This issue of *Manuscrito* is devoted to some of the central topics in contemporary epistemology. Its ten papers are a mixture of invited contributions and contributions that answered to a worldwide call for papers. There are three invited papers. In ‘Knowledge as fact-tracking true belief,’ Fred Adams, John A. Barker, and Murray Clarke update the tracking theory of knowledge, originally made famous by Fred Dretske and Robert Nozick. In their piece the authors offer an account of recent cases allegedly involving knowledge deduced from false premises (aka ‘knowledge from falsehood cases’). They also offer direct replies to recent purported counterexamples to sensitivity analyses of knowledge. To top it all off, they rest their sensitivity condition on a Relevance Logic account of counterfactuals, alleging that it improves on the usual Lewisian/Stalnakerian account of those constructions. The second invited paper, Clayton Littlejohn’s ‘Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment,’ argues that a form of fallibilism (one that lets pragmatic factors determine whether a subject knows) is guilty of the very defect her proponent tries to pin on the infallibilist -- skepticism. Littlejohn's contention is that we are not likely to notice this consequence of fallibilism if we focus too much on cases in which practical stakes are high. By focusing on cases of low practical stakes Littlejohn aims to show that the form of fallibilism he is discussing faces the threat of skepticism. The third and last invited paper, ‘Assertion and Its Many Norms,’ by John N. Williams, argues for a new account of the propriety of assertions. He does so by arguing against the most prominent rival account of that act, the knowledge account, and by arguing that his account performs better at the normative tasks its main rival fails. According to Williams, the knowledge account's claim that knowledge uniquely governs assertion is ultimately unsupported, rendering it mysterious why breaking the knowledge norm would necessitate criticism of the speaker who breaks this norm. For Williams, assertion is a game governed by different rules and in which criticism for breaking those rules is a matter of practical rationality.

In ‘Omniscience and Semantic Information,’ Bernardo Alonso tackles the problem of logical omniscience for epistemic logic. He argues that we should feel hopeful that this problem can be appropriately dealt with. Charles Coutê-Bouchard’s paper, ‘Epistemological closed questions: A reply to Greco,’ disputes a recent argument put forward by Daniel Greco that says that epistemic questions are just as open as questions in ethics (G.E. Moore had famously argued that
moral questions are open). Coutê-Bouchard convincingly shows that Greco’s argument expanding Moore’s challenge to the epistemological domain does not work. ‘Epistemic Internalism and Knowledge-Relevant Anti-Individualist Responsibility,’ by Leandro de Brasi, argues for an original form of epistemic internalism according to which our pervasive epistemic interdependence produces the need for a reformulation of internalism in anti-individualistic terms. The influential propositional/doxastic justification distinction and the prospect of an infinitist account of this distinction are the focus of Tito Flore’s ‘Propositional Justification and Infinitism.’ According to him, propositional justification does not implies doxastic justification and infinitism is, primarily, a theory of propositional justification. In ‘Phenomenal Conservatism and the Demand for Metajustification,’ Rogel Oliveira argues that Michael Huemer’s theory of justification -- phenomenal conservatism -- cannot meet the demands of metajustification and, therefore, that the view lacks rational support. Lastly (but not least!), Breno Andrade Zuppolini reviews David Bronstein’s book *Aristotle on Knowledge and Learning*.

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