1788 British Prime Minister William Pitt rose in the House of Commons to move consideration of legislation against the slave trade. The first time such a motion had ever been presented to a national legislature, he insisted that it was a necessary response to an engaged public.
More than half of all petitions submitted to the House that year were demands for action against the slave trade. Pitt was powerfully seconded by Charles James Fox, leader of the parliamentary opposition. He too drew attention to the table of the House, loaded with petitions. Edmund Burke the legislature’s outstanding orator, warned his colleagues that they must heed the nation. The consensus was clear. British abolition was to be a dialogue between parliament and people (THE PARLIAMENTARY, 1816, p. 495-505).

Exactly a century later, on May 8, 1888, João Alfredo, head of the government, introduced a Bill in the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies calling for the extinction of slavery. His motion was received with acclamations and celebrations throughout the nation. The legislature agreed to bypass the customary preliminaries. The very next day, exactly one century after Pitt’s motion in parliament, the Brazilian Chamber overwhelmingly voted its approval (CONRAD, 1972, p. 270-275).

Twelve years later, in 1900, Joachim Nabuco summarized alternative paths to emancipation taken by other nations. Abolition in Brazil, he emphasized, did not come, as it did in the United States, as the result of a bloody civil war. It was not, as with Great Britain, the gift of a rich and generous nation to its colonists, redeeming slaves by purchase. Nor was it, as in the case of France, brought in 1848 about by a revolution. Nor was it, as in Russia, the work of an autocrat. In each country, he concluded, “the extinction of slavery had its distinct features, and was accomplished in a different manner”. At the end of what contemporaries called the “age of emancipation”, Nabuco could offer his nation to the world as the ultimate abolitionist process, “a spontaneous movement, a current of opinion and of sentiment stronger than vested interests. It was an inward surrender on the part of those who might have defied it, and, a peaceful victory, a growing national emotion, which effaced in a week even the memory of an institution which had always held the state and its laws in bondage” (NABUCO, 1900, p. 126-129).

Nabuco, was interested in presenting the Brazilian way to emancipation as a moment of convergence with the progressive world’s progress towards ever-expanding civilization. The last New World nation to eliminate the institution was distinguished by the harmonious alignment of its ruler, its parliament, and its people, all peacefully sweeping aside the dissonant protests of a few reluctant reactionaries. Its achievement was untainted by monetary compensation, by revolutionary trauma, by military carnage, or by dependence on the whim of a single autocrat. In its emergence emancipation had barely touched the sides of Brazil’s birth canal.

In the light of a century and many historiographical turns in slavery and abolition, it is worthwhile taking another turn towards Brazilian abolition in comparative perspective. I will follow
Nabuco in his choice of preeminent cases. Russia, the United States, Brazil, Britain, and France controlled the world’s largest slave populations on the eve of the terminations of their respective slave systems. For purposes of comparison I will concentrate on that aspect of the abolitionist process that Nabuco identified as most significant – the relation of their civil societies to their polities, and to the levels of violence that accompanied their abolitions.

**Pioneers: The Anglo-French Moment**

Antislavery sentiments first politicized in the 1780s. The first national abolitionist societies were founded in Britain (1787) and France (1788). (Their counterparts in the United States remained at the state level under their new federal constitution). When the British and French crossed the threshold to the formation of abolitionist societies their civil, political and legal systems offered a striking contrast. British abolitionists could make use a variety of mechanisms in a public sphere still unavailable to their counterparts across the Channel. In Britain a network of provincial newspapers served both to localize and nationalize discussions of slavery between private individuals, civil associations and a national parliament, all supported by a popular prime minister. On the other side of the Channel, as the Marquis de Lafayette emphasized to William Wilberforce in 1788, the French Société des Amis des Noirs lacked a National Assembly, thus precluding “the citizens of France from uniting in expressions of sympathy” with their British counterparts. France lacked even a free press. Its Royal Censor gave the Amis de Noirs permission to publish news only about abolitionist activity on the English side of the Channel (DRESCHER, 2013b).

The next few years were to demonstrate that it would take more than a national legislature and even a dramatic expansion of French civil society to nationalize abolitionism. Perhaps the most striking difference between Britain and France was the fact that British abolitionists found themselves backed by one of the most massive non-revolutionary social movements in their national history. Thereafter, for nearly five decades, British abolitionism absorbed a share of the public sphere that was never remotely replicated anywhere else in Europe.

During the half-century of popular mobilizations between the 1780s and 1830s, the sites and rituals of abolitionism bespoke a broader connection between the nation’s civil and political spheres. From the outset petitioners gathered at general meetings in town halls or other public places. Their gatherings followed the pattern of parliamentary procedure: motions; seconding speeches; and solemnly worded resolutions – patterns familiar to those who regularly petitioned their national...
legislature. Thereafter, denominational petitions usually represented less than 8% of abolitionist
submitted to parliament. Only in the 1830s did non-conformists begin to sign up under their own
denominational banners. By then they accounted for more than half of the antislavery petitions
submitted to parliament (DRESCHER, 1999, ch. 2, 3).

Despite their overwhelming dominance of the public sphere British abolitionists faced
formidable opposing interests in parliament. In 1791 the defeat of the first bill to abolish the slave trade
elicited a redoubled popular response. The number of petitions in 1791-1792 increased five-fold, and
they favored abolition by a hundred to one. The number of signers increased more than six-fold to
upwards of 400,000. Civil society mobilization also broadened. Since only adult males were regarded
as legitimate signatories, a parallel mobilization drew families into activism in the form of a slave-
sugar boycott. Anti-saccharite campaigners offered women a means of overcoming their still-gendered
inability to sign petitions as well as opportunities to bring the question home to their children at the
dinner table. The following generation of British women broke down the barriers to female abolitionist
associations and petition signing.¹

The campaign of 1792 achieved a partial victory in parliament. A majority in the House of
Commons voted for abolition of the slave trade by 1796 but the House of Lords postponed further
progress by electing to hold its own independent hearings. Thereafter, the outbreak of war with the
revolutionary French republic and the great slave revolution in Saint-Domingue induced the
government to constrain further popular mobilization. British military forces were massively deployed
to combat French revolutionary emancipation in the Caribbean. The British Empire briefly became the
most rapidly expanding slave system in the world.

Regarding the progress of abolitionism Britain and France moved in precisely opposite
directions over the next generation. A great collection of national grievances was assembled in France
on the eve of its great revolution in 1789. Calls for action against slavery were, however, swamped by a
multitude of demands for reform within France. In the new National Constituent Assembly it was the
defenders of colonial slavery who carried the day. The framers of France’s first constitution explicitly
declined to apply their revolutionary principles to their slave colonies, the most prosperous area of their
empire. At the height of the British petition and boycott campaigns across the channel the Saint-
Domingue revolution was treated in France as a disaster that had to be suppressed.

Only the convergence of outside developments induced the rulers of France to welcome the
insurgents of the French Caribbean as allies rather than as enemies of the revolution.² In 1794 the
French Jacobins aligned themselves with their Caribbean insurgents and decreed the end of slavery in
the French empire. That declaration occurred at the moment when French civil society was subject to the reign of terror: “Enemies of the Revolution”, whether Vendéan or aristocratic, Austrian or English, were branded as evil barbarians, “condemned by the high court of history for a failure to accept the blessings of revolutionary civilization” (BELL, 2007, p. 160). Both In the French metropole and overseas the course of events was determined by violent military confrontations. The subsequent shifts in French colonial policy before the Napoleonic restoration of slavery in 1802 were not influenced by popular abolitionist mobilizations (CABANIS; MARTIN, 1991).

The interaction of the Franco-Caribbean theaters of revolution disrupted or aborted autonomous civil society activity on both sides of the Atlantic. When Toussaint Louverture gained control of Saint-Domingue by 1800, three basic elements of civil society were prohibited by his constitution in 1801: the free movement of individuals from plantations: the right to public assembly; and the right of association. Most inhabitants of plantations remained under regimes of iron-clad discipline and military supervision. The long term legacy of the revolutionary conflict leading to independence was a critically fragmented civil society.3

After 1800 the association of radical terror in France and slave revolution overseas spawned narratives of inhumanity as well as liberation. Napoleon’s brutal and catastrophic failure in Saint-Domingue allowed Haiti to become the first national polity in the Americas to constitutionally prohibit slavery. Elsewhere, in 1802, Napoleon supervised the re-enslavement of tens of thousands of French colonial citizens while metropolitan civil society was also silenced. The British then reversed their reversal. Napoleon’s defeat in Haiti, reinforced by British mastery of the world’s oceans after Trafalgar allowed Britain to emerge as abolitionism’s pioneering empire. Aided by revived civil society activity abolition of its Atlantic slave trade was enacted by parliament in 1807.

II Post-War Internationalization

By the end of the Napoleonic wars Britain had established a position as the principal global agent against the transatlantic slave trade. Even before Napoleon’s defeat the British unsuccessfully attempted to include abolition in peace negotiations with France (1801, 1806, 1814). Negotiations were again immediately reopened with the restored Bourbon monarchy in 1814. Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Secretary, believed that he had overcome a major hurdle to international abolitionism when Louis XVIII agreed to reopen the slave trade for only five years. News of this extension, however, produced yet another wave of petitions – again the largest in turnout of signatures in British
history. 1,370 petitions reached parliament. In a nation with no more than four million eligible signers, between a fifth and a third signified their disapproval of the offending slave trade agreement with France. For Britain’s Foreign Minister, the 1814 campaign made it definitive, that “the nation was bent upon this object […] Ministers must make it the basis of their policy” (KIELSTRA, 2000, p. 30-31).

Britain’s first postwar achievement was to negotiate an international declaration against the slave trade at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. With an oblique glance at and beyond British civil society, the assembled Congress credited “the public voice, in all civilized countries” for “calling aloud” for suppression. The public mobilization of one civil society was thus seamlessly grafted onto all European “civilized countries”. The condemnation of the slave trade was the only article in the peace treaty that offered any evidence that the world beyond Europe had claims on those assembled at Vienna. Nevertheless, it had a profound impact on the perspective of all continental powers still deeply engaged in the slave trade. The Portuguese were then carrying eight out of every ten African captives across the Atlantic to Brazil. One of Portugal’s delegates at the Congress warned that Brazil would have to begin to substitute free European for forced African labor. It would take three more generations to fulfill that prophecy (PAQUETTE, 2013, p. 77). More immediately, the article also allowed time for the French to become reconciled to a cause many still identified with national humiliation and defeat, both by ex-slaves in the Caribbean and by British enemies in Europe. Britain had passed through the “Age of Revolution” without experiencing revolution, civil war, or foreign occupation. France had endured them all. It would take decades before another French abolition society could again be founded in France (JENNINGS, 2000).

French civil society entered the post-Napoleonic era in another way that distinguished it from its offshore counterpart. The French heard the story of their Caribbean revolutions mostly through the tales of returning colonial refugees and soldiers. For decades after 1804 the Haitian Revolution remained a taboo subject in French legislative discussions – too horrific to need or warrant discussion. When, in 1825, the French government finally succeeded in pressuring Haiti to pay compensation in exchange for recognition of its independence, no association in France expressed reservations about the morality of extracting reparations from those who had been the victims of systematic brutality and violence (MEADOWS, 2004, p. 323-340).

While a new generation of French abolitionists had to balance conflicting commitments to abolition and nationalist pride, British abolitionists turned their attention to ending Britain’s imperial slave system and to ending other nations’ transoceanic slave trades. Domestically this meant continuous public lobbying and periodical renewals of petitioning. In the generation between the
petition of 1814, and post-emancipation “Apprenticeship” (1837-38), the social base of adherents expanded in many directions. Abolitionist religious supporters were increasingly drawn from the ranks of non-conformist Protestants. Methodists, Baptists and Congregationalists were all experiencing growth. Geographically, by the 1830s popular support expanded to include Ireland, both Protestant and Catholic.

Even more significantly the gender boundary was massively breached by the 1830s. As pioneers in modern mass petitioning, British women came into their own as independent organizers and signers. In 1833, their greatest single petition, loaded with more than 180,000 names, became the most widely publicized abolitionist document delivered to parliament in a half-century of abolitionist mobilizations. By the end of the 1830s women had probably overtaken men as combined signers of petitions to Parliament and Addresses to the monarch. As the campaign for slave emancipation approached its climax in 1833, working class adherents also became vocal supporters at petition and elections rallies.4

Perhaps the most surprising addition to the ranks of British abolitionists were slaves in the West Indies. Before emancipation they could not form associations or petition for their own freedom on the very sites where their status as property constituted the foundation of their masters’ authority. Between Waterloo and emancipation in 1833 their entry into the public sphere came in the form of uprisings. Again, the coordination between parliamentary attention and political action was clear. Not coincidentally, every major British slave insurrections after 1815 came in the wake of parliamentary debates or governmental initiatives designed to limit the arbitrary powers of masters or to ameliorate the slaves’ conditions.

British slave insurgencies contrasted with the French pattern. British colonial uprisings, in Barbados (1816), Demerara (1823) and Jamaica (1831), involved tens of thousands of slaves, totals exceeded only by those in the Saint-Domingue Revolution. As David Brion Davis observes, the combined number of whites killed in the three British revolts was less than twenty. This was less than a third of the number killed in Nat Turner’s brief revolt in Virginia in 1831. Fewer whites were killed in all three uprisings combined than in the opening weeks of the revolt in Saint-Domingue. The toll of slave deaths was a small fraction of those who died in the French Caribbean revolution (DAVIS, 2006, ch. 11, esp. p. 208-221).

Beginning with the Demerara revolt in 1823 the slave leaders tried to preserve the lives of all those whom they took into custody. The most striking novelty of the Demerara uprising was how it was used by abolitionists in Britain. Metropolitan British abolitionists successfully reframed slave
resistance before emancipation as civilized behavior under the stress of captivity. They compared the uprising to English-style workers strike actions. Self-disciplined laborers had, in their view, behaved no differently from fellow Christians and British workers at home (COSTA, 1994; CRATON, 1982, ch. 16; DRESCHER, 2010, p. 120-132).

What most deeply impressed foreign abolitionists was the behavior of the slaves on the day of emancipation August 1, 1834. For William Lloyd Garrison, across the Atlantic, it was “the greatest miracle of the age”. For Frederick Douglass, Americans had “discovered, in the progress of the antislavery movement, that England’s passage to freedom is not through rivers of blood […] What is bloody revolution in France is peaceful reformation in England. The friends and enemies of […] freedom, meet not at the barricades […] but on the broad platform of Exeter Hall” [the abolitionists’ customary site of assembly]. For Alexis de Tocqueville, across the Channel, neither the day of emancipation nor the decade thereafter – had produced “a single insurrection” or “cost the life of a single man”. All this had occurred in colonies where blacks were twelve times as numerous as whites. From the perspective of French and American abolitionists that was indeed a civilized transformation.⁵

Until 1848 French abolitionists also had to wrestle with the spectre of revolutions at home, past and potential. They therefore hesitated to attempt to mobilize the civil society of their nation. Founded in the wake of British emancipation (1834), the French Abolition Society, continued the Amis des Noirs’ tradition of elite organization. Two small French petition campaigns in the 1840s, neither initiated by the Society, never mounted to more than one percent of signers mobilized by the British. The first (1844), organized by urban workers, seemed to underline the social distance between them and the rest of the nation. Women too, always remained a small contingent among the signers. French religious mobilization was equally modest. Except for one petition signed by 600 Catholic clergy, the French Hierarchy took a position of studied neutrality towards the fate of slavery – rendering it unto Caesar as a secular institution. Those who wished to maintain the status quo in the French empire dismissively pointed to the millions of French peasants and workers who had not responded to the pleas of a few “liberal théoriciens”.⁶

Perhaps the most significant indicator of the lack of prior popular pressure for slave liberation came in the wake of the Revolution of 1848. With conservatives momentarily immobilized, the Provisional Government charged Victor Schoelcher with preparing a decree of emancipation. He chose to promulgate it before the National Constituent Assembly was scheduled to convene. Schoelcher actually feared that such a body, elected by universal male suffrage, might choose to delay the passage

**Second Wave of Emancipations: Russia and the United States**

In terms of its relationship to civil society, Russian emancipation occurred in a far different context from those in the British and French orbits. Unlike its predecessors, the servile estate in Russia overwhelmingly outnumbered the number of non-serfs. The imperial nobility was dependent upon as their labor. The Tsar himself had direct dominion over more bondsmen than those in all masters of the Americas combined. He also ruled with a discretion unmatched in any other European or American polity.

A political system unchecked by any national representative legislature combined with a closely censored press and severely limited rights to association or assembly, to rendered the Tsar “the autocrat of all the Russias”. Serious challenges to the state and society could only take the form of conspiracies from within or exiled voices from without. At the lowest level of society resistance manifested itself through communal petitions and regional uprisings.

After Russia’s disastrous defeat in the Crimean war by Great Britain and France, Russian serfdom was identified as one of the principle sources of the empire’s relative economic, military and social vulnerability. The new Tsar, Alexander II, was convinced that Russia’s international security and internal harmony crucially depended on eliminating serfdom. He wanted to include all levels of society in the renegotiation of their social relationships. Yet none of the agents of the state felt that the “floodgates” to participation could simply be thrown or even to the privileged nobility much less the unfathomable expectations of the peasant masses. They feared that the outcome of emancipation might generate forces far beyond the ability of the imperial bureaucracy to control.⁷

As Roxanne Easley observes, the state finally undertook a calculated gamble to gradually open a public conversation and to allow limited inputs only at certain stages. The Tsar began by convening a “Secret Committee on Peasant Affairs”, in January 1857 composed of reform-minded intellectuals and nobles. At later bureaucratic stages the initial Committee was followed by a “Main Committee” and finally by an “Editing Commission”. It was necessary to at least create a virtual publicity (glasnost): To bring landowners aboard, provincial noble committees were formed. Some discussion of the pending legislation was permitted in newspapers, disguised as histories of the peasant commune.⁸
Once the Main Committee hammered out a blueprint of legislation, further debate in the press was virtually stifled until the statute was ready for promulgation. An important reason for the resumption of strict censorship was the growth of peasant unrest. Peasants were permitted a symbolic presence only in ceremonies of thanks to the Tsar in St. Petersburg and Moscow. The Tsar also received weekly reports on the rural mood from the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Although initially planned to pre-empt any “unreasonable” expectations, news of the pending reform intensified political awareness. Peasants petitioned to insist their right to ownership of land had to be recognized as part of any emancipation. They also demonstrated their self-discipline by joining in a collective temperance pledge. Entire villages took the pledge. In Russia, the English tactic of abstinence from sugar became Russian abstinence from Vodka. By the end of 1858, the movement claimed a million members. The state’s alcohol revenue dropped. It was difficult for the state to brand sobriety as a Russian crime.

To forestall similar mobilizations by the nobility, it was decided to invite provincial deputies to preview selected parts of the draft decree. They were not permitted to offer counter-proposals. They could meet the drafting committee only as individuals and were forbidden to meet separately as a body. Some deputies did attempt to petition for an independent judiciary and freedom of the press. The emperor was outraged by this “oligarchic” noble intervention and forbade any further discussion of the peasant question. While modifications were made the emancipation statute was issued as a lofty proclamation by “Alexander II, Emperor and Autocrat of all the Russias” on February 19, 1861.9

The legislation was designed to transfer some of the landowners domains to collectively to the liberated peasants. This was to avoid creating an enormous “proletariat” who were seen as agents of radical revolution in Western Europe. This allotment was balanced by measures to reduce the economic self-sufficiency of the peasantry, ensuring that their labor would continue to be accessible to the landowners. Most significantly the ex-serfs were required to compensate for their allocation through extended redemption payments. Like the Haitians, the liberated serfs were required to contribute to the indemnity for their liberation. The peasants also continued to be classified as a separate estate with obligations to the state.

The real institutional addition to Russian civil society was a new form of localized government, the zemstvo. Once the uncertainty of the transition had passed without widespread peasant uprisings, the state avoided further gambles by ensuring that the zemstvo would not be a democratic institution. Property qualifications for membership resulted in a major over-representation of the nobility, particularly in the provincial assemblies, where they secured three quarters of the seats. Above all, zemstvos could not affect the larger policy of the state, either in fiscal matters, the court system, or the
central government’s state police. Absent a representative political system curtailing contact between zemstvos, removing its judicial functions, and appointing its peasant delegates, the state became confident that local self-government could be as easily confined as it had been to create (KOLCHIN, 1980, esp. 823 ff).

Only another major war-induced crisis in 1905 and the formation of a national legislature could reopen the possibility of an expansion of civil and political liberty. Whatever its other differences from later Brazilian abolition, Russia offered a way to emancipation premised upon the initiative of the ruler. If, as Peter Kolchin concludes, Russians never openly conducted a public debate on emancipation, they provided a formula for the initial top-down stage of the emancipation process in Brazil.

The United States

Like Russia, the United States represented the second wave of emancipation in the 1860s. However, in terms of their respective political and civil societies they stood as polar extremes in the perspective of contemporaries. The United States was a federal republic rather than an absolute monarchy. America was studded with layers of representative legislatures rather than a centralized bureaucracy; Its inhabitants enjoyed the broadest electorate of any nation. Rather than being ruled by a lone autocrat, the United States allowed the freeest press, and the most unrestricted civil society in the world. Alexis de Tocqueville was not alone in offering the two countries as the polar opposites of the potential future: America functioning through the interaction of individuals; Russia based upon collective obedience and servitude; the one expanding westward with the plough, the other advancing eastward with the sword (TOCQUEVILLE, 2012, v. 1, p. 656).

Yet it was America, not Russia that terminated its servile system by the sword. It was perhaps the very strength of its civil society that rendered slavery’s ending so deadly. The USA had been created through the formal consent of its active citizens in their component states. One of its founding compromises was the acceptance of the right of each state to decide on the future of its slave system. American statesmen initially observed a vow of mutual self-constraint, keeping the institution’s prognosis out of national legislative discussion. For nearly two generations after the American Declaration of Independence there remained a rough balance between slave and non-slave states. In 1807 the abolition of the slave trade to the United States was the outcome of a broad consensus to prevent further African migration.
Just as successful British military action in the Crimea precipitated Russia’s decision to move towards emancipation, successful British mobilization against its colonial slavery in the 1830s accelerated the formation of a parallel movement in the northern United States. In America the ubiquitous practice of collective association encouraged abolitionist leaders to quickly replicate practices that had taken decades to develop in Great Britain. Few studies of American abolitionism begin without reference to the “Second “Great Awakening” of American Protestant reformism that provided recruits for radical abolitionism, with its twin belief in individual ability and moral responsibility for remaking society.

The American Antislavery Society (AAS), founded within months of the passage of British emancipation, expanded its membership and propaganda at a rate exceeding anything that the British movement had produced in its early phase. The decentralized organization of British abolitionism was also quickly replicated and surpassed in the United States. The feminization of American abolitionism was equally rapid. By the mid-1830s hundreds of thousands of Americans were signing petitions requesting Congress to end slavery in Washington D. C. which, unlike the states, was under the direct jurisdiction of the national legislature (FEHRENBACKER, 2001, ch. 2; DAVIS, 2006, ch. 13; FREEHLING, 1994, p. 198-214).

America’s abolitionists were able to go beyond Britain’s in another important respect. Both slaves and most free blacks in the British orbit were separated from the metropole by thousands of miles. British abolitionists could interact with most Caribbean blacks only at a distance. America’s Northern states contained free blacks who could be directly incorporated into the antislavery movement. Many more, as runaways from the South could also act as living representatives of those still enslaved. They went on speaking tours in both America and Great Britain. British-style abolitionist civil mobilization had different effects on the other side of the Atlantic. By the late 1830s abolitionists, at the peak of their power relied on the fact that their parliamentary support was necessary to sustain a British administration. Meanwhile, in America, abolitionist speakers were mobbed in riots. Propaganda sent to the South was burned. Thereafter, U. S. Postmasters-General allowed each state to block mails deemed threatening to public order. Abolitionist petitions sent to Washington were subjected to a “gag” rule. For eight long years abolitionist petitions could not even be acknowledged by Congress as having been submitted to the national legislature (DAVIS, 2014, ch. 8-10; BLACKETT, 1983).

Most crucially, unlike their British counterpart American abolitionism was confronted by both hostility in the North and a great anti-abolitionist mobilization in the South. In America, unlike Britain, antislavery was not consensually ratified at the ballot box. Voting was the ultimate register of public
opinion. For almost two decades after the mid-1830s abolitionism could make almost no headway against a two party system that offered no hope for broad sectional action against the Southern slave system. Southern political counter-mobilization was quite robust. In every off-year election between 1840 and 1860 the South exceeded the North in the percentage of its eligible electorate who cast votes.

Given the state of Southern civil society, it was impossible for slaves to replicate the Caribbean insurgencies of Demerara or Jamaica. During the generation between British emancipation and the Civil War, there were no major slave insurrections in the South. The toll of the brief Nat Turner rebellion in Virginia resulted in the deaths of more than three times the toll of all whites killed in the combined slave uprisings of tens of thousand in the British colonies between Waterloo, and emancipation. Most non-slaveholding American citizens, North and South deemed emancipation impossible or impractical unless coupled with the colonization of freed slaves beyond the borders of the United States. The only significant path to freedom in the antebellum US South was the “underground railway” which amounted to a trickle compared to the rate of natural increase in the slave population (DAVIS, 2006, p. 216-221; COSTA, 1994).

Moreover, the reaction to abolitionism in South was more pro-slavery and extreme than elsewhere. By contrast, Russian pro-Serfdom sentiment gradually weakened in the generation before emancipation (KOLCHIN, 1987). Unlike Russia in the late 1850s, most American observers still estimated the probable endurance of slavery in generations. Abraham Lincoln himself estimated its duration for another century as late as his campaign for the Senate in 1858. In no other society was the institution as central to the elite’s self-definition as in the writings of US Southern apologists. The constitution of the Confederate States of America in 1861 acknowledged its foundation on the principle of slavery.

American abolitionist mobilization, launched on a British-inspired model, had to cope with the fact that Southern counter-mobilization, reinforced by nationwide racism and the risk to the Union created an tremendous barrier to political abolitionism even in the North. In the 1840s the “Liberty Party” never attracted more than three percent of the electorate and failed to elect a single individual to the national legislature (FOGEL, 1989, p. 287-302). To preserve itself as a movement abolitionists, like other minorities, had to perpetuate themselves through traditional civic rituals like the Fourth of July, military parades, public meetings and church gatherings. Their one major innovative ceremony was in celebrating anniversaries of the first of August – the date British slave emancipation (RUGEMER, 2008, ch. 7).10
It was not the expansion of abolitionism but the expansion of the United States that opened the political door to antislavery. The more rapidly expanding North, especially in population, haunted the South. The North’s potential to generate a coalition of northern free soil states threatened a long-term erosion of Southern support of slavery. This is not the place to discuss the impact of the reopening of the issue of slavery in the new western territory newly conquered from Mexico. The issue of restricting the spread of slavery engaged not only traditional abolitionists but a far larger Northern antislavery constituency. Rallies of laborers now joined “free soiler” contentions that areas previously set aside for free labor was being reopened to slavery. Mass meetings were followed by new waves of mass petitions. The crisis reinforced a general fear of Southern expansionism: It nurtured Northern fears of a subversion of free labor and of a slave power conspiracy (HOLT, 1978, p. 148-153).

Although abolitionist petitioners had been unable to convert the North into an overwhelmingly antislavery region, the election of Lincoln, dedicated to stopping any further extension of slavery, was sufficient for the beginning of Southern secession. The violence and duration of the subsequent American civil war did not, however, replicate the impact of the Haitian, French, or Spanish American revolutions. Civil society did not break down in the United States. The conflict did open doors to slave flights to freedom in unprecedented numbers as the Union armies moved into the South. Yet even at the end of the war far more people remained enslaved in the South than had been liberated by Northern arms (GALLAGHER, 2011, 198 n.).

The constitutional underpinnings of the American political system remained intact and were reaffirmed. Since the US Constitution did not give Congress the authority to interfere with slavery within the states, the only certain way of definitively abolishing the institution was by formal amendment to the constitution, forbidding it throughout the United States. That process was duly completed in 1865. There were no revolutionary seizures of power on either side of the conflict. Above all, no wars of mass civil extermination or expulsion occurred. Even with the widespread “violence of everyday life” that followed the fall of the Confederacy, it seemed reasonable for ex-slaves to assume “that blacks could expect justice from the government under which they lived” (FONER, 1988, p. 123). Above all, United States slave emancipation was immediate and total, without compensation either to slaveowners, as in Britain or as in Russia, obligations for redemption payments from freedmen.

Brazil
What of Brazil? The last of Nabuco’s five polities to end institutional slavery carried the knowledge of all of its predecessors into the process of emancipation. Like Russia, Brazil’s servile institution was pervasive throughout the empire and its ruling notables were slavery’s principal beneficiaries. Unlike Britain, France and the United States there was no area of Brazil where the free soil principle prevailed for generations before abolition. Like Britain and France it was a constitutional representative monarchy. Brazil’s political system, with its small and highly stratified electoral franchise, gave the emperor great leeway to determine the outcome of elections and the composition of ministries. However, Brazilian civil society apparently had more press freedom of than was the case with the pre-1848 French constitutional monarchy certainly more than Russia. So, “given the fraudulent character of Brazilian elections, […] the emperor and the monarchy’s statesmen tried to guage public opinion through a combination of provincial presidential reports and the press”. The degree to which newspapers were supported by subventions, however, often undercut their credibility. This was of particular importance in assessing its role in ending the Brazilian slave trade. The British secret service funds that subsidized pro-abolitionist newspapers rendered them far less authoritative as an index of public opinion.11

As they had with France, Russia and the United States, the British played an important initial role as a catalyst in Brazilian abolition. The total number of African captives landed in Brazil reached its all time peak in the triennium immediately before slave trade abolition in 1850. This surge was due in no small part to two British policies. Britain moved to end tariff restrictions on the importation of slave-grown sugar in 1846. In Britain, the consequent increase in Brazilian slave importation (1847-1849) occasioned the most serious parliamentary challenge to the Royal navy’s deployment against African the slave trade (1850). The combined pressure of these developments intensified the British government’s determination to undertake decisive naval action against slavers in Brazilian waters.

Recent historiography has debated the relative roles of British intervention, fear of slave revolt, or a cholera epidemic. 12 No one, however, has argued that that a large abolitionist popular mobilization precipitated abolition. Even measured against French abolitionist activity before French emancipation, the decision to end the Brazilian trade does not appear to have been a response to non-slave mass pressure. A Conservative pro-slave Cabinet, backed by the emperor secured passage and enforcement of the legislation, and well into the American Civil War the British Minister in Rio de Janeiro could identify no major current of public opinion against slavery.
Regarding slavery itself, even before the American Civil War, the succession of French Dutch, Portuguese, South American and Russian emancipations Brazil’s notables could perceive the increasing isolation of the institution and of Brazil’s standing in the opinion of the “civilized” world.

Well into the 1860s the emperor regarded potential external pressures as a prime motive for undertaking further action against slavery. As the tide of the American Civil War turned in favor of the North emperor Dom Pedro was concerned that it should not produce a repetition of British humiliations. Early in 1864 he noted to the incoming head of a new cabinet that “events in America require us to think of about the future of slavery in Brazil. So that what occurred in respect of the slave trade does not happen again to us”. The impact of the “Christie affair” and the brief British naval blockade was also a reminder of Brazil’s continuing vulnerability on account of slavery.13

In the country at large there was as yet little evidence of widespread agitation in favor of moves towards emancipation. To foreign abolitionist societies the emperor, with his periodic indications of the need to address the problem, seemed to offer the first best hope for progress towards emancipation. In 1867 the revived French abolitionist movement presented a plea for emancipation to Dom Pedro. The British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society issued similar personal appeals for an imperial initiative in 1864, 1869 and 1871. Indicative of their early assessment of the weakness of popular agency in Brazil was their appeal to Dom Pedro to repeat what the Russian emperor successfully had done (THE BRITISH AND FOREIGN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY, Apr. 1864, p. 89-95; Apr. 1871, p. 131-132).

In 1867, for the first time, the emperor alluded to the question of emancipation before the legislature, but forward movement was postponed pending the end of the war against Paraguay. Brazil’s victory in 1870 presented the world with the only instance in which one slaveholding nation induced another to abolish slavery while sustaining its own institution. The passage of the (free womb) Rio Branco law (1871) appears to have been primarily an intra-elite contestation. Even with the weight of his constitutional prerogatives it took four years for the emperor’s first initiative to ripen into a parliamentary project, and months more to assemble a cabinet in 1871 willing to bring a bill before the legislature. There was certainly more Brazilian antislavery activity by 1870 than there had been in Russia a decade earlier. Yet extra-parliamentary mobilization may have been as vigorous from those who opposed the legislation. Unlike Britain, opponents of the bill entered an unprecedented volume of protests into the records of Brazil’s Chamber of Deputies. Planters and merchants launched two waves of hostile petitions. The account of the Rio Branco debates also seems to indicate that, for those in the Chamber, “public opinion” still signified the views of the landed and mercantile classes. Indeed, members on both sides of the debate spoke as though “public opinion” was reluctant to accept even
gradual emancipation, and even though conservatives, unlike US Southerners, acknowledged the moral inferiority and ultimate demise of the institution.  

I stress these elite petitions because popular abolitionist petitioning does not appear to have been a salient factor in the passage of the Rio Branco law. Equally striking is the relatively small number of petitions to the national legislature even when popular mobilization did transform the salience of an aroused antislavery public opinion during the following decade. This offers further evidence of a gap between political and civil society in Brazil for most of the period before emancipation. In Britain abolitionist organizers could always offer petitions as evidence of overwhelming metropolitan support for moves towards abolition. In contrast, universal white male suffrage in the United States long demonstrated the absence of support for radical abolitionism in all parts of the nation down to 1860. Brazilian abolitionism developed in the absence of both America’s mass suffrage and its institutionalized racist hostility to non-white participation in the public sphere. (It would be interesting to know about the extent to which the Franco-Caribbean model of violent racialized revolution was used as a threat either for or against liberation).  

From the comparative perspective of a non-expert, the most remarkable aspect of Brazilian popular mobilization was its distinctive *modus operandi* in the final decade before emancipation. The abolitionists’ first task was to expand the base of their movement. Both Celso Thomas Castilho and Angela Alonso have analyzed the means by which abolitionists expanded the social base of Brazilian abolitionism and infused its participants with a sense of citizenship and political agency.  

Unlike Anglo-Americans, Brazilian abolitionists could not easily turn existing religious or political institutions to their own ends. In most countries with overwhelmingly Catholic populations abolitionists could not rely upon the Church hierarchy to actively support abolitionism. Ideologically, moreover, radical nineteenth-century abolitionists identified Catholicism with the hierarchical structures of the old regime. Politically, Brazilian emancipation occurred within the context of an electoral system that actually decreased the number of inhabitants eligible to vote. At the height of the struggle for emancipation and the Western world’s trend towards expanded suffrage Brazil’s electoral reform in 1881 further restricted its electorate. It may well be that the percentage of eligible voters in the 1880s was less than that of the French constitutional monarchy before 1848.  

Anglo-American abolitionism evolved within a world of public meeting halls and churches. Brazilian abolitionism occurred in different locales: theaters; concert halls; and carnivals. As Castilho observes, reacting to the exclusionary electoral reform of 1881, abolitionism demonstrated alternative means of participating in the political process. In this sense the defeat of Nabuco’s first motion for
Civil Society and Paths to Abolition

emancipation in the Chamber of Deputies radicalized the implications of civil mobilizations. They occurred at the sub-national and provincial levels as a reaction and a counterpoint to the legislature’s attempt to evade the question at the national level. British Abolition had never had to grapple with this issue. American Abolition also been faced with a legislative wall at the national level. But Brazilian abolitionists, unlike the Americans, also had to create a sense of empowerment among unfranchised Brazilians. They also had to create an active commitment to abolitionism that had become nationalized in Britain nearly a century earlier (CASTILHO, Aug. 2013, p. 386 ff).

Brazilian abolitionists developed their most effective recruitment tool in artistic performances in theaters and streets. They mixed cultural performances with abolitionist associational appeals, in of recitals, concerts, plays. As Castilho notes, narratives of slave life had a different pedagogical function for Brazilians than those presented to British or American audiences. Performances had to generate empathic identification in non-slaves who casually witnessed slave life in their own communities. One means of doing so was to climax abolitionist performances with donations for freeing a slave by the legal means prescribed in the Rio Branco law. Another means of identification was through the appropriation of carnivals. They injected abolitionist symbolism into African and religiously inspired festivities and ceremonies. Carnival groups cooperated with abolitionist associations to make such events another occasion for slaves to buy freedom. At the same time local governments were urged to promote municipal and provincial manumission funds. Instead of practicing consumption restraint or limiting purchases to “free labor” commodities Brazilians could purchase the liberation of slaves (CASTILHO, Aug. 2013, p. 406-407).

Far more than their American counterparts, Brazilian men of color could play leading roles in civic gatherings, André Rebouças, Vincente de Souza and José do Patrocínio organized the Central Emancipation Committee (ACE) in Rio de Janeiro. Between its founding in 1880 and emancipation they sponsored nearly 150 events in or near the capital. They integrated concerts, plays, poetry and festivals. They blended traditions of theater, carnival, displays of decorations, flowers and newly introduced electrical lighting to appeal to all of the senses. Two generations earlier many Anglo-American might have been shocked by such baroque settings for serious abolitionist mobilizations.

The presence of mulattos onstage was crucial to energize audiences usually left on the margins of political activity: “There is nothing more holy and noble than we of African race, who are working day and night to save our brothers from the barbarous irons of slavery [...]” It would be “infamous”, one leading mulatto told his audience, if they were not at the forefront in “a cause which is wholly ours, by our blood, our heads, and our hearts (Repeated Applause)” (ALONSO, 2010). The memory of the
indigenous population was evoked in opera. The European tradition was invoked with radical symphonic marches like *The Marselhese of the Slaves*, in selections from Verdi and in portraits of radicals like of Victor Hugo.

British abolitionism had sought to encompass the family nearly a century earlier beginning with abstention from sugar. In Brazilian abolitionist festivities women and children were recruited as decorators and performers. As both Alonso and Castilho emphasize, the cumulative effect of such performances was not just to create a new sensibility toward slaves but to expand the public sphere by identifying the participating audiences as “citizens of all classes”. As in Anglo-America, abolitionists were socially inclusive. They had the additional capacity to ceremonially extend citizenship, to individual slaves by rituals of purchase.

Peculiarities of slavery in Brazil also made it possible for civil associations to dispute the slave status of large numbers of individuals. By treaty with Britain, Brazil had prohibited the purchase of African slaves as of 1831. All captives intercepted by the British navy or landed clandestinely and all of their descendants were therefore being held illegally as slaves. Abolitionist-sponsored lawsuits could free individuals and keep the question of liberation before the public. Such performances, in courtrooms as well as on the streets, were within the parameters of the Rio Branco law and the legal repertoire of Brazilian public activities. But slavery still remained a national institution.

A dramatic change occurred in 1881. An abolitionist group in the province of Ceará began to advocate for a ban on the exportation of slaves from the province. They persuaded the boatmen of a merchant ship to refuse to load slaves bound for sale. The strike, supported by thousands of demonstrators, grew into mass movement. Within two months the slave trade was at an end. The central government countered by appointing new anti-abolitionist officials. In response abolitionists developed a new repertoire in Ceará – spontaneous creations of free soil areas by blocks, towns, provincial capitals and finally whole provinces.

By the Spring of 1884 Ceará was not quite a free province, but had earned the sobriquet of the “Canada of Brazil”. It was receiving runaways from Piauí to São Paulo, as the terminus of an underground railroad. It spawned similar liberation movements from Amazonas to Rio Grande do Sul. Even where the abolition process remained incomplete, the pace of erosion portended an accelerated ending. As late as 1881 planters expected slavery to last until at least until 1910. By 1883 they had reduced their expectation to 1889 or 1890. 16

In tandem with abolitionist subversions slaves themselves appeared to be testing the range of new options offered to them by a shifting public opinion. In some individual cases insurgents even
presented themselves to local authorities after committing acts of violence. This would indicate a level of interactive trust. During the final stage of abolition collective slave escapes from plantations became the order of the day. They were actively or passively sanctioned by the press and agents of the legal and political system, including the princess regent Isabel. There was no repetition of the widespread killings of masters that had characterized the outbreak of the Saint-Domingue revolution. Nor did Brazilian slaves engage in mass burnings of British plantations as slaves had in the Barbados and Jamaica uprisings. In anticipation of proximate liberation, even slaves in the hard core areas of planter resistance appear to have concluded that bloodshed and guerilla warfare were neither necessary nor desirable.

The state finally reacted with vigor in 1885, after a major conservative victory in national elections (NEEDELL, 2010). In response, regional abolitionist movements intensified and radicalized their tactics. By 1886, abolitionists extended their underground railroad activities into the Paulena heartland of planter resistance. Facilitating rural flight they probably favored collective desertion over violence to sustain the support of urban public opinion. Police violence and brutality could then be contrasted with flight in the press, in public demonstrations and parliament. As with their concerts abolitionists were now orchestrating contention.

The abolitionist’s repertoire of was destabilizing both the labor system and governmental authority. The army’s refusal to act as slave hunters was an ominous sign that, as far as slavery was concerned, the institutional props were eluding state management. The looming prospect of collapsing legitimacy for the government was further compounded by the military’s public petition to the princess regent, denouncing their deployment against slaves. This petition marked a decisive victory for the civil society initiative. A rapidly withering estate had to be quickly dispatched buried in order to save the (elite – dominated) state.

**Legacies: Civil Society After Abolition**

In light of their respective paths to emancipation, how may we assess the legacies of these different paths to abolition? In one respect the Great French and Haitian revolutions should again command our attention. I would hazard the guess that Nabuco excluded this emancipation from his list of predecessors because of association with deadly militarized revolutions. (The same might hold true for his avoidance of Spanish American precedents). Slavery was abolished, at least in aspiration, throughout the French empire in 1794. After Napoleon restored the institution in 1802, Haiti, with its independence, became the first nation to have permanently abolished slavery throughout the territory.
under its jurisdiction (1804). The priceless message delivered to the enslaved, and to the world at large, was that slavery was no longer immutable or inevitable in the plantation societies of the New World. That liberation came at enormous cost to Haitians both before and after independence. Struggling for recognition, Haiti’s militarized political system depressed the development of its civil society. Two centuries later it remained a nation whose individual citizens endured the second highest risk of bondage in the world.17

France’s first revolutionary emancipation also ended with a military despotism that both suppressed its civil institutions and restored overseas slavery. Its empire would witness the interplay of further abolitions and restorations of the slave trade only in tandem with further metropolitan revolutions and restorations. For generations French advocates of abolition would avoid focusing upon the first revolutionary emancipations. Nabuco was therefore hardly alone in associating French slave emancipation with Lamartine and 1848, and not revolutionary Haiti and Paris in the 1790s.18 For Nabuco, French emancipation was more comfortably associated with the less murderous abolition of France’s second slavery. Selecting among the commemorating date(s) of French abolition endures as a challenging embarrassment of riches.

For most nineteenth-century abolitionist societies on both sides of the Atlantic, the British example remained abolitionists’ preferred point of departure. In the United States, France, Spain and Brazil, Britain’s example offered the smoothest and most durable schema for terminating and historicizing their own emancipations systems. The narrative of the British process was widely accepted at home. A political system in which slavery had been firmly ensconced was challenged by the people. A parliamentary elite had to be compelled, reluctantly but ineluctably, through stages of abolition. Even in Haiti, early commemorations of British emancipation toasted the British people for taking the initiative and the parliament for having had the wisdom to accede to the national will. Uprisings of British slaves could be credited with accelerating emancipation but its supreme moments was the bloodless last act.

By the 1880’s the British Antislavery Society was recognized everywhere as the oldest established permanent human rights group in the world. Their nation’s long position as the world’s most powerful economic, naval, and diplomatic empire enabled the Society to remain the world’s most international antislavery organization. Even when it became a tool of imperial expansion the continuous association of abolitionism with British imperial power offered its citizens with a vision that their country remained the world’s most trustworthy guardian of civilization, politically and morally (HALL, 2002).
The Russian legacy is less clear. Emancipation gingerly opened the door to civil society. The real civil society legacy of emancipation was the creation of the Zemstvos, local agencies organized at provincial & district levels to oversee local needs. Election was open to individuals of any estate, but representation was proportional to land ownership. The state made it clear that zemstvos would not be a democratic representative institution. At the provincial level the noble minority held three quarters of the seats, and the state retained the right to nullify local decisions. The possibility of crowning the zemstvos with a national representative institution was firmly rejected by the state until the revolution of 1905. Thereafter, until 1917, the state attempted to roll back its concessions in the interest of the autocracy. In the twentieth century Russia would develop and dismantle yet another servile labor system – the Gulag – created in the absence of any popular civil or political mobilization.

In the United States, Northern victory in the Civil War opened a brief period in which ex-slaves were offered equal access to both civil and political rights. Given the continuity of racism and the federal structure of the United States, the gains in equality beyond legal freedom were sharply constrained once the white majority regained control of most state governments in the South. The momentum towards equality was renewed only a century after the Civil War, again through a massive multiracial civil rights mobilization. As earlier in the case of Britain, the violence of the Southern opposition helped to solidify majority support for the rights movement. The most significant long term impact of American slave emancipation may have been international. The Civil War entailed the deaths of 750,000 men, the largest toll of any in the age of emancipation. Absent that victory it is easy to imagine slavery’s persistence in the Americas well into the twentieth century.

Estimating the probable impact of such ongoing slave societies allows for too many contingent outcomes may not be counterfactually compelling. At the very least, we may hypothesize that the continued existence of slave societies in the Americas, and perhaps in Afro-Asia might only have enhanced the growth of racism during the first half-century of the twentieth century. Any powerful racialized state in the eastern hemisphere would probably have gained at least the benevolent neutrality of counterparts elsewhere. There would certainly have been far less of a “free” New World to redress the wrongs of the Old.

Brazil most closely resembled Britain in achieving a civil society emancipation without a major revolution or war. Although Brazil had the advantage of latecomer it completed the process of abolition in opposition to inclinations of a majority of its elected representatives. Nabuco used its celebratory and non-violent climax as the signifier of a consensual national sentiment that was supposedly implicitly there from the very first moment of abolitionist agitation: “The slave-owner of one day was, the next,
the liberator of his slaves *en masse*. The heart of the country was won to the cause from the very beginning […]” (NABUCO, 1900, p. 126). Yet even the immediate aftermath of the Golden Law’s passage makes this implausible. The princess regent signed the legislation preceded and followed by a joyous multitude of all classes. However, both monarch and monarchy were both swept aside sixteen months later. Even before the overthrow the imperial Chamber of Deputies had declined to make the anniversary of emancipation a day of national celebration (KRAAY, 2013).

Nor, among the ranks of society were there other reformers quickly mobilized to adopt the repertoires of the movement or to transfer the language of antislavery to other demands for reform. It was certainly not effectively tied to successful demands for the extension of political rights as concomitant to America’s post-war reconstruction. The sparse simplicity of Brazil’s Golden Law bespeaks little concern for the future of the transformed slaves. The speed with which ex-slave labor was marginalized by European migration seems to have been matched by the political marginalization of their abolitionist allies.¹⁹

Domestic marginalization had its counterpart at the international level. On the eve of the emancipation of the last slaves in the Western hemisphere, Pope Leo XIII famously issued a ringing endorsement of antislavery in the form of an epistle to the Brazilian Church. Little more than a year later invitations were dispatched from Brussels to attend the most important international conference ever held on the abolition of the slave trade. Brazil was not on the list. Instead, it was classified by its European organizers as one of the “minor powers”, whose presence might just make the proceedings unwieldy. Such nations, it was decided, could be asked to adhere to the final resolutions in order to add moral support – if necessary. ²⁰

Which brings us back to Nabuco’s ultimate vision of Brazilian slavery as having held the nation in thrall until the climactic moment of emancipation wiped out even the memory of the institution. Did his dazzling retrospective of the Brazilian process obscure the true magnitude of one of the most significant popular mobilizations in the history of abolition?

References

ALONSO, Angela. The Theatricalization of Politics: The Brazilian Movement for the Abolition of Slavery, presented at the Gilder-Lehrman Center conference on American Counterpoint. *New Approaches to Slavery and Abolition in Brazil*, October 2010.

BALES, Kevin. Walk Free Global Slavery Index, 2013.


CELEBRATION of Negro Emancipation at Haiti, from the Manifeste Port-Au-Prince, Aug. 20, 1841.


THE BRITISH AND FOREIGN ANTI-SLAVERY SOCIETY. *Anti-Slavery Reporter*, Nov. 17, 1841; Apr. 1864, Apr. 1871.

THE PARLIAMENTARY *History of England*, from the earliest period to the year 1803. From which last-mentioned epoch it is continued downwards in the work entitled, “The Parliamentary Debates”. Comprising the period from the Fourteenth of February 1788, to the Fourth of May 1789. London: T. C. Hansard, 1816. v. XXVII.


Notes


3 See Carolyn E. Fick (2009, p. 177-196); quote on 179; and Miranda Frances Spielerl (2009, p. 365-408); quote on 373. On the continuities and transformations wrought by the Haitian Revolution, see Malick W. Ghachem (2012, p. 303-314).

4 See, inter alia, Clare Midgley (1992); on Catholics in Ireland, Christine Kinealy (2007, p. 51-57); C. S. Monaco (2005); on the limits of the relationship between Irish Catholics and Abolitionists over Ireland, see David Turley (1991, p. 150-151).


7 See Roxanne Easley (2009, ch. 1); David Moon (2001, p. 1-70); and John Markoff (1996, ch. 5-8).


10 Haiti was the only other foreign country in which British emancipation was commemorated.


13 Roderick J. Barman (1999, p. 195). It must be recalled that the British government continued to hold the issue of liberating *emancipados* like a sword of Damocles over Brazil’s head until 1869. On the Christie affair, see Bethell (1970, p. 386-87).


16 See Robert Conrad (1972, p. 183-209); and Pedro C. de Mello (1992, p. 629-646, Table 32.3, p. 644). Maria Helena Machado (2011) examines movements involving slaves themselves in the coffee regions of Brazil during the last decade of Brazilian slavery. She traces a long-term development in Sao Paulo culminating in a highly organized form of slave agency.

17 See Kevin Bales’ project: *Walk Free Global Slavery Index* (2013).


19 On marginalization, see inter alia, Rebecca Scott (1994); Reid Andrews (1988); Thomas H. Holloway (1980); and Maria Helena Pereira Toledo Machado (2006). In following Nabuco’s scenario I have not included Spanish imperial abolition into my essay. Those who are interested may see my brief reflections in (DRESCHER, 2013, p. 291-316).


---


Received on 12/11/2014
Approved on 03/02/2015