POSITING AND PRESUPPOSING. A READING OF THE RELATION BETWEEN NATURE AND SPIRIT IN HEGEL’S SYSTEM*

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RESUMO Neste artigo, proponho-me a fornecer uma leitura da relação entre natureza e espirito a partir de uma análise do movimento de pôr e pressupor descrito por Hegel na “Ciência da Lógica”, na passagem do Ser à Essência. 1) Analisarei o contexto lógico dentro do qual surge o movimento de pôr e pressupor. 2) Mostrarei o papel deste movimento dialético na determinação da relação entre as esferas da natureza e do espirito na “Enciclopédia” de Hegel. 3) Destacarei uma dificuldade que emerge na “Lógica” e mostrarei como esta dificuldade tem repercussões sobre a relação entre natureza e espirito no sistema de Hegel. Em particular, 4) uma ambiguidade que emerge no nível lógico gera duas diferentes configurações deste movimento, dependendo de se ele descreve 4.1) a relação do espirito finito ou 4.2) a relação do espirito infinito com a natureza. 5) Na última parte, mostrarei alguns problemas que derivam de minha reconstrução e tentarei sugerir – em termos gerais e programáticos – em que sentido uma análise interna da relação entre natureza e espirito em Hegel pode ser proficuamente discutida com respeito ao paradigma dominante do debate contemporâneo, isto é, o naturalismo.

Palavras-chave Hegel, Natureza, Espírito, Lógica da Essência, Naturalismo.

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ABSTRACT  In this paper I will provide a reading of the relation between nature and spirit starting from an analysis of the movement of positing and presupposing, discussed by Hegel in the “Science of Logic” in his discussion of the transition between Being and Essence. 1) I will offer an analysis of the logical context within which this dialectical movement emerges. 2) I will show the role played by this dialectical movement in determining the relation between the spheres of nature and spirit in Hegel’s “Encyclopedia”. 3) I will then claim that a difficulty related to this movement arises in the “Logic”, and that this difficulty reverberates in the relation between nature and spirit in Hegel’s system. In particular, 4) an ambiguity arising at a logical level generates two different configurations of this movement, depending on whether the latter is meant to describe the relation of 4.1) the finite or of 4.2) the infinite spirit to nature. 5) I will finally focus on some problems deriving from my reconstruction and I will try to suggest – in very general and programmatic terms – in what sense the internal analysis of the relation between nature and spirit in Hegel’s system can be fruitfully discussed against the dominant framework of the contemporary debate, i.e. naturalism. However, this suggestion does not necessarily imply an endorsement of Hegel’s position.

Keywords  Hegel, Nature, Spirit, Logic of Essence, Naturalism.

0 Introduction

The relation between nature and spirit seems to have attracted renewed interest within Hegelian studies. This new attention stems from some core issues which are considered urgent in contemporary philosophical debates (for instance: the mind-body problem, the issues of naturalism and human freedom). In particular, it is motivated by the success of Hegel’s post-Sellarsian interpretations (Pippin, Pinkard, Brandom, McDowell),¹ which are responsible for a sort of theoretical rehabilitation of Hegel’s philosophy and tend to discuss the relation between nature and spirit in terms of the relation between first nature and reason’s normativity.²

a) From a methodological standpoint, these authors tend to read the Hegelian system starting from the questions and conceptuality of a specific

¹ For an excellent analysis of the different interpretations of Hegel's philosophy developed by these authors, see Corti (2014).
² By 'first nature' I mean here nature as it is described by natural sciences; and by 'reason's normativity' I mean here the human capacity to be responsive to rational rules.
branch of the contemporary philosophical debate – this approach is indeed useful for highlighting aspects of Hegel’s thought that acquire a particular philosophical interest thanks to the framework within which they are read. 

b) From an interpretive standpoint, a common feature of these readings is the explicit rejection of the properly metaphysical dimension of Hegel’s thought. By trying to “domesticate” Hegelian rhetoric and render it fruitful in contemporary discussions, these authors avoid facing some of the most problematic and scandalous aspects of Hegel’s thought.

In this paper I will follow an opposite methodological and interpretive direction. a) I will try to provide a reading of the relation between nature and spirit from an exegetical standpoint which is more internal to Hegel’s system. b) I will maintain that Hegel’s metaphysical logic is the correct interpretive starting point in order to understand the relation between nature and spirit in his system. In particular, I will focus on the movement of *positing* and *presupposing*, analysed by Hegel in the “Science of Logic” in his discussion on the transition between Being and Essence.

I will thus proceed as follows: 1) I will offer an analysis of the logical context within which this dialectical movement emerges. 2) I will show the role played by this dialectical movement in determining the relation between the spheres of nature and spirit in Hegel’s “Encyclopedia”. 3) I will then claim that a difficulty related to this movement arises in the “Logic”, and that this difficulty reverberates in the relation between nature and spirit in Hegel’s system. In particular, 4) an ambiguity arising at a logical level generates two different configurations of this movement, depending on whether the latter is meant to describe the relation of 4.1) the finite or of 4.2) the infinite spirit to nature. 5) I will finally focus on some problems deriving from my reconstruction and I will try to suggest – in very general and programmatic terms – in what sense the internal analysis of the relation between nature and spirit in Hegel’s system can be fruitfully discussed against the dominant framework of the contemporary debate, i.e. naturalism. However, this suggestion does not necessarily imply an endorsement of Hegel’s position.

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3 For an overview on the debate between metaphysical and anti-metaphysical readings of Hegel, see Redding (2012).

4 See McDowell (1994, p. 44).
1 Positing and Presupposing in the “Science of Logic”

Within the “Science of Logic”, Hegel discusses the movement of positing (Setzen) and presupposing (Voraussetzen) in his treatment of reflection. One of Hegel’s aims in these pages is to show that reflection and immediate determinacy are not dualistically opposed, but should rather be conceived as being intimately bound by a dialectical movement that accounts for their unity. Nevertheless, this result is hidden within a very complicated speculative process taking place at the beginning of the Logic of Essence. It is therefore necessary to summarize the dialectical process described by Hegel in these pages, particularly discussing the aspects that are relevant to my interpretive purposes (realising, of course, that it would be impossible to analyse in detail every dialectic transition in the confines of this paper).

According to Hegel, Essence coincides with a negative reflective movement that exceeds the fixity and immediacy characterizing Being’s thought determinations. As opposed to mere Being, Essence is not a “positive” logical determination, a being-there, but it is the movement of negating Being’s immediacy. By negating Being’s immediacy, Essence emerges as Being’s determinate negation, i.e. Essence at first immediately negates Being. In this opposition, Being is defined as the “unessential”, namely as something which faces Essence, which is in turn defined as the “essential”. This picture, nevertheless, shows Essence to be falling back into a relation that is proper to the Logic of Being, because the “unessential” and the “essential” are only extrinsically opposed as reciprocally “other”. However, in truth, Essence is not Being’s immediate determinate negation. Rather, it is its essential negation. By negating Being, Essence makes it something “null” (nichtig). Being is not properly something “other” against Essence; it does not stand in a relation of “otherness”, but of “nothingness” (Nichtigkeit) with respect to Essence. Insofar as Being turns into Essence’s “nothingness”, Being loses its positivity and turns into something negative: “shine” (Schein).

5 Before dealing with Hegel’s treatment of the movement of positing and presupposing, I will recall Hegel’s discussion of the shine/reflection relation. This is necessary in order to support my argument in sections 3 and 4. Moreover, this reconstruction describes the scenario which will be considered as the source of the difficulty I see in Hegel’s treatment of the Natur-Geist relation.


7 This is correctly stressed by Houlgate (1999).

8 See Henrich (1978, pp. 236-238).

9 Shine (unlike the unessential) is not something merely “other” against Essence. Nevertheless shine cannot be immediately identified with Essence itself and maintains a peculiar kind of “otherness” against it. See SL, p.
Shine is defined as “all that still remains” (das ganze Rest) of Essence, “all that still remains” against Essence, its “leftover”. It should be noted, nevertheless, that this “leftover” should not be conceived of as being “outside” or externally opposed to Essence (as we have seen, that would once again be a logical movement pertaining to the sphere of Being). On the contrary, shine is something “null” with respect to Essence. While the “other”, discussed by Hegel in the Logic of Being, preserves the positive self-standing of the “something” against which it is also opposed (the “other” is a being-there characterized by an external limitation, a “negated being there”\(^{10}\)), shine is only something negative; it only has the moment of the “not-being-there” (Nichtdasein). Shine does not have any positive consistency against Essence, but it constitutively depends on Essence itself.\(^{11}\)

Essence, therefore, does not merely oppose itself to Being, but arises from within Being, so that Being passes over into Essence.\(^{12}\) At first, Essence (conceived as self-referring negativity) seems to be merely opposed to Being’s immediate positivity. Yet, Essence is not something “other” with respect to shine – and, consequently, to Being, which has determined itself as shine through the unessential. Essence is therefore “the truth” of Being, which, for its part, has to be preserved within Essence. In fact, shine (namely, Being’s nullity) determines itself as Essence’s own shine.\(^{13}\) The immediacy which characterizes shine is substantially different from Being’s immediacy, because shine is a negative immediacy, which does not have the negation and the mediation outside itself, even though the mediation is still not explicit.\(^{14}\) Thus, shine seems to be the mediation that links Being and Essence. The negative immediacy characterizing shine (qua Being’s “leftover” within Essence) is in truth Essence’s immediacy itself. Therefore Being is preserved within Essence. In this way, reflection, i.e. the movement defining Essence itself,\(^{15}\) arises in

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399: “Here, therefore, the other is not being with a negation, or limit, but negation with the negation”. On this, see Henrich (1978, p. 244). Hereafter, I will modify all Hegel’s quotes from the Miller translation of the “Science of Logic” in order to be consistent with the translation of ‘Schein’ with ‘shine’ (this translation was proposed by DiGiovanni – Miller suggests the translation of ‘Schein’ with ‘illusory being’, while Houlgate seems to prefer the term ‘seeming’). The choice among the possible English translations of the Hegelian term Schein is notoriously a very difficult one. I have opted for the term ‘shine’ because of its proximity to the original German word.

10 See SL, pp. 395-396.
11 Shine, unlike being-there, does not have a positive self-identity. See Henrich (1978, p. 240).
12 Essence arises by virtue of the unfolding of the mediation which was already present within the last thought determination of the sphere of Being, i.e. the measureless.
13 See Klotz (forthcoming).
14 See SL, pp. 397: “It is the immediacy of non-being that constitutes shine; but this non-being is nothing else but the negativity of essence present within it”. I return on the difference between Being’s and shine’s immediacy at pp. 10-11.
15 SL, p. 399: “Essence in this its self-movement is reflection”.

continuity with the logical structure of shine. Reflection emerges, specifically, as the unfolding of the mediation present only in itself within shine.\footnote{Reflection is the movement resulting from the unfolding of the structure of shine. See SL, p. 399: “Shine is the same thing as reflection; but it is reflection as immediate. For shine that has withdrawn into itself and so is estranged from its immediacy, we have the foreign word reflection”.
} Thus, reflection emerges \textit{from} and, at the same time, \textit{within} shine, the latter being conceived as reflected immediacy. Reflection results at first as the liberation (within shine itself) of mediation from immediacy. Reflection is defined here as “shine that has withdrawn into itself and so is estranged from its immediacy”.\footnote{SL, p. 399.}
Reflection, in its first and immediate configuration, results in a movement that does not start from something positive, but from a “nullity” (i.e. from shine). This movement gains subsistence only by negating the negative \textit{qua} negative (i.e. only by negating shine).

Starting from the definition of reflection as the movement of negating the negative, the dialectic of \textit{positing} and \textit{presupposing} plays the role of mediating the relation between the abstract and empty reflection of Essence within itself, and the positivity of Being, which has to be sublated within the reflection of Essence. Firstly (1. \textit{Positing Reflection}), Essence is the reflective movement of negating the negative. This negative is shine conceived of as what has been \textit{posited} by Essence within itself;\footnote{See Henrich (1978, p. 238), my translation: ‘Positedness’ (Gesetzsein) is Hegel's antonym for ‘being-in-itself’ (Ansichsein) and is distinguished from this thought by two properties: (a) What is posited, is not self-standing; (b) moreover, it must be thought as standing in relations of determinacy (Bestimmtheitsverhältnissen), unlike what has being in itself in an undifferentiated way. These properties are not independent. For, precisely because what is in itself does not stand in relation to other, it can be the indetermined. Already from this definitions follows that the simple immediacy cannot be conceived of as posited immediacy.}
shine \textit{qua} something \textit{posited} is not the “other” of Essence, but it is the \textit{presupposing} of Essence itself. Secondly (2. \textit{External Reflection}), Essence \textit{presupposes} an immediate, external, and positive being-there as the starting point of its reflective movement.\footnote{See SL, p. 403: “External reflection therefore \textit{presupposes} a being, \textit{first}, not in the sense that its immediacy is only positedness or a moment, but, on the contrary, that this immediacy is self-relation and the determinateness is only a moment”. Henrich (1978) does not seem to interpret the “other” which arises in external reflection as a being-there. He rather suggests conceiving of it as a self-reflection and duplication of Essence itself, even though he admits that the dialectical transition from \textit{positing} reflection to external reflection is far from been clear – see Henrich (1978, p. 291).}
Thirdly (3. \textit{Determining Reflection}), Essence mediates the first two moments – i.e., the reflection as negation of the \textit{negative posited} by reflection itself, on the one hand, and the \textit{positive presupposition} constituted by the immediate being-there of external reflection, on the other hand – so that they do not constitute two dualistically opposing sides, but only moments of a complex process, in which their independence subsists together with their relation.\footnote{It should be noted, that determining reflection is not supposed to account in a definitive way for the relation between Being and Essence. This relation can be properly understood by starting from the structure of the.
2 Positing and Presupposing in the Relation between Nature and Spirit

This complex dialectical movement is at work in determining the relation between nature and spirit. By making this statement, I do not mean to draw a rigid parallelism between the logical sphere of Being and nature, on the one hand, and between the logical sphere of Essence and spirit, on the other hand – i.e., I do not argue for an identification tout-court of the sphere of Being with nature and of the sphere of Essence with spirit. Nevertheless, there are several passages which confirm that Hegel thought about the logical dialectic of positing and presupposing when discussing the relation between nature and spirit.

Yet, to what extent does this dialectical movement play a role in determining the relation between nature and spirit? In the Introduction to the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit called “Concept of Spirit” Hegel explicitly recalls the terms of the logical transition from Being to Essence.

Revelation, as the revelation of the abstract Idea, is the unmediated transition, the becoming, of nature. As the revelation of spirit, which is free, it is the positing of nature as its world; but because this positing is reflection, it is at the same time the presupposition of the world as independent nature. Revelation in the concept is creation of nature as its being, in which the spirit procures the affirmation and truth of its freedom.

Spirit, like Essence, is not something positive, a being-there, a thing (Ding) dualistically opposed to nature. Rather, it is only a negative and reflexive movement, which subsists only insofar as it negates nature as its own negative. Only insofar as it negates nature as its own negative, spirit is the Idea-for-itself, namely the Idea returned within itself from the externality of nature:

Concept, discussed by Hegel in the Subjective Logic (see Klotz, forthcoming). I maintain, however, that within the transition from Being to Essence a problem arises, which represents a difficulty for Hegel’s solution.

This is also convincingly claimed by Quante (2002).

The issue of the relation between the thought determinations of the logic and the concrete structures of reality (nature and spirit) has been recognized as “maybe the most important among the many” problems of Hegel’s philosophy – see Henrich (1978, p. 312 in particular fn. 34). The question concerning the justification of the different combinations of logical determinations that are deployed by Hegel to explain the concrete structures of nature and of spirit remains open, since the way in which they figure into the Realphilosophie does not correspond to the order in which they appear in the logic.

Hereafter, the German word ‘Geist’ will be translated as ‘spirit’ instead of ‘mind’ (pace Inwood in his revised translation).

ES, § 384, p. 18.

See ES, § 389, Anmerkung, p. 29.

By ‘Idea-for-itself’ Hegel means spirit as a level of reality characterized by a form of self-relation which is qualitatively different and more adequate with respect to the forms of self-relation taking place within the sphere of nature. Also within spirit there is a hierarchy of forms of self-relation which are discussed according to increasing levels of adequacy.
For us spirit has nature as its presupposition, though spirit is the truth of nature, and is thus absolutely first with respect to it. In this truth [in spirit, FS] nature has vanished, and spirit has emerged as the Idea that has reached its being-for-self [...]. This identity is absolute negativity, since in nature the concept has its complete, external objectivity, but this externalization of the concept has been sublated and the concept has, in this externalization, become identical with itself. And so the concept is this identity only so far as it is at the same time a return out of nature.  

Some further clarification is necessary here.  

These passages show that the relation between nature and spirit does not take place merely between two terms (nature and spirit), but includes as its protagonist the Idea, qua absolute ontological structure of reality, which manifests itself according to these two forms. The relation between nature and spirit takes place against the background of the Idea (i.e., the absolute revelation). According to Hegel, it is only by taking into account this broader background that it can be possible to adequately understand spirit’s relation to nature.  

In particular, in the first passage, Hegel seems to speak of a twofold revelation. From the perspective of the abstract Idea, nature is an unmediated revelation. It is the unmediated manifestation of nature qua “complete, external objectivity”. From the perspective of spirit, nature is, at the same time, both a presupposition and a positing of spirit.  

However, as I shall argue (see section 4), there is more to be said about the revelation from the perspective of spirit. As a matter of fact, I shall claim that the perspective of spirit on nature is itself twofold and, therefore, that there are three perspectives which must be taken into account. First, there is the unmediated revelation of the abstract Idea, which manifests itself in nature (apparently) without spirit playing a role in this revelation. Second, there is the perspective of finite spirit on nature (as I will claim in section 4.1) according to which spirit finds nature as a pre-existing, presupposed world, and posits it as its own world. Third, there is the perspective of absolute spirit, which is not explicitly mentioned in the quoted passages and coincides with the perspective of the Idea in-and-for-itself. As I will claim in section 4.2, according to this perspective, infinite spirit presupposes itself qua nature and recognizes itself as the positing agent of nature.  

According to this analysis, the perspective of finite spirit seems therefore to mediate between the revelation of the abstract Idea and the perspective of infinite spirit (i.e., the perspective of the Idea in-and-for-itself). It accounts for the transition from a merely presupposed nature – qua result of the revelation

27 ES, § 381, p. 9.  
28 For a detailed exegesis of both this passage and the one quoted below, see Quante (2002, 2004).  
29 ES, § 381, p. 9.
of the abstract Idea – to the perspective of absolute spirit, which conceives of itself as the positing agent of nature.

I will problematize the consistency of these three perspectives in sections 3 and 4 as well as in the conclusions.

For the moment, what must be stressed is that these perspectives are interrelated. In particular, Hegel seems to hold that the absolute Idea, manifesting itself in nature and spirit, mediates the relation from nature to spirit in both directions according to the movement of positing and presupposing: from presupposed nature to spirit and from positing spirit to nature. Hegel invites us to think of these two movements as identical, as moments in the “absolute process” which is unifying them:

The absolute process has two opposing directions in itself: one inside out, one outside in. These two streams penetrate one another, their recoil is only shine [italics mine, FS]. This is one and the same, eternal activity. Finding a world before oneself is the one side, the other side is that spirit produces the world as something posited by spirit itself. Both movements, FS are one and the same.

The two directions of the mediating relation between nature and spirit are therefore represented by the movements of positing and presupposing. In the “Logic”, on the one hand, the reflection of Essence posits Being as something null, as shine (1. Positing Reflection); on the other hand the reflection of Essence arises as negation of a positive, presupposed being-there (2. External Reflection). Similarly, the transition from nature to spirit must be understood as a double movement: on the one hand, spirit seems both to posit external nature as something null and to reflect in itself starting from this position; on the other hand spirit seems to arise as negation of the positive and presupposed immediacy of nature, as negation of a pre-existent, independent and external world, which is the result of the revelation of the abstract Idea.

3 A Difficulty Concerning the Logical Movement of Positing and Presupposing and Its Consequences on the Relation between Nature and Spirit

So far, I have maintained that the relation between nature and spirit is adequately understood when read in the broader context of the structure of the Idea (whose manifestations are nature and spirit), and that Hegel invites us to think

30 Moreover, it is necessary to think of the mediation of the Idea as being mediated by the perspective of spirit. This should, according to Hegel, avoid any risk of foundationalism. For more on this, see Houlgate (1999).

31 VPṣG 1825, p. 204, my translation. DiGiovanni, in his translation of the “Science of Logic”, suggests the translation of ‘Gegenstoss’ as either ‘counter-repelling’ or ‘rebound’.
of this mediation as the unity of the movements of **positing** and **presupposing**, discussed in the “Science of Logic” in the transition from Being to Essence. My claim is that an ambiguity arises within this specific logical context, which has decisive repercussions on the relation between the spheres of nature and spirit.

In the first moment of reflection (1. **Positing Reflection**) Being *qua* shine is not a positive determination, against which Essence would be the immediately determinate negation. Rather, Being *qua* shine is only a reverberation of the reflective movement of Essence. In the second moment of reflection (2. **External Reflection**), on the contrary, being-there arises again as a positive presupposition – this positive presupposition stands over against reflection, which finds it as a mere given. According to Hegel, 1) the negative positedness (namely, shine *qua* shine of Essence discussed within **positing** reflection) and 2) the positive, presupposed being-there treated within external reflection are sublated in 3) determinate being as positive positedness. Thus, determinate being would mediate between the sheer negativity of **positing** reflection (which *posits* only a mere shine, a nullity within itself) and the positive, immediate being-there that figures as the **presupposition** of external reflection.

Determining reflection is in general the unity of **positing** and external reflection. This is to be considered in more detail [...]. Determinate being is merely posited being or positedness; this is the principle expressing essence about determinate being. Positedness stands opposed, on the one hand, to determinate being, and on the other, to essence, and is to be considered as the middle term which unites determinate being with essence, and conversely, essence with determinate being. Nevertheless, given this context, it seems to me problematic to dialectically identify and sublate both 1) shine as negative positedness and 2) being-there as positive presupposition of Essence itself into 3) posited determinate being. How could posited determinate being and further thought determinations account for the mediation and sublation of the nullity of shine and the positivity of being-there against reflection?

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32 **Positing** and **presupposing** are conceived here like an internal “recoil” (Gegenstoss) within the reflexive movement of Essence itself. This “recoil” can take place only insofar as the two sides of it are negative terms that reciprocally negate and identify with each other.

33 It is worth noting that what I call here ‘determinate being’ must be distinguished from the immediate Dasein of the Logic of Being, insofar as ‘determinate being’ is now a determinacy which is mediated by a reflection within itself and is something posited.

34 SL, pp. 405-406, translation modified. I wish to emphasize that determining reflection is not meant to justify in a definitive way the unity of Being and Essence (see supra, fn.20).

35 Houlgate (2011, p. 146) seems to admit a priority of Essence’s **positing** activity above the external, positive presupposition arising within external reflection.

36 Christian Klotz (forthcoming) interprets posited determinate being of determinate reflection as a “second-order externality”, which is not a mere immediacy “against” reflection like the presupposed being-there of external reflection (interpreted in turns as “first-order externality”). According to Klotz, the “second-order externality”
This tension between positive immediacy and negative positedness seems to be closely connected to the difficulty concerning the relation between nature and spirit. At the logical level, there is a contradiction between shine qua negative positedness of Essence (in 1. Positing Reflection) and the presupposed, positive being-there standing against Essence (in 2. External Reflection). Similarly, there is a contradiction in the Realphilosophie between nature qua negative positedness of spirit and nature as a positive presupposition of spirit.

On the one hand, nature is described as something having an independent subsistence (like the presupposed being-there in external reflection): “Nature is the negative of its own Idea [...]; it is what is external to itself. Even if spirit was not there, nature would still be what it is; it is for itself.”

On the other hand, nature is described as something negative, which subsists only insofar as it is posited by spirit (like shine, which is posited by positing reflection): “Its [Nature’s, FS] characteristic is positedness, the negative, in the same way that the ancients grasped matter in general as the non-ens.”

What is this ambiguity rooted in? At the logical level, the ambiguity originates before Hegel’s treatment of 1. Positing Reflection and 2. External Reflection. The ambiguity arises when Being, which is at first merely opposed to Essence, is identified with the shine of Essence itself (Schein des Wesens). In other words, I maintain that the ambiguity is rooted in the very concept of Schein itself, which opens the path to the three forms of reflection. Hegel actually identifies in his concept of shine the positive immediacy of Being qua “all that still remains” against Essence, on the one hand, and the negative immediacy of Essence itself, on the other. The problematic character of these passages has been effectively highlighted by D. Henrich:

If we permit ourselves a discourse which is not protected by formal-ontologic definitions, then we can say that shine, though already absolutely sublated, has a side which does not depend on Essence [...]. If we ask on behalf of what we can make understandable the will be sublated only in the Logic of Concept. My paper aims at problematizing Hegel’s attempt to account for a coherent transformation of the “first-order immediacy” into a kind of “second-order immediacy”. This problematization concerns the concept of Schein at the beginning of the Logic of Essence – see pp. 10-12.

37 VPhN 1819/20, pp. 27-28, my translation. See also ES, § 381, Zusatz, p. 10.
38 EN, § 248, Anmerkung, p. 17. See also EN, § 248, Zusatz, p. 19: “Nature is the negative because it is the negative of the Idea”; and EN, § 376, Zusatz, p. 444: “True, Nature is the immediate – but even so, as the other of spirit, its existence is a relativity: and so, as the negative, its being is only posited, derivative. It is the power of free spirit which sublates this negativity: spirit is no less before than after Nature, it is not merely the metaphysical Idea of it. Spirit, just because it is the goal of Nature, is prior to it, Nature has proceeded from spirit: not empirically, however, but in such a manner that spirit is already from the very first implicitly present in Nature which is spirit’s own presupposition”.
39 See SL, p. 393: “The shine, however, is essence’s own positing”. What I am urging here is that the self-problematization of the concept of Schein taking place at the beginning of the Logic of Essence is itself problematic.
According to Henrich, the concept of shine carries out the transformation (Umformulierung) – within the Logic of Essence – of what otherness is in the sphere of Being. In the sphere of Being otherness is linked to the positiveness of being-there. However, this cannot apply to shine, which is a not-being-there (Nichtdasein). Henrich sees here a “shift of meaning” (Bedeutungsverschiebung) from the immediacy of Being qua “leftover” of Essence to the immediacy of Essence qua shine. This shift should justifize – if I understand Henrich correctly – the preservation within and the translation of the “content” of Being in terms of negative immediacy of shine, which in turn depends on Essence itself. “When the apparently simple immediacy of shine (U1) is interpreted starting from the reflected immediacy of Essence (U2), then it can be claimed that it is justifiable to shift the meaning of the immediacy of Being to the meaning of the immediacy of Essence.”

By virtue of this “shift of meaning” (Bedeutungsverschiebung), the 1. negative positedness of Essence and 2. the positive being-there presupposed by Essence can be related and mediated by further thought determinations. In particular, it is the “first immediacy” of shine (qua “all that still remains” of Being, which is to some extent still opposed to Essence) that arises again in external reflection as external presupposition. Without this “shift of meaning”

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41 See Henrich (1978, p. 240), my translation: “Therefore, Hegel must carry on the transformation of the logic of the other into the logic of shine and he must bring into it also the second moment of the otherness, namely immediacy. Since the conditions under which the examination began exclude that immediacy stands in contraposition to the relation to other, immediacy can be introduced into the definition of shine only under the presupposition of an unrestricted and fundamental characterization of shine as not-being-there. In other words, shine can have immediacy only in precisely the same relation in which it is also not-being-there”.
42 Henrich (1978, p. 248), my translation. See also pp. 266, 280-281, 282. Henrich (1978, pp. 248 and 317) considers this Bedeutungsverschiebung as “exhibited” (aufgewiesen) but not as logically “warranted” (bewiesen). Henrich maintains that this Bedeutungsverschiebung is necessary in order for the logical process to progress.
and preliminary identification between immediacy of Being and shine of Essence (which takes place in the sections on “The Essential and the Unessential” and on “Shine”) the re-emergence of being-there as presupposed by external reflection would not be possible.

If we recognize this dialectical movement in the transition from nature to spirit, a difficulty arises when this “shift of meaning” concerns the issue of the relation between positive givenness of nature and reflexive, negative movement of spirit. The result would be that the determinacy of nature, insofar as negative immediacy, is always already sublated (Henrich would say “suspended”43) within spirit itself, and subsists only insofar as it is negated by spirit as something negative. Still, how are we to understand the immediacy of the determinacy of nature with respect to spirit, if this immediacy – by virtue of the parallelism between the determinacy of nature and shine – is a negative immediacy which is always already mediated, dependent and comprehended within spirit itself? More specifically, how can we conceive of nature both as presupposition and, at the same time, as reflected immediacy?

As I have previously suggested (see quote p. 8 and fn. 31), Hegel aims at reconstructing a complex movement that leads from nature to spirit and from spirit to nature, and invites us to think of the encounter of these two movements, their “recoil” (Gegenstoss), as a “mere shine” (nur Schein). Nevertheless, according to the analysis I have put forward, shine has a twofold connotation, and the “recoil”, which takes place in it, is resolved by a “shift of meaning”. This has important consequences at a systematic level. Shine consisting in the being-there of nature (i.e. the “first immediacy” – or “spirit’s leftover”) seems to be always already sublated and identified with shine of spirit (i.e. the “second immediacy”). The “recoil” between natural and spiritual determinacy is “mere shine” (nur Schein) because this “recoil” results in a “shift of meaning” leading toward a concept of shine depending on spirit itself.

4 Finite and Infinite Spirit

By virtue of the analogy with the transition from Being to Essence, I have tried to show that the “recoil” between the two opposing directions defining the relation between nature and spirit can be downgraded to a mere shine only if we conceive of shine, in its technical meaning, as shine of spirit (i.e. as something posited and depending on spirit). The “recoil” between nature and

spirit is not symmetrical; nature and spirit are not equivalent. In all actuality, the *positing* of nature by spirit seems to hold a primacy over the standpoint according to which nature is something positive, given, and *presupposed* by spirit itself.\(^{44}\) I will support my claim by looking at the distinction between finite and infinite spirit and their respective relations to nature. By analysing this distinction we can see how Hegel transforms the *presupposition* of nature as something “other” and pre-existent to spirit into a *self-presupposition* of spirit itself, which *presupposes itself qua* nature. This movement coincides with the transition from the perspective of finite spirit to the perspective of infinite spirit on nature (see above, section 2).

4.1 Finite Spirit

According to Hegel, the finite way of conceiving the relation between nature and spirit coincides with a form of external reflection. This is the standpoint of the “*for us*” (§ 381), namely the standpoint of finite spirit.\(^{45}\) Finite spirit considers nature as a given, a positive, external, and *presupposed* being-there, which spirit immediately finds as its “other”. Thus, finite spirit finds a *presupposed* world that is independent from the external subjective reflection of spirit itself. For finite spirit, nature is not a result of spirit’s creation or *positing*, but is found as a pre-existent world. Nevertheless, this standpoint is one-sided and untrue (*unwahr*). Finite spirit does not yet acknowledge that nature (which spirit interprets as its own “other”) is rather a sort of self-alienation of infinite spirit.\(^{46}\) “[N]ature is, therefore, not yet comprehended as subsisting only through infinite spirit, as its creation. Here, consequently, spirit still has in nature a limitation and by this very limitation is finite spirit.”\(^{47}\)

4.2 Infinite Spirit

According to the “true” standpoint on the relation between nature and spirit, spirit neither genetically emerges from natural stages nor does it relate itself to a *presupposed* external otherness. Rather it is the *primum* presupposing itself in its own inferior moments. These inferior moments, in turn, constitute

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\(^{44}\) In the relation between nature and spirit there is no “recoil” (*Gegenstoss*) between them. This implies an asymmetry between nature and spirit qua manifestations of the Idea: only spirit *posits* and *presupposes* nature.

\(^{45}\) See *ES*, § 381, p. 86: “*For us* spirit has *nature* as its *presupposition*, though spirit is the *truth* of nature, and is thus *absolutely first* with respect to it”. I agree with Quante (2004, pp. 83-85), who identifies this perspective of the “*for us*” with the perspective of the external reflection and not – as Peperzak (2001, p. 122) does – with the perspective of the writer (or the reader) of the “Encyclopaedia”.

\(^{46}\) See *ES*, § 384, *Zusatz*, p. 19: “The awakening spirit does not yet recognize here its unity with the spirit that is in itself, hidden in nature, it stands, therefore, in external relation to nature, it does not appear as all in all, but only as one side of the relationship [...]”.

the stages of its own coming-to-itself. These lower stages, insofar as they are presuppositions of infinite, absolute spirit, are not external presuppositions that would be merely found. Rather, they turn out to be moments posited by infinite spirit as self-presuppositions of itself (i.e., they are not an external presupposition of something “other” and pre-existent). An example of this relation is offered in the Zusatz to the § 381 of the “Encyclopedia”:

[I]t is already evident from our discussion so far that the emergence of spirit from nature must not be conceived as if nature were the absolutely immediate, the first, the original positing agent, while spirit, by contrast, were only something posited by nature; it is rather nature that is posited by spirit, and spirit is what is absolutely first. Spirit that is in and for itself is not the mere result of nature, but is in truth its own result; it brings itself forth from the presuppositions that it makes for itself, from the logical Idea and external nature, and is the truth of the logical Idea as well as of nature, i.e. the true shape of the spirit that is only within itself, and of the spirit that is only outside itself.48

According to this perspective, the natural outer world is not an external presupposition consisting of a pre-existent reality, but a self-presupposition – in the form of externality – of absolute spirit itself. According to this view, nature loses its meaning as an external, positive, and given presupposition and is instead considered to be a self-presupposition (qua outer world) of spirit itself, so that spirit can become identical with itself through double negativity.49 However, in this way, nature – as well as shine in the “Logic” – is treated as something “null”, negative, and posited by spirit. The “truth” of the relation between nature and spirit is not the external reflection of finite spirit, which refers to nature as to a given and presupposed outer world. This perspective is sublated by the self-presupposition of absolute spirit qua external natural world and qua finite spirit. Nature, therefore, does not seem to be a positive and original givenness, but a self-presupposition, a shine, of absolute spirit. The finite standpoint on spirit’s relation to nature is also, in turn, a moment that must be sublated into the transparent self-referential totality of infinite, absolute spirit, which seems to be the sole protagonist of this whole story.50 “The shine of spirit’s being mediated by an Other is sublated by spirit itself, since spirit has, so to speak, the sovereign ingratitude of sublating, of mediatizing, that by which it seems

48 ES, § 381, Zusatz, pp. 14-15. See also VPsG 1825, pp. 166-167 and p. 176, my translation: “This immediacy of nature is a false immediacy, a false first [term, FS], spirit itself is the positing, but also the sublating, of this shine”.
49 My claim here is that spirit can sublate and “preserve” nature within itself through the movement of negating the negative only if this negative (nature) is conceived of as self-presupposition of spirit itself.
50 ES, § 384, Zusatz, p. 99: “At this stage the dualism disappears, of, on the one hand, a self-subsistent nature or spirit poured out into a sunderness, and, on the other hand, the spirit that is first beginning to become for itself but does not yet comprehend its unity with the spirit in nature”.

to be mediated, of reducing it to something subsisting only through spirit and in this way making itself completely independent.51

Once spirit – by sublating the stages of its own finitude – attains self-knowledge, it acknowledges that nature is only something posited by spirit itself. If we interpret what Hegel asserts in a radical way, it seems that absolute spirit “creates” (even though this creation must not be understood in religious terms) nature and finite spirit.

Absolute spirit recognises itself as positing being itself, as itself producing its Other, nature and finite spirit, so that this Other loses all shine of independence in face of spirit, ceases altogether to be a limitation for spirit and appears only as the means which spirit attains to absolute being-for-itself, to the absolute unity of its being-in-itself and its being-for-itself, of its concept and its actuality.52

Thus, there is no symmetry between nature and spirit, nor does spirit emerge from nature.53 Spirit does not result from nature, but is rather “the result of itself”. The “truth” of the relation between nature and spirit, far from being a neutral dissolution of the opposition, seems to be conceived of as free positing achieved by absolute spirit. Spirit presupposes the outer world as something independent and given only at the level of finite reflection. However, spirit is actually the “creator” of nature as its own world.54 Far from emerging from nature, absolute spirit is said to “judge” itself, more specifically, it divides itself into nature and finite spirit.

If this reconstruction is persuasive, nature has a problematic status with respect to spirit. In the “Ways of Considering Nature”, Hegel aptly highlights the difficulty in determining what nature is: “What is Nature? [...] Nature confronts us as a riddle and a problem, whose solution both attracts and repels us: attracts us, because Spirit is presaged in Nature; repels us, because Nature seems an alien existence, in which Spirit does not find itself.”55

51 ES, § 381, Zusatz, p. 15. See also EL, § 239, Zusatz, p. 306: “It is only for that consciousness which is itself immediate that nature comes first or immediately, while spirit is mediated by it. For, in fact, nature is posited by spirit, and it is spirit itself that makes nature into its presupposition”.


53 See, for instance, VPsG 1825, p. 175, where Hegel discusses the transition from nature to spirit as follows – my translation: “This point of the transition, this standpoint is for itself one-sided, in general if it is taken only as it has just been expressed it is even false, and it can induce the misunderstanding that spirit is taken as the product of nature, as it is often happened to regard it, so that what is material, sensible, natural is claimed to be the only thing which is true, real, while spirit is seen as a combination, an aggregate of natural activities, forces etc., so that, when these natural activities and forces refine themselves until a certain degree, what is spiritual (das Geistige), consciousness, would arise”.

54 ES, § 384, p. 18.

55 EN, p. 3.
On the one hand, we have seen that nature should be conceived of neither as something positive and prior with respect to spirit, nor as something deserving of the same degree of ontological self-sufficiency as spirit. On the other hand, nature cannot be completely dissolved into something negative, into something “null” (nichtig) without the risk of having nature “vanish” into spirit itself. If nature is nothing but a self-presupposition of spirit, how can nature constitute a limit for spirit and make it passive? Nature should preserve an independent and positive existence against spirit. It is only by virtue of this “positive” existence that nature – insofar as it is external reality in actu – can exercise a constraint and represent a sort of otherness with respect to spirit. Nevertheless, the reading in which nature is given to spirit as something immediate and positive is sublated and subordinated to the reading in which spirit (in its absolute dimension) presupposes itself as nature qua its own negative, in order to negate this self-presupposition and come to itself as double negation.

5 Conclusions

The present reconstruction generates three main problems and at the same time offers a challenging and provocative perspective on the relation between nature and spirit.

1) The first problem seems to be a difficulty which can be regarded as being internal to Hegel’s thought (i.e. it should have been recognized as a problem by Hegel himself). This problem concerns the “shift of meaning” (Bedeutungsverschiebung) from the positive immediacy to the negative immediacy that takes place within the concept of shine and introduces Hegel’s logical treatment of reflection. This shift has been recognized as being relevant to our understanding of the puzzling status of nature within the system. Indeed, nature is conceived, in one sense, as a mind-independent outer world, and in another as a self-presupposition of absolute spirit. This ambiguity reflects the difficulty of combining two different Hegelian ambitions. The first being his desire to avoid the charge of subjective idealism, which is motivated by denying nature an independent ontological status. The second is to give an account of nature, according to which nature can be considered as rational and not opaque to spirit. The Hegelian demand of conceiving the two explicative directions (from nature to spirit and from spirit to nature) as identical seems to be not consistently pursued in Hegel’s texts. In fact, it has been shown that there is no equivalence between these two drives – or an equivalence between the two directions of the same process. The movement described as spirit’s self-presupposition qua nature is prior to, and tends to swallow up, the image of spirit emerging from nature.
2) The second problem sounds more like a controversial thesis for the contemporary debate and can be regarded as external to Hegel’s thought (i.e. Hegel would not have considered it as a problem). This issue concerns the ontological and explicative primacy of the metaphysical logic with respect to the relation between nature and spirit. In my view, Hegel is committed to the thesis that the Logic’s thought determinations are not determinations of a merely subjective or intersubjective reason. Rather, they coincide with the rational constitution of reality. According to this view, the Logic’s thought determinations are ontological determinations, which are embodied in nature and spirit, and determine the relation between the two. This ontological and explicative primacy of the Logic can be seen as controversial in our (at least to a certain extent alleged) “post-metaphysical” time.

3) As a matter of fact, a related issue concerns the relation between Hegel’s metaphysics and his philosophy of subjective spirit, as well as the distinction between finite and infinite spirit. How should we understand the relation between finite spirit and spirit that is infinite and absolute? How is it possible that finite spirit achieves an “absolute” point of view on reality, and still manages to avoid both subjectivistic and relativistic drifts as well as the appeal to a “divine” metaphysical reality pre-existing the individual activity of thinking of subjects?56

These problems are rooted in the heart of Hegel’s thought and cannot be discussed without providing a global interpretation of his philosophy. Nevertheless, even avoiding an attempt at a detailed global interpretation of Hegel’s thought or an interpretive posture which considers Hegel’s philosophy as deserving a mere “historical interest”, it is still possible for one to consider what the theoretically interesting aspect stemming from this reconstruction of the relation between nature and spirit in Hegel’s system can be. It goes beyond the limits of this paper to provide a discussion of the post-Sellarsian interpretations of Hegel (Pippin, Pinkard, McDowell, Brandom) on the relation between nature and spirit, let alone to contextualize Hegel’s account within the contemporary debate on this topic – these tasks require separate contributions. It is nevertheless possible to stress a more general and fundamental idea that can be challenging due to the fact that it goes against the flow of the contemporary debate, i.e. naturalism. This fundamental idea regards the approach to the question of the nature/spirit relation.

56 See Taylor (1975, in particular pp. 76-127). For a clear and persuasive reconstruction of the dilemma implicit in the relation between the finite and the absolute dimension of thought, see the last pages of Ferrarin (forthcoming). In particular, Ferrarin highlights an aporia deriving from the attempt to make consistent the three perspectives I have analyzed in section 2, p. 7.

Starting from the asymmetry between nature and spirit that I have outlined above, Hegel’s task is not that of integrating spirit into a certain picture of nature – which would be considered as primitive with respect to spirit itself. Indeed, the asymmetry of the relation between nature and spirit implies the primacy of the latter – nature never posits spirit! On the contrary, nature can be justified and comprehended only by starting from infinite spirit. Fundamentally, the problem seems to be the opposite one, namely trying to describe a consistent notion of nature starting from the axiological priority of self-knowing absolute spirit. In other words, the core issue is not to justify the emergence of spirit from nature or to succeed in making sense of how spirit fits into a natural world, which is considered more fundamental. Rather, the core issue is to elaborate an understanding of nature as the “other” of spirit, while avoiding both the radicalization of this otherness and the absorption of this otherness by spirit itself.

What strikes me as interesting is that most of the contemporary attempts to conceive of the relation between nature and spirit (including some attempts of rehabilitating Hegel) move in the opposite direction. That is to say, they try to make plausible the emergence of spirit from nature or, at least, the compatibility of the spiritual levels with respect to nature, which remains ontologically and chronologically prior. I think that the origins of this approach are rooted in the great influence of evolutionary theory on our contemporary world-view and into a sort of scientistic and physicalistic tendency dominating our epoch. In Hegel’s philosophy, on the contrary, there is neither such thing as a “gravitational attraction” toward a naturalistic monism, nor an ontological primacy of the physicalistic and naturalistic dimension. Once again, the problem is not how to understand spirit on the basis of the prior presupposition of nature or to understand how spirit can fit into a natural horizon. On the contrary, the problem is how to understand nature as mind-independent and, at the same time, permeable (if not always already permeated) by the activity of spirit, starting from the prior axiological standpoint of spirit’s self-knowledge.

If my reconstruction makes sense, I have shown how Hegel’s enterprise runs into internal difficulties. Nevertheless Hegel’s analysis can produce the

58 See ES, § 388, 29: “Spirit has come into being as the truth of nature as the truth of nature. In the idea in general this result has the meaning of the truth and of what is prior, rather than posterior, as compared with what precedes it.”

59 An interesting debate about the possibility of interpreting Hegel’s system according to the framework of liberal naturalism is currently taking place (for an overview of the debate on the naturalistic readings of Hegel, see Bar (2016)) – this debate focuses also on the connection between liberal naturalism and anti-metaphysical readings of Hegel: see Stone (2005), Gardner (2007), Papazoglou (2012; 2015), Giladi (2014). Gardner argues for a metaphysical and anti-naturalistic reading of Hegel, Papazoglou defends a non-metaphysical, anti-naturalistic reading, while Stone and Giladi defend a metaphysical and liberal-naturalistic interpretation.

60 See in particular Pinkard (2012) and Testa (2010).
effect of calling into question some of the implicit assumptions characterizing
our contemporary attitude toward the relation between nature and spirit and to
invite us to reflect critically on them.

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