“IN THIS TRADE, NO PLACES ARE HELD”: Involvement of Portuguese slave traders in the slave trade between Africa and Brazil

Entre os anos de 1818 e 1828, a Junta do Comércio portuguesa concedeu permissões para que navios partindo de Lisboa fossem traficar escravos africanos com destino ao Brasil. Essas autorizações foram dadas com base nos tratados firmados entre as coroas de Portugal e da Grã-Bretanha em 1815 e 1817. Este artigo discute o contexto em que esses traficantes agiram, o modo pelo qual essas autorizações foram concedidas e como as fontes existentes na Junta do Comércio no período assinalado possibilitam identificar traficantes baseados em portos lusos.

The terms agreed upon regarding the prohibition of slavery north of the Equator in 1815 and 1817 led to commitment on the part of Portuguese authorities to issue passports and authorizations for their slave ships to navigate only in ports located south of the Equator and where Portuguese domain was not questioned. As a result of these changes, the Portuguese bureaucracy sought to comply with the accords made with their British allies and to protect the slave traders already established in Portugal. This article will focus on a group of these Portuguese slave traders. Analyzing the slave trade as a business and detailing the profiles of those involved in it are not new approaches in history research. Many authors have already made important contributions, particularly in the understanding of "the specific ways in which the slave trade process was carried out, both in Africa and in Brazil" (FLORENTINO, 1997, p. 107). Slave traders' commercial interests in colonial society began to take root in the early eighteenth century, when both trafficking and colonial demand for salves intensified drastically. At that time, the goods produced in the colonial Americas were highly valued in the trade for African captives, giving an advantage in the slave trade to merchants established on the western side of the Atlantic.
Even so, historical research has sought to understand Lisbon's loss of control over the trafficking of Africans and the dominance of slave traders from Rio de Janeiro in the market, since neither the existence of colonial goods nor factors linked to nature are able to explain how the Brazilian port came to receive 80% of the slaves imported by the country from 1700 to 1850.
According to Florentino, the key to this dominance was credit, or the financing methods that the Rio de Janeiro merchants were able to establish: it is in this system of credit that we find "the roots of the process by which Portuguese slave traders were driven out of the slave trade," particularly between 1790 and 1830 (FLORENTINO, 1997, p. 116). This historian calls attention to the radical archaism of Portuguese production chains in the eighteenth century, which differed "even from the classic patterns that marked the societies of the Ancien Régime... with the aristocracy owning half of the land, and their ecclesiastical peers owning another 30%" (FLORENTINO 1997, 116). The key explanation for Lisbon's loss of control over the slave trade in the Congo and Angola to the slave traders in Rio de Janeiro is the archaism in their mission: Thus, the values associated with a non-capitalist mentality prevailed...It was through this mechanism that the resources acquired in the commercial sphere were channeled into aristocratic activities, many of which resulted in wasted resources. It can therefore be thought that the Portuguese lag in the eighteenth century was not an anomaly, or the result of Portugal's inability to keep up with European ideas of capitalist manifest destiny; instead, this archaism was a veritable social mission, the viability of which was highly dependent upon the appropriation of colonial revenues (FLORENTINO, 1997, p. 117) In this debate, Maximiliano Menz (2012) argues that recent decades have produced "a true historical consensus over the idea that the slave trade was controlled by merchants living in Brazil-at least in the eighteenth century." In this analysis, this consensus relies on "fragile quantitative evidence" and encompasses a variety of studies by Brazilian and American historians. More recent works have questioned this consensus, presenting series of data that have revived what Menz referred to as "the widely accepted interpretation of trafficking on the Mina Coast and in Angola" (MENZ, 2012, p. 187-189).
We are therefore faced with a dichotomy in which the arguments to explain Rio de Janeiro's predominance as the slave trade capital in the slave trade and bilateral trade oppose the traditional idea of colonial domination by more modern interests. The latter idea has recently been rekindled by quantitative evidence demonstrating the presence of Portuguese goods and capital in the transatlantic slave trade.
One can argue for a consensus only by ignoring other analytical perspectives present in the research on the history of slave trade between Africa and Brazil. While important, economic theory as an approach does not provide a complete explanation, nor is it the argument in all historical studies. The issue involves questions that the economics-based approach cannot answer. For example, the enslaved Africans would have a different destiny if credit, investments in ship fittings, and the goods used in Atlantic trade had come from South American colonies rather than from Portugal, England, or the United States?
Arguments like Florentino's, in my opinion, are beneficial in that they include African powers, conflicts, and demands into the history of the transatlantic slave trade, a fundamental perspective that is not considered in the purely economics-based studies from recent memory. In a study published years ago, I argued that, if there were anything close to a consensus (which I cautiously referred to as "the broadest trend"), it would have been one over the view of slavery as "a business involving slave traders, slave owners, and governments (those of Portugal and, later, of Brazil)" (RODRIGUES, 2005, p. 24). The inclusion of African events as an essential part of the slave trade phenomenon has effects on our understanding of the phenomenon as a whole; it is also seen within the scope of a new In this article, we will see which demands established in the international accords signed in the early nineteenth century resulted in the provision of passports for slave ships traveling from Portugal to Brazil. We will also consider the way in which diplomacy manifested itself in bureaucratic records, and we will examine the profiles of Portugal-based slavers as described in Portuguese primary sources in order to better understand how the State protected the interests of Portuguese slave traders, the intent of which may have been to maintain dominion over African colonies during the first decades of the nineteenth century. In general terms, the 1815 treaty replaced the treaty that had been signed in Rio de Janeiro on February 19, 1810 to establish cooperation between the British and the Portu- The convention altered the terms for the emission of passports and required the translation of these documents into English in order to enable British oversight without fluency in Portuguese. For many Portuguese, these concessions were a bitter loss, but this period was difficult for the Monarchy overall. It had been exiled to Rio de Janeiro after being invaded by French and Spanish forces in 1808 during the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. The Convention of 1817 also established which members of the Portuguese government were authorized to issue passports: the Minister of Maritime Affairs (in the case of ships embarking from Rio de Janeiro), the governor or the captain general of the other colonial captaincies, and the Secretary of the Navy (in the case of ships departing from Portuguese ports). In a way, these terms required those holding administrative offices to faithfully adhere to the agreement.

International Treaties and Affidavits of Justification
Affidavits of justification were a prerequisite to the issuing of these new passports.
These affidavits of justification were administered to clarify the reasons why ship owners had to confirm their precise weight in metric tons: in cases of seizure, slavers were tried by bilateral Anglo-Portuguese commissions, and any compensation was issued by the Bilateral Commission of London; however, ship owners could not "claim Compensation for a larger Number of Slaves than that which, according to the existing Laws of Portugal, they were permitted to transport, according to the Rate of Tonnage of the captured Vessel" (CON-VENÇÃO..., 1817, p. 13).
Finally, the Separate Article of the Additional Convention of 1815, signed in London on September 11, 1817, declared the intention to completely abolish the slave trade. Though it did not stipulate a precise date, it established a term of fifteen years for the Additional Convention.
As for the ships departing from Brazil after its independence, the consequences (or lack thereof) of these diplomatic agreements are well known. Briefly, the formal recognition of Brazil's independence in 1825 was followed by the Anglo-Brazilian Treaty from November 13, 1826, which called for the end of slave trafficking within three years and which reinstated the terms of the Additional Convention of 1817. Ratified by the English Crown on March 13, 1827, the new accord allowed for the legal continuation of the slave trade until March 13, 1830. Negotiations surrounding this treaty, as well as its formal signing, had profound effects on relations between the Empire of Brazil and British governments over the second quarter of the nineteenth century (BETHELL, 1976;CONRAD, 1985;RODRIGUES, 2000). Reactions were clearly reflected in Brazil's political landscape, and they can be tra- Less is known about the effects and consequences of the agreements signed with Great Britain in early nineteenth century on the slavers established in Portugal. The series of affidavits of justification issued by the Portuguese Board of Trade provide important insight into this topic in that they reveal the legal loopholes and justifications used to protect Portuguese slavers. Through these affidavits, we learn of the slave traders and ships that departed from Portugal to participate in the sale of captives; we are also able to trace their reported routes and question whether these routes were strictly followed. There are proven records of thirty-two ships making forty-seven voyages from Portugal to Africa between 1818 and 1828.

Slave Traders, Their Profiles, and Interactions between Them
Slave traders networked with each other and other businessmen in "companies with representatives spread out across many countries" (MARQUES, 2001, p. 610), with members on all continents surrounding the Atlantic. People from a variety of sectors and industries were involved, ...from the black king selling slaves to the American plantation owner who used them; [the network] consisted of countless intermediaries and accomplices-merchants from the African coast, corrupt colonial authorities who allowed for the importation or exportation of slaves, sailors who transported them across the Atlantic, and so on-who were involved in the slave trading system (MARQUES, 2001, p. 610).
If we include the authorities who acted on behalf of the Kingdom of Portugal, the trading system becomes more complete than Marques's description. There are challenges to overcome in the quest to understand who the investors in the slave trade market were.
Nevertheless, some understanding of ship-owning slave traders and their interactions with others in the system can be gained from the affidavits of justification from the Portuguese Board of Trade, as well as from other sources.
Slavers seemed to be united, particularly in times of repression, by a sense of identity; they offered mutual protection and sought to display their power and fortune. Verger has called attention to this by describing, for example, the public demonstrations of religiosity that they promoted in the Brazilian state of Bahia (VERGER, 1981, p. 76-79 Janeiro, found that it was common practice among most slavers in Rio de Janeiro between 1811 and 1830 to purchase or charter each other's vessels. I will briefly describe the owners of some of the slave ships that worked out of Lisbon, focusing on those who were able to establish business connections, particularly between 1818 and 1823. In spite of advances in research in recent years, an important challenge remains: "...the biographies of those involved in the slave trade, and, more specifically, of those who failed or for whom success was only moderate or fleeting, are generally unknown or difficult to ascertain based on the existing documentation" (MARQUES, 2001, p. 610). 3 The first of the slave traders I will discuss is João Esteves Alves, a merchant with investments in in ships used on a variety of routes. His business-related interests involved many vessels, including the brig known as Restaurador and the schooner or sailing yacht known ...in this business, no places are held, because...as soon as the first slave boards the ship, there are no protective areas or reserved spaces inside the ship, and with tarpaulins, they attempt to sleep all the way to Brazil; for this reason, the stockings and measurements are very diverse and serve only for this trade. 6 From Alves's perspective, all space available was to be considered in the measurements used to determine the number of Africans to be loaded on board, despite the fact that they did not occupy all of the ship's space. This evidently contributed to overcrowding below deck, but Alves demonstrated no humanitarian concern in this regard. On the contrary, he was concerned only with the delay in the embarkation of his brig: the tribunal of the Board of Trade would not process his request for another week, recording it in September 1818.
The cargo agents disagreed, arguing that, in any vessel, including a slave ship, space was to be reserved for food stores, water, sails, and moorings, as well as areas to accommodate the ship's crew which, in this case, was composed of thirty-nine men. Audaciously, Alves said that the cargo agents doing the measuring were not performing their functions and were "even treating the petitioner poorly," and he begged that His Majesty "to send the agents to board the brig and take an exact measurement including the chamber, the galley, and the crew's quarters, for in such negotiations of slaves, there is there is no extra space on the voyage to Brazil...and issue the certificate." 7 This arrogance, typical of those who were accustomed to attaining privileges from the State, was not limited to attempts to require public employees to measure their ships using methods that favored them. Alves wanted more for his ships on their many voyages to islands in the Atlantic, as well as to the Mediterranean, Angola, East Africa, and Brazil between 1818 and 1820. 8 He requested a loan from the Navy Arsenal of sixteen pieces of artillery "with the appropriate accompaniments" so that Restaurador and São Francisco de Assis could traffic slaves from Mozambique and Cabinda to Brazil, mostly likely to defend against privateers on the Prata River. The Navy made the effort of responding, informing him that only Restaurador was eligible for artillery, but that it was not to be loaned out "due to any need for them that may arise from one moment to the next" at the Fort of São Paulo, where they were in use at the time. 9 Manuel Ribeiro da Silva, a contemporary of Esteves Alves's, was a merchant in Lisbon who was born in 1767. Between 40 and 60 years of age, he made his fortune on overseas trade and established solid relationships with merchants in Lisbon and at ports in northern Brazil. The first report of this slave trader mentions him as the owner of the brigantine Diana, on a voyage from Porto Novo in 1804 (PARÉS, 2013, p. 363 (1818)(1819)(1820)(1821)(1822)(1823)(1824)(1825)(1826)(1827)(1828) ments in trade in other goods between Portugal, Maranhão, and Pará. This was likely the kind of trade activity that he bequeathed to his son, Manuel Ribeiro da Silva Filho, who he had certainly been educating in business matters. As a witness to the affidavit of justification for General Sampaio in 1828, Ribeiro da Silva Filho was described on the document as a merchant in Lisbon who was 28 years of age and living at the same address as his father. 11 Interactions between slave traders can be seen in ship property declarations, as well as in the frequency with which these same merchants served as witnesses for their fellow slavers' requests for passports. 12  Bernardo José Fernandes, a merchant in Lisbon, was another slave trader who served as a witness for affidavits for Astrea in 1826, when he was 50 years old. His professional interests included co-ownership of São Nicolau Augusto with Antônio José Moreira in 1827. 14 The list of witnesses provided by ship owners, a required part of the passport request process, can tell us more about the interactions between these merchants. Before proceeding further, I would like to note that, with the descriptions of residential and business addresses, the affidavits of justification also provide information on the social geography of Lisbon. Only one witness lived on the southern side of the Tagus River (in Cacilhas); all of the others were concentrated in the upper-class parishes of Lisbon, such as Madalena, Lapa, Mártires, Sacramento, Santa Justa, and São Paulo. The bourgeoisie of the first half of the nineteenth century had adopted aristocratic habits, such as the abundance of white and black servants in the houses, "from secretaries, stewards, or servants, to cooks, coachmen, water carriers, footmen, butlers, and squires" (SÁ, 1992, p. 9). Their houses and shops were located near the river, which pulsed with sea life, but at a convenient distance from others in riverside enclaves of sailors and members of the lower classes. These properties were located in Bairro Alto and Alfama, several parishes with concentration areas of wealthy members of society: There were marked linguistic differences between the regions, including differences in slang. At night, the boundaries between bohemia and respectable society were most noticeable. Prostitutes, fado singers, horsemen, bullfighters, coachmen, vagabonds, and sailors had their characteristic worlds; they maintained an open coexistence, regardless of each other's social origins (SÁ, 1992, p. 9-10).
Some witnesses were frequently named on the affidavits of justification. Merchants from Lisbon such as Antônio da Cunha Guimarães, Bento Antônio de Andrade, Feliciano José Colares, and Sebastião Lopes Ramos are listed as witnesses on many passport concession documents from the Board of Trade. However, the most common slave trader witness was Bento José da Cunha Viana, who I will discuss further in the coming section.
Viana was a specialist in obtaining various types of passports. It was not by chance that he was described in the reports as a forwarding agent for ships. In this role, he was able to obtain certifications from the Ship Authority; he studied the legislation and diplomatic agreements to instruct his clients on how to legitimize their business, and he visited the Portuguese Board of Trade offices to check on the progress of requests. With the exception of Ativo in 1824, all of the cases for which he served as a witness were dated between 1825 and 1828. 15 Viana also lent credibility to the requests, particularly when slave trade in Brazil under the Portuguese flag became illegal.
He commonly served as a proxy for many merchants both in Lisbon and overseas.
In Lisbon, he began work in the late eighteenth century mediating passport approvals for individuals who wanted to travel to Brazil for the first time or return there after a stay in Portugal. 16  suggest that they find a way to support Viana, whose business had suffered a blow after the recognition of the Empire of Brazil. 24 It is possible that suggestions like these helped the representative's career survive after 1825 in the market for passports for ships illegally transporting slaves to Brazil which, as we have seen, benefited from the authorities of the Overseas Council and the Board of Trade turning a blind eye and providing approvals. We also have a revealing example of how interactions between public agents from different realms of power within the Portuguese State manifested into support for a businessman from the private sector who had friends in these places. In a world with social and legal inequality, helping a friend to keep his business afloat and survive detrimental changes in laws was something seen as being within the bounds of normality. It is discouraging to observe how this definition of normal has passed the test of time and how transparency in public power is an achievement that is quickly reversible, particularly when the society is powerless, divided, or distracted.

Final Comments
In this reflection on the role of Portugal in the slave trade, the intention was not to take sides or to present one side of the dichotomy as wholly good or wholly bad, an approach which I would consider to be reductionist. In the historical event that was the slave trade, research into large blocks of time is relevant for detecting trends, but it may cause us to neglect the specificity of issues that are only visible in the study of shorter periods. On the other hand, studies may become muddled when researchers rely too heavily on a series of data from a short period to extrapolate ambitious explanations. Disregarding political circumstances and social transformations in the name of "safe" numerical data may inadvertently cause us to lose sight of the complexity of such extensive historical events.
Though it goes beyond the scope of this article, an exercise in comparative history would be necessary to confirm either Rio de Janeiro's dominance in the slave trade or the strength of Portuguese slave traders in maintaining more modern interests and overcoming persistent archaism. By considering the data presented herein, I sought to demonstrate the efforts required by Portuguese merchants to remain active in the slave trade, and how those involved in the slave trade worked together to channel their existing commercial interests into former Portuguese colonial ports in the Americas through the formation of commercial associations and representation of overseas merchants in Lisbon and Portugal. In these efforts, they were able to reply on the crucial support of the Portuguese Crown in quickly shifting circumstances in which so much was at stake: relations with their secular and most important foreign ally (Great Britain), the loss of political power over their most important colony (Brazil), continued involvement in the profitable slave trade in the Americas, and the viability of their newest colonial mission, the focus was Africa.
These factors say nothing of the mission to maintain the aristocratic social hierarchy, of the entrepreneurial spirit of merchants in Rio de Janeiro (or in Pernambuco or Bahia, for that matter), or of Lisbon's power in the slave trade: the evidence presented herein is meant to reflect only the attempts to keep businesses alive, with agents fighting on many fronts and adapting to a rapidly changing world. This is therefore a story of historical characters facing the adversities of their time using the tools and allies available to them.